In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised through regular practice.
Recycling is often employed as part of a disaster waste management system. However, the feasibility, method and effectiveness of recycling varies between disaster events. This qualitative study is based on literature reviews, expert interviews and active participatory research of five international disaster events in developed countries (2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australia; 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy; 2005 Hurricane Katrina, United States; 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand; 2011 Great East Japan earthquake) to answer three questions: What are the main factors that affect the feasibility of recycling post-disaster? When is on-site or off-site separation more effective? What management approaches improve recycling effectiveness? Seven disaster-specific factors need to be assessed to determine the feasibility of disaster waste recycling programmes: volume of waste; degree of mixing of waste; human and environmental health hazards; areal extent of the waste; community priorities; funding mechanisms; and existing and disaster-specific regulations. The appropriateness of on or off-site waste separation depends on four factors: time constraints; resource availability; degree of mixing of waste and human and public health hazards. Successful recycling programmes require good management including clear and well enforced policies (through good contracts or regulations) and pre-event planning. Further research into post-disaster recycling markets, funding mechanisms and recycling in developing countries is recommended.
The Canterbury earthquakes resulted in numerous changes to the waterways of Ōtautahi Christchurch. These included bank destabilisation, liquefaction effects, changes in bed levels, and associated effects on flow regimes and inundation levels. This study set out to determine if these effects had altered the location and pattern of sites utilised by īnanga (Galaxias maculatus) for spawning, which are typically restricted to very specific locations in upper estuarine areas. Extensive surveys were carried out in the Heathcote/Ōpāwaho and Avon/Ōtākaro catchments over the four peak months of the 2015 spawning season. New spawning sites were found in both rivers and analysis against pre-earthquake records identified that other significant changes have occurred. Major changes include the finding of many new spawning sites in the Heathcote/Ōpāwaho catchment. Sites now occur up to 1.5km further downstream than the previously reported limit and include the first records of spawning below the Woolston Cut. Spawning sites in the Avon/Ōtākaro catchment also occur in new locations. In the mainstem, sites now occur both upstream and downstream of all previously reported locations. A concentrated area of spawning was identified in Lake Kate Sheppard at a distinctly different location versus pre-quake records, and no spawning was found on the western shores. Spawning was also recorded for the first time in Anzac Creek, a nearby waterway connected to Lake Kate Sheppard via a series of culverts.
This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.
Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) play acrucial role in times of disasters. Therefore it is crucial to understand more thoroughly the communication roles and responsibilities of interagency team members and to examine how individual members communicate within a complex, evolving, and unstable environment. It is also important to understand how different organisational identities and their spatial geographies contribute to the interactional dynamics. Earthquakes hit the Canterbury region on September, 2010 and then on February 2011 a more devastating shallow earthquake struck resulting in severe damage to the Aged Residential Care (ARC) sector. Over 600 ARC beds were lost and 500 elderly and disabled people were displaced. Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) set up an interagency emergency response team to address the issues of vulnerable people with significant health and disability needs who were unable to access their normal supports due to the effects of the earthquake. The purpose of this qualitative interpretive study is to focus on the case study of the response and evacuation of vulnerable people by interagencies responding to the event. Staff within these agencies were interviewed with a focus on the critical incidents that either stabilised or negatively influenced the outcome of the response. The findings included the complexity of navigating multiple agencies communication channels; understanding the different hierarchies and communication methods within each agency; data communication challenges when infrastructures were severely damaged; the importance of having the right skills, personal attributes and understanding of the organisations in the response; and the significance of having a liaison in situ representing and communicating through to agencies geographically dispersed from Canterbury. It is hoped that this research will assist in determining a future framework for interagency communication best practice and policy.
Tsunami have the potential to cause significant disruptions to society, including damage to infrastructure, critical to the every-day operation of society. Effective risk management is required to reduce the potential tsunami impacts to them. Christchurch city, situated on the eastern coast of New Zealand’s South Island, is exposed to a number of far-field tsunami hazards. Although the tsunami hazard has been well identified for Christchurch city infrastructure, the likely impacts have not been well constrained. To support effective risk management a credible and realistic infrastructure impact model is required to inform risk management planning. The objectives of this thesis are to assess the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure from a credible, hypothetical far-field tsunami scenario. To achieve this an impact assessment process is adopted, using tsunami hazard and exposure measures to determine asset vulnerability and subsequent impacts. However, the thesis identified a number of knowledge gaps in infrastructure vulnerability to tsunami. The thesis addresses this by using two approaches: a tsunami damage matrix; and the development of tsunami fragility functions. The tsunami damage matrix pools together tsunami impacts on infrastructure literature, and post-event field observations. It represents the most comprehensive ‘look-up’ resource for tsunami impacts to infrastructure to date. This damage matrix can inform the assessment of tsunami impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure by providing a measure of damage likelihood at various hazard intensities. A more robust approach to tsunami vulnerability of infrastructure are fragility functions, which are also developed in this thesis. These were based on post-event tsunami surveys of the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami in Japan. The fragility functions are limited to road and bridge infrastructure, but represent the highest resolution measure of vulnerability for the given assets. As well as providing a measure of damage likelihood for a given tsunami hazard intensity, these also indicate a level of asset damage. The impact assessment process, and synthesized vulnerability measures, are used to run tsunami impact models for Christchurch infrastructure to determine the probability of asset damage occurring and to determine if impact will reach or exceed a given damage state. The models suggest that infrastructure damage is likely to occur in areas exposed to tsunami inundation in this scenario, with significant damage identified for low elevation roads and bridges. The results are presented and discussed in the context of the risk management framework, with emphasis on using risk assessment to inform risk treatment, monitoring and review. In summary, this thesis A) advances tsunami vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies for infrastructure and B) provides a tsunami impact assessment framework for Christchurch city infrastructure which will inform infrastructure tsunami risk management for planners, emergency managers and lifelines groups.
The 2015 New Zealand strong-motion database provides a wealth of new strong motion data for engineering applications. An important component of this database is the compilation of new site metadata, describing the soil conditions and site response at GeoNet strong motion stations. We have assessed and compiled four key site parameters for the ~460 GeoNet stations that recorded significant historical ground motions. Parameters include: site classification (NZS1170.5), Vs30, fundamental site period (Tsite) and depth to bedrock (Z1.0, i.e. depth to material with Vs > 1000 m/s). In addition, we have assigned a quality estimate (Quality 1 – 3) to these parameters to provide a qualitative estimate of the uncertainty. New highquality Tsite estimates have largely been obtained from newly available HVSR amplification curves and spectral ratios from inversion of regional strong motion data that has been reconciled with available geological information. Good quality Vs30 estimates, typically in urban centres, have also been incorporated following recent studies. Where site-specific measurements of Vs30 are not available, Vs30 is estimated based on surface geology following national Vs30 maps. New Z1.0 values have been provided from 3D subsurface models for Canterbury and Wellington. This database will be used in efforts to guide development and testing of new and existing ground motion prediction models in New Zealand. In particular, it will allow reexamination of the most important site parameters that control and predict site response in a New Zealand setting. Furthermore, it can be used to provide information about suitable rock reference sites for seismological research, and as a guide to site-specific references in the literature. We discuss compilation of the database, preliminary insights so far, and future directions.
The operation of telecommunication networks is critical during business as usual times, and becomes most vital in post-disaster scenarios, when the services are most needed for restoring other critical lifelines, due to inherent interdependencies, and for supporting emergency and relief management tasks. In spite of the recognized critical importance, the assessment of the seismic performance for the telecommunication infrastructure appears to be underrepresented in the literature. The FP6 QuakeCoRE project “Performance of the Telecommunication Network during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence” will provide a critical contribution to bridge this gap. Thanks to an unprecedented collaboration between national and international researchers and highly experienced asset managers from Chorus, data and evidences on the physical and functional performance of the telecommunication network after the Canterbury Earthquakes 2010-2011 have been collected and collated. The data will be processed and interpreted aiming to reveal fragilities and resilience of the telecommunication networks to seismic events
The 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, and the resulting extensive data sets on damaged buildings that have been collected, provide a unique opportunity to exercise and evaluate previously published seismic performance assessment procedures. This poster provides an overview of the authors’ methodology to perform evaluations with two such assessment procedures, namely the P-58 guidelines and the REDi Rating System. P-58, produced by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States, aims to facilitate risk assessment and decision-making by quantifying earthquake ground shaking, structural demands, component damage and resulting consequences in a logical framework. The REDi framework, developed by the engineering firm ARUP, aids stakeholders in implementing resilience-based earthquake design. Preliminary results from the evaluations are presented. These have the potential to provide insights on the ability of the assessment procedures to predict impacts using “real-world” data. However, further work remains to critically analyse these results and to broaden the scope of buildings studied and of impacts predicted.
Sewerage systems convey sewage, or wastewater, from residential or commercial buildings through complex reticulation networks to treatment plants. During seismic events both transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation can induce physical damage to sewerage system components, limiting or impeding the operability of the whole system. The malfunction of municipal sewerage systems can result in the pollution of nearby waterways through discharge of untreated sewage, pose a public health threat by preventing the use of appropriate sanitation facilities, and cause serious inconvenience for rescuers and residents. Christchurch, the second largest city in New Zealand, was seriously affected by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) in 2010-2011. The CES imposed widespread damage to the Christchurch sewerage system (CSS), causing a significant loss of functionality and serviceability to the system. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) relied heavily on temporary sewerage services for several months following the CES. The temporary services were supported by use of chemical and portable toilets to supplement the damaged wastewater system. The rebuild delivery agency -Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was created to be responsible for repair of 85 % of the damaged horizontal infrastructure (i.e., water, wastewater, stormwater systems, and roads) in Christchurch. Numerous initiatives to create platforms/tools aiming to, on the one hand, support the understanding, management and mitigation of seismic risk for infrastructure prior to disasters, and on the other hand, to support the decision-making for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery, have been promoted worldwide. Despite this, the CES in New Zealand highlighted that none of the existing platforms/tools are either accessible and/or readable or usable by emergency managers and decision makers for restoring the CSS. Furthermore, the majority of existing tools have a sole focus on the engineering perspective, while the holistic process of formulating recovery decisions is based on system-wide approach, where a variety of factors in addition to technical considerations are involved. Lastly, there is a paucity of studies focused on the tools and frameworks for supporting decision-making specifically on sewerage system restoration after earthquakes. This thesis develops a decision support framework for sewerage pipe and system restoration after earthquakes, building on the experience and learning of the organisations involved in recovering the CSS following the CES in 2010-2011. The proposed decision support framework includes three modules: 1) Physical Damage Module (PDM); 2) Functional Impact Module (FIM); 3) Pipeline Restoration Module (PRM). The PDM provides seismic fragility matrices and functions for sewer gravity and pressure pipelines for predicting earthquake-induced physical damage, categorised by pipe materials and liquefaction zones. The FIM demonstrates a set of performance indicators that are categorised in five domains: structural, hydraulic, environmental, social and economic domains. These performance indicators are used to assess loss of wastewater system service and the induced functional impacts in three different phases: emergency response, short-term recovery and long-term restoration. Based on the knowledge of the physical and functional status-quo of the sewerage systems post-earthquake captured through the PDM and FIM, the PRM estimates restoration time of sewer networks by use of restoration models developed using a Random Forest technique and graphically represented in terms of restoration curves. The development of a decision support framework for sewer recovery after earthquakes enables decision makers to assess physical damage, evaluate functional impacts relating to hydraulic, environmental, structural, economic and social contexts, and to predict restoration time of sewerage systems. Furthermore, the decision support framework can be potentially employed to underpin system maintenance and upgrade by guiding system rehabilitation and to monitor system behaviours during business-as-usual time. In conjunction with expert judgement and best practices, this framework can be moreover applied to assist asset managers in targeting the inclusion of system resilience as part of asset maintenance programmes.
This project was initiated by ENGEO Limited and KiwiRail Holdings Limited to assess the stability of Slovens Creek Viaduct (specifically its western abutment) and a 3km section of rail corridor between Slovens Creek Viaduct and Avoca on the Midland Line (MDL). Commonly known as the scenic TranzAlpine rail journey (through Arthurs Pass National Park) the MDL connects Greymouth to Christchurch via Rolleston, where the MDL meets the Main South Line into Christchurch. The project area is approximately 40km southeast of Arthurs Pass Township, in the eastern extension of the Castle Hill Basin which is part of the Waimakariri Catchment and Canterbury Foothills. The field area is underlain by Rakaia Terrane, which is part of the Torlesse Composite Terrane forming the basement rock unit for the field area. Cretaceous-Tertiary rocks of the Castle Hill Basin overlie the basement strata and record a transgression-regression sequence, as well as mid-Oligocene submarine volcanism. The stratigraphic sequence in the Castle Hill Basin, and its eastern extension to Avoca, comprises two formations of the Eyre group, the older Broken River Formation and the younger Iron Creek Formation. Deep marine Porter Group limestones, marls, and tuffs of Oligocene age succeed the Iron Creek Formation of the Eyre Group, and probably records the maximum of the transgression. The Enys Formation lies disconformably on the Porter Group and is overlain unconformably by Late Pleistocene glacifluvial and glacial deposits. The Tertiary strata in the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are weak, and the clay-rich tuff derived from mid-Oligocene volcanism is particularly prone to slaking. Extensive mapping carried out for this project has identified that some 90 percent of the surface along the length of the Slovens-Avoca corridor has been subject to mass movement. The landslides of the Slovens-Avoca rail corridor are clearly younger than the Last Glaciation, and Slovens Creek has been downcutting, with associated faulting and uplift, to form the present day geomorphology of the rail corridor. Deep-seated landslides in the rail corridor extend to Slovens Creek, locally deflecting the stream course, and a generic ground failure model for the rail corridor has been developed. Exploratory geotechnical investigations, including core drilling, installation of an inclinometer and a piezometer, enabled the construction of a simple ground model and cross section for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment. Limit-equilibrium and pseudo-static slope stability analyses using both circular and block critical slip surface search methods were applied to the ground model for the western abutment of Slovens Creek Viaduct. Piezometric and strength data obtained during laboratory testing of core material have been used to constrain the western abutment stability assessment for one representative section line (C-C’). Prior to pseudo-static sensitivity analyses peak ground acceleration (PGA) for various Ultimate Limit State (ULS) design return periods, defined by an equation given in NZS1170.5:2004, were calculated and have been used as a calibration technique to find and compare specific PGA values for pseudo-static analyses in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area. The main purpose has been to provide an indication of how railway infrastructure could be affected by seismic events of various return periods defined by ULS design standards for the area. Limit equilibrium circular slip surface search methods, both grid search and auto refine search, indicated the slope is stable with a FoS greater than 1.0 returned from each, although one particular surface returned the lowest FoS in each. This surface is in the lower portion of the slope, adjacent to Slovens Stream and northeast of the MDL. As expected, pseudo-static analyses returned a lower FoS overall when compared to limit equilibrium analyses. The PGA analyses suggest that partial ground failure at the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment could occur in a 1 in 25-year return period event within materials on the slower slope beyond the immediate rail corridor. A ULS (1 in 500-year) event in the Slovens Creek Viaduct area would likely produce a PGA of ~0.9g, and the effects on the western abutment and rail infrastructure would most likely be catastrophic. Observed ground conditions for the western abutment of the Slovens Creek Viaduct suggest there is no movement within the landslide at depth within the monitoring timeframe of this project (22 May 2015 – 4 August 2015). Slope stability monitoring is recommended to be continued in two parts: (1) the inclinometer in BH1 is to be monitored on a six monthly basis for one year following completion of this thesis, and then annually unless ground movements become evident; and (2) surface movement monitoring should be installed using a fixed datum on the stable eastern abutment. Long-term stability management strategies for the Slovens Creek Viaduct western abutment are dependent upon future observed changes and ongoing monitoring. Hazard and risk assessment using the KiwiRail Qualitative Risk Assessment Framework (QRA) is recommended, and if slope stability becomes problematic for operation of the Midland Line consideration should be given to deep slope drainage. In the event of a large magnitude or high PGA earthquake all monitoring should be reviewed.
