Major earthquakes, such as the Canterbury and Kaikoura events recorded in New Zealand in 2010 and 2016 respectively, highlighted that floor systems can be heavily damaged. At a reduced or full scale, quasi-static experimental tests on structural sub-assemblies can help to establish the seismic performance of structural systems. However, the experimental performance obtained with such tests is likely to be dependent on the drift protocol adopted. This paper provides an overview of the drift protocols which have been assumed in previous relevant experimental activities, with emphasis on those adopted for testing floor systems. The paper also describes the procedure used to define the loading protocol applied in the testing of a large precast concrete floor diaphragm as part of the Recast floor project at the University of Canterbury. Finally, major limits of current loading protocols, and areas of future research, are identified.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
