Background Liquefaction induced land damage has been identified in more than 13 notable New Zealand earthquakes within the past 150 years, as presented on the timeline below. Following the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), the consequences of liquefaction were witnessed first-hand in the city of Christchurch and as a result the demand for understanding this phenomenon was heightened. Government, local councils, insurers and many other stakeholders are now looking to research and understand their exposure to this natural hazard.
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 2010-2011 (CES) induced widespread liquefaction in many parts of Christchurch city. Liquefaction was more commonly observed in the eastern suburbs and along the Avon River where the soils were characterised by thick sandy deposits with a shallow water table. On the other hand, suburbs to the north, west and south of the CBD (e.g. Riccarton, Papanui) exhibited less severe to no liquefaction. These soils were more commonly characterised by inter-layered liquefiable and non-liquefiable deposits. As part of a related large-scale study of the performance of Christchurch soils during the CES, detailed borehole data including CPT, Vs and Vp have been collected for 55 sites in Christchurch. For this subset of Christchurch sites, predictions of liquefaction triggering using the simplified method (Boulanger & Idriss, 2014) indicated that liquefaction was over-predicted for 94% of sites that did not manifest liquefaction during the CES, and under-predicted for 50% of sites that did manifest liquefaction. The focus of this study was to investigate these discrepancies between prediction and observation. To assess if these discrepancies were due to soil-layer interaction and to determine the effect that soil stratification has on the develop-ment of liquefaction and the system response of soil deposits.
This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
