Observations made in past earthquakes, in New Zealand and around the world, have highlighted the vulnerability of non-structural elements such as facades, ceilings, partitions and services. Damage to these elements can be life-threatening or jeopardise egress routes but typically, the main concern is the cost and time associated with repair works. The Insurance Council of New Zealand highlighted the substantial economic losses in recent earthquakes due to poor performance of non-structural elements. Previous inspections and research have attributed the damage to non-structural elements principally to poor coordination, inadequate or lack of seismic restraints and insufficient clearances to cater for seismic actions. Secondary issues of design responsibility, procurement and the need for better alignment of the various Standards have been identified. In addition to the compliance issues, researchers have also demonstrated that current code provisions for non-structural elements, both in New Zealand and abroad, may be inadequate. This paper first reviews the damage observed against the requirements of relevant Standards and the New Zealand Building Code, and it appears that, had the installations been compliant, the cost of repair and business interruption would have been substantially less. The second part of the paper highlights some of the apparent shortcomings with the current design process for non-structural elements, points towards possible alternative strategies and identifies areas where more research is deemed necessary. The challenge of improving the seismic performance of non-structural elements is a complex one across a diverse construction industry. Indications are that the New Zealand construction industry needs to completely rethink the delivery approach to ensure an integrated design, construction and certification process. The industry, QuakeCentre, QuakeCoRE and the University of Canterbury are presently working together to progress solutions. Indications are that if new processes can be initiated, better performance during earthquakes will be achieved while delivering enhanced building and business resilience.
Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030 involves transformational change in the business of business, and social enterprises can lead the way in such change. We studied Cultivate, one such social enterprise in Christchurch, New Zealand, a city still recovering from the 2010/11 Canterbury earthquakes. Cultivate works with vulnerable youth to transform donated compost into garden vegetables for local restaurants and businesses. Cultivate’s objectives align with SDG concerns with poverty and hunger (1 & 2), social protection (3 & 4), and sustainable human settlements (6 & 11). Like many grant-supported organisations, Cultivate is required to track and measure its progress. Given the organisation’s holistic objectives, however, adequately accounting for its impact reporting is not straightforward. Our action research project engaged Cultivate staff and youth-workers to generate meaningful ways of measuring impact. Elaborating the Community Economy Return on Investment tool (CEROI), we explore how participatory audit processes can capture impacts on individuals, organisations, and the wider community in ways that extend capacities to act collectively. We conclude that Cultivate and social enterprises like it offer insights regarding how to align values and practices, commercial activity and wellbeing in ways that accrue to individuals, organisations and the broader civic-community.
This thesis explores how social entrepreneurship develops following a crisis. A review of literature finds that despite more than 15 years of academic attention, a common definition of social entrepreneurship remains elusive, with the field lacking the unified framework to set it apart as a specialised field of study. There are a variety of different conceptualisations of how social entrepreneurship works, and what it aims to achieve. The New Zealand context for social entrepreneurship is explored, finding that it receives little attention from the government and education sectors, despite its enormous potential. A lack of readily available information on social entrepreneurship leads most studies to investigate it as a phenomenon, and given the unique context of this research, it follows suit. Following from several authors’ recommendations that social entrepreneurship be subjected to further exploration, this is an exploratory, inductive study. A multiple case study is used to explore how social entrepreneurship develops following a natural disaster, using the example of the February 2011 earthquake in Christchurch, New Zealand. With little existing theory in this research area, this method is used to provide interesting examples of how the natural disaster, recognised as a crisis, can lead to business formation. Findings revealed the crisis initially triggered an altruistic response from social entrepreneurs, leading them to develop newly highlighted opportunities that were related to fields in which they had existing skills and expertise. In the process of developing these opportunities, initial altruistic motivations faded, with a new focus on the pursuit of a social mission and aims for survival and growth. The social missions addressed broad issues, and while they did address the crisis to differing extents, they were not confined to addressing its consequences. A framework is presented to explain how social entrepreneurship functions, once triggered in response to crisis. This framework supports existing literature that depicts social entrepreneurship as a continuous process, and illustrates the effects of a crisis as the catalyst for social business formation. In the aftermath of a crisis, when resources are likely to be scarce, social entrepreneurs play a significant role in the recovery process and their contributions should be highly valued both by government and relevant disaster response bodies. Policies that support social entrepreneurs and their ventures should be considered in the same way as commercial ventures.
Landslides are significant hazards, especially in seismically-active mountainous regions, where shaking amplified by steep topography can result in widespread landsliding. These landslides present not only an acute hazard, but a chronic hazard that can last years-to-decades after the initial earthquake, causing recurring impacts. The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused more than 20,000 landslides throughout North Canterbury and resulted in significant damage to nationally significant infrastructure in the coastal transport corridor (CTC), isolating Kaikōura from the rest of New Zealand. In the years following, ongoing landsliding triggered by intense rainfall exacerbated the impacts and slowed the recovery process. However, while there is significant research on co-seismic landslides and their initial impacts in New Zealand, little research has explored the evolution of co-seismic landslides and how this hazard changes over time. This research maps landslides annually between 2013 and 2021 to evaluate the changes in pre-earthquake, co-seismic and post-earthquake rates of landsliding to determine how landslide hazard has changed over this time. In particular, the research explores how the number, area, and spatial distribution of landslides has changed since the earthquake, and whether post-earthquake mitigation works have in any way affected the long-term landslide hazard. Mapping of landslides was undertaken using open-source, medium resolution Landsat-8 and Sentinel-2 satellite imagery, with landslides identified visually and mapped as single polygons that capture both the source zone and deposit. Three study areas with differing levels of post-earthquake mitigation are compared: (i) the northern CTC, where the majority of mitigation was in the form of active debris removal; (ii) the southern CTC, where mitigation was primarily via passive protection measures; and (iii) Mount Fyffe, which has had no mitigation works since the earthquake. The results show that despite similar initial impacts during the earthquake, the rate of recovery in terms of landslide rates varies substantially across the three study areas. In Mount Fyffe, the number and area of landslides could take 45 and 22 years from 2021 respectively to return to pre-earthquake levels at the current rate. Comparatively, in the CTC, it could take just 5 years and 3-4 years from 2021 respectively. Notably, the fastest recovery in terms of landslide rates in the CTC was primarily located directly along the transport network, whereas what little recovery did occur in Mount Fyffe appeared to follow no particular pattern. Importantly, recovery rates in the northern CTC were notably higher than in the southern CTC, despite greater co-seismic impacts in the former. Combined, these results suggest the active, debris removal mitigation undertaken in the northern CTC may have had the effect of dramatically reducing the time for landslide rates to return to pre-earthquake levels. The role of slope angle and slope aspect were explored to evaluate if these observations could be driven by local differences in topography. The Mount Fyffe study area has higher slope angles than the CTC as a whole and landslides predominantly occurred on slightly steeper slopes than in the CTC. This may have contributed to the longer recovery times for landsliding in Mount Fyffe due to greater gravitational instability, however the observed variations are minor compared to the differences in recovery rates. In terms of slope aspect, landslides in Mount Fyffe preferentially occurred on north- and south-facing slopes whereas landslides in the CTC preferred the east- and south-facing slopes. The potential role of these differences in landslide recovery remains unclear but may be related to the propagation direction of the earthquake and the tracking direction of post-earthquake ex-tropical cyclones. Finally, landslides in the CTC are observed to be moving further away from the transport network and the number of landslides impacting the CTC decreased significantly since the earthquake. Nevertheless, the potential for further landslide reactivation remains. Therefore, despite the recovery in the CTC, it is clear that there is still risk of the transport network being impacted by further landsliding, at least for the next 3-5 yrs.
