This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
This study analyses the Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) insurance claims database to investigate the influence of seismic intensity and property damage resulting from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) on the repair costs and claim settlement duration for residential buildings. Firstly, the ratio of building repair cost to its replacement cost was expressed as a Building Loss Ratio (BLR), which was further extended to Regional Loss Ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch by multiplying the average of all building loss ratios with the proportion of building stock that lodged an insurance claim. Secondly, the total time required to settle the claim and the time taken to complete each phase of the claim settlement process were obtained. Based on the database, the regional loss ratio for greater Christchurch for three events producing shakings of intensities 6, 7, and 8 on the modified Mercalli intensity scale were 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, small (less than NZD15,000), medium (between NZD15,000 and NZD100,000), and large (more than NZD100,000) claims took 0.35-0.55, 1.95-2.45, and 3.35-3.85 years to settle regardless of the building’s construction period and earthquake intensities. The number of claims was also disaggregated by various building characteristics to evaluate their relative contribution to the damage and repair costs.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
Though rare and unpredictable, earthquakes can and do cause catastrophic destruction when they impact unprepared and vulnerable communities. Extensive damage and failure of vulnerable buildings is a key factor which contributes to seismic-related disasters, making the proactive management of these buildings a necessity to reduce the risk of future disasters arising. The devastating Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought the urgency of this issue to national importance in New Zealand. The national earthquake-prone building framework came into effect in 2017, obligating authorities to identify existing buildings with the greatest risk of collapse in strong earthquakes and for building owners to strengthen or demolish these buildings within a designated period of time. Though this framework is unique to New Zealand, the challenge of managing the seismic risk of such buildings is common amongst all seismically-active countries. Therefore, looking outward to examine how other jurisdictions legally manage this challenge is useful for reflecting on the approaches taken in New Zealand and understand potential lessons which could be adopted. This research compares the legal framework used to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings in New Zealand with that of the similarly earthquake-prone countries of Japan and Italy. These legal frameworks are examined with a particular focus on the proactive goal of reducing risk and improving resilience, as is the goal of the international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework, which each of the case study countries have committed to and thus have obligations under, forms the legal basis of the need for states to reduce disaster risk in their jurisdictions. In particular, the states’ legal frameworks for existing building risk reduction are examined in the context of the Sendai priorities of understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance, and investing in resilience. While this research illustrates that the case study countries have each adopted more proactive risk reduction frameworks in recent years in anticipation of future earthquakes, the frameworks currently focus on a very narrow range of existing buildings and thus are not currently sufficient for promoting the long-term resilience of building stocks. In order to improve resilience, it is argued, legal frameworks need to include a broader range of buildings subject to seismic risk reduction obligations and also to broaden the focus on long-term monitoring of potential risk to buildings.
