Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
Disaster recovery is significantly affected by funding availability. The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are not only impacted by the extent of the funding but also the mechanisms with which funding is prioritised, allocated and delivered. This research addresses the impact of funding mechanisms on the effectiveness and efficiency of post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. A qualitative assessment of the impacts on recovery of different funding sources and mechanisms was carried out, using the 2010 Canterbury Earthquake as well as other recent international events as case studies. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness, environmental, economic and social impacts. Of the case studies investigated, the Canterbury Earthquake was the only disaster response to rely solely on a privatised approach to insurance for debris management. Due to the low level of resident displacement and low level of hazard in the waste, this was a satisfactory approach, though not ideal. This approach has led to greater organisational complexity and delays. For many other events, the potential community wide impacts caused by the prolonged presence of disaster debris means that publicly funded and centrally facilitated programmes appear to be the most common and effective method of managing disaster waste.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
This report discusses the experiences gained and lessons learned during a project management internship in post-earthquake Christchurch as part of the construction industry and rebuild effort.
Earthquakes impacting on the built environment can generate significant volumes of waste, often overwhelming existing waste management capacities. Earthquake waste can pose a public and environmental health hazard and can become a road block on the road to recovery. Specific research has been developed at the University of Canterbury to go beyond the current perception of disaster waste as a logistical hurdle, to a realisation that disaster waste management is part of the overall recovery process and can be planned for effectively. Disaster waste decision-makers, often constrained by inappropriate institutional frameworks, are faced with conflicting social, economic and environmental drivers which all impact on the overall recovery. Framed around L’Aquila earthquake, Italy, 2009, this paper discusses the social, economic and environmental effects of earthquake waste management and the impact of existing institutional frameworks (legal, financial and organisational). The paper concludes by discussing how to plan for earthquake waste management.
The timeliness and quality of recovery activities are impacted by the organisation and human resourcing of the physical works. This research addresses the suitability of different resourcing strategies on post-disaster demolition and debris management programmes. This qualitative analysis primarily draws on five international case studies including 2010 Canterbury earthquake, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, 2009 Samoan Tsunami, 2009 Victorian Bushfires and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The implementation strategies are divided into two categories: collectively and individually facilitated works. The impacts of the implementation strategies chosen are assessed for all disaster waste management activities including demolition, waste collection, transportation, treatment and waste disposal. The impacts assessed include: timeliness, completeness of projects; and environmental, economic and social impacts. Generally, the case studies demonstrate that detritus waste removal and debris from major repair work is managed at an individual property level. Debris collection, demolition and disposal are generally and most effectively carried out as a collective activity. However, implementation strategies are affected by contextual factors (such as funding and legal constraints) and the nature of the disaster waste (degree of hazardous waste, geographical spread of waste etc.) and need to be designed accordingly. Community involvement in recovery activities such as demolition and debris removal is shown to contribute positively to psychosocial recovery.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
The paper presents preliminary findings from comprehensive research studies on the liquefaction-induced damage to buildings and infrastructure in Christchurch during the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes. It identifies key factors and mechanisms of damage to road bridges, shallow foundations of CBD buildings and buried pipelines, and highlights the implications of the findings for the seismic analysis and design of these structures.
This is an interim report from the research study performed within the NHRP Research Project “Impacts of soil liquefaction on land, buildings and buried pipe networks: geotechnical evaluation and design, Project 3: Seismic assessment and design of pipe networks in liquefiable soils”. The work presented herein is a continuation of the comprehensive study on the impacts of Christchurch earthquakes on the buried pipe networks presented in Cubrinovski et al. (2011). This report summarises the performance of Christchurch City’s potable water, waste water and road networks through the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), and particularly focuses on the potable water network. It combines evidence based on comprehensive and well-documented data on the damage to the water network, detailed observations and interpretation of liquefaction-induced land damage, records and interpretations of ground motion characteristics induced by the Canterbury earthquakes, for a network analysis and pipeline performance evaluation using a GIS platform. The study addresses a range of issues relevant in the assessment of buried networks in areas affected by strong earthquakes and soil liquefaction. It discusses performance of different pipe materials (modern flexible pipelines and older brittle pipelines) including effects of pipe diameters, fittings and pipeline components/details, trench backfill characteristics, and severity of liquefaction. Detailed breakdown of key factors contributing to the damage to buried pipes is given with reference to the above and other relevant parameters. Particular attention is given to the interpretation, analysis and modelling of liquefaction effects on the damage and performance of the buried pipe networks. Clear link between liquefaction severity and damage rate for the pipeline has been observed with an increasing damage rate seen with increasing liquefaction severity. The approach taken here was to correlate the pipeline damage to LRI (Liquefaction Resistance Index, newly developed parameter in Cubrinovski et al., 2011) which represents a direct measure for the soil resistance to liquefaction while accounting for the seismic demand through PGA. Key quality of the adopted approach is that it provides a general methodology that in conjunction with conventional methods for liquefaction evaluation can be applied elsewhere in New Zealand and internationally. Preliminary correlations between pipeline damage (breaks km-1), liquefaction resistance (LRI) and seismic demand (PGA) have been developed for AC pipes, as an example. Such correlations can be directly used in the design and assessment of pipes in seismic areas both in liquefiable and non-liquefiable areas. Preliminary findings on the key factors for the damage to the potable water pipe network and established empirical correlations are presented including an overview of the damage to the waste water and road networks but with substantially less detail. A comprehensive summary of the damage data on the buried pipelines is given in a series of appendices.
In the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) initiated a series of Short Term Recovery Projects (STRP) aimed at facilitating and supporting the recovery of Christchurch from the earthquake impacts. This report presents the outcomes of STRP 6: Impacts of Liquefaction on Pipe Networks, which focused on the impacts of liquefaction on the potable water and wastewater systems of Christchurch. The project was a collaborative effort of NHRP researchers with expertise in liquefaction, CCC personnel managing and designing the systems and a geotechnical practitioner with experience/expertise in Christchurch soils and seismic geotechnics.
Decision making on the reinstatement of the Christchurch sewer system after the Canterbury (New Zealand) earthquake sequence in 2010–2011 relied strongly on damage data, in particular closed circuit television (CCTV). This paper documents that process and considers how data can influence decision making. Data are analyzed on 33,000 pipes and 13,000 repairs and renewals. The primary findings are that (1) there should be a threshold of damage per pipe set to make efficient use of CCTV; (2) for those who are estimating potential damage, care must be taken in direct use of repair data without an understanding of the actual damage modes; and (3) a strong correlation was found between the ratio of faults to repairs per pipe and the estimated peak ground velocity. Taken together, the results provide evidence of the extra benefit that damage data can provide over repair data for wastewater networks and may help guide others in the development of appropriate strategies for data collection and wastewater pipe decisions after disasters.
Recycling is often employed as part of a disaster waste management system. However, the feasibility, method and effectiveness of recycling varies between disaster events. This qualitative study is based on literature reviews, expert interviews and active participatory research of five international disaster events in developed countries (2009 Victorian Bushfires, Australia; 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy; 2005 Hurricane Katrina, United States; 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, New Zealand; 2011 Great East Japan earthquake) to answer three questions: What are the main factors that affect the feasibility of recycling post-disaster? When is on-site or off-site separation more effective? What management approaches improve recycling effectiveness? Seven disaster-specific factors need to be assessed to determine the feasibility of disaster waste recycling programmes: volume of waste; degree of mixing of waste; human and environmental health hazards; areal extent of the waste; community priorities; funding mechanisms; and existing and disaster-specific regulations. The appropriateness of on or off-site waste separation depends on four factors: time constraints; resource availability; degree of mixing of waste and human and public health hazards. Successful recycling programmes require good management including clear and well enforced policies (through good contracts or regulations) and pre-event planning. Further research into post-disaster recycling markets, funding mechanisms and recycling in developing countries is recommended.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in supporting lifelines utilities.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
The majority of Christchurch’s stormwater has historically been discharged untreated directly into urban surface waterways. These receiving waterways have become adversely affected by the contaminants carried in the stormwater, particularly sediment and heavy metals. An event-based contaminant load model was developed to identify the distribution and magnitude of contaminant loads entering the waterway, as well as to assess the reduction in TSS and heavy metal loads that can be achieved by various stormwater management options. The GIS-Excel based model estimates contaminant loads from an individual storm event based on different contributing impervious surfaces and key rainfall characteristics (rainfall intensity, duration, pH and antecedent dry days). It then calculates contaminant reduction loads that could be achieved through source reduction (e.g. green roofs, repainting) as well as from treatment (e.g. raingardens, wet ponds) applied to different surfaces within the catchment. This model differs from other annual load models as it is event-based and accounts for storm characteristics in its calculation of contaminant loads. Christchurch is a valuable case setting due the unique opportunity for retrofitting improved stormwater management in the post-earthquake rebuild. It is anticipated that this modelling approach could later be adapted for use in other urban settings outside of Christchurch.
The Master of Engineering Management Project was sponsored by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and consisted of two phases: The first was an analysis of existing information detailing the effects of hazardous natural events on Canterbury Lifeline Utilities in the past 15 years. The aim of this “Lessons Learned” project was to produce an analysis report that identified key themes from the research, gaps in the existing data and to provide recommendations from these “Lessons Learned.” The Second phase was the development of a practical “Disaster Mitigation Guideline” that outlined lessons in the field of Emergency Sanitation. This research would build upon the first stage and would draw from international reference to develop a guideline that has practical implementation possibilities throughout the world.
The earthquake sequence has resulted in significant physical and reputational damage to the Canterbury tourism industry. Eighteen months after the earthquakes inbound tourism data is still below pre-earthquake levels, with Canterbury operators reporting that the industry has not bounced back to where it was before September 2010. Outcomes of the earthquakes on business performance highlight there were winners and losers in the aftermath. Recovery of inbound tourism markets is closely tied to the timeframe to rebuild the CBD of Christchurch. Reinstating critical tourism infrastructure will drive future tourism investment, and allow tourism businesses to regenerate and thrive into the future. A blueprint for rebuilding the CBD of Christchurch was released by the Christchurch City Council in July 2012, and has been well received by tourism stakeholders in the region. The challenge now is for city officials to fund the development projects outlined in the blueprint, and to rebuild the CBD as quickly as possible in order to help regenerate the tourism industry in Christchurch, Canterbury and the rest of the South Island
The 2015 New Zealand strong-motion database provides a wealth of new strong motion data for engineering applications. An important component of this database is the compilation of new site metadata, describing the soil conditions and site response at GeoNet strong motion stations. We have assessed and compiled four key site parameters for the ~460 GeoNet stations that recorded significant historical ground motions. Parameters include: site classification (NZS1170.5), Vs30, fundamental site period (Tsite) and depth to bedrock (Z1.0, i.e. depth to material with Vs > 1000 m/s). In addition, we have assigned a quality estimate (Quality 1 – 3) to these parameters to provide a qualitative estimate of the uncertainty. New highquality Tsite estimates have largely been obtained from newly available HVSR amplification curves and spectral ratios from inversion of regional strong motion data that has been reconciled with available geological information. Good quality Vs30 estimates, typically in urban centres, have also been incorporated following recent studies. Where site-specific measurements of Vs30 are not available, Vs30 is estimated based on surface geology following national Vs30 maps. New Z1.0 values have been provided from 3D subsurface models for Canterbury and Wellington. This database will be used in efforts to guide development and testing of new and existing ground motion prediction models in New Zealand. In particular, it will allow reexamination of the most important site parameters that control and predict site response in a New Zealand setting. Furthermore, it can be used to provide information about suitable rock reference sites for seismological research, and as a guide to site-specific references in the literature. We discuss compilation of the database, preliminary insights so far, and future directions.
Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste. Waste volumes from a single event can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste generation rate of the affected community. These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and personnel. Mismanagement of disaster waste can affect both the response and long term recovery of a disaster affected area. Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event specific, making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another. The aim of this research is to develop a systems understanding of disaster waste management and in turn develop context- and disaster-transferrable decision-making guidance for emergency and waste managers. To research this complex and multi-disciplinary problem, a multi-hazard, multi-context, multi-case study approach was adopted. The research focussed on five major disaster events: 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The first stage of the analysis involved the development of a set of ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators. The indicators demonstrate a method by which disaster managers, planners and researchers can simplify the very large spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key decision-drivers which will likely influence post-disaster management requirements. The second stage of the research was to develop a set of criteria to represent the desirable environmental, economic, social and recovery effects of a successful disaster waste management system. These criteria were used to assess the effectiveness of the disaster waste management approaches for the case studies. The third stage of the research was the cross-case analysis. Six main elements of disaster waste management systems were identified and analysed. These were: strategic management, funding mechanisms, operational management, environmental and human health risk management, and legislation and regulation. Within each of these system elements, key decision-making guidance (linked to the ‘disaster & disaster waste’ indicators) and management principles were developed. The ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators, the effects assessment criteria and management principles have all been developed so that they can be practically applied to disaster waste management planning and response in the future.
On 4 September 2010 the Magnitude 7.1 'Darfield' Earthquake marked the beginning of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. The Darfield earthquake produced strong ground shaking throughout the centralCanterbury Plains, affecting rural areas, small towns and the city of Christchurch. The event produced a 29km long surface rupture through intensive farmland, causing localised flooding and liquefaction. The central Canterbury plains were subjected to a sustained period of thousands of aftershocks in the months after the Darfield earthquake. The primary sector is a major component of the in New Zealand economy. Business units are predominantly small family-run farm organisations, though there are increasing levels of corporate farming. The agribusiness sector contributes 20 per cent of real GDP and 47 per cent of total exports for New Zealand. Of the approximately 2,000 farms that are located in the Canterbury Plains, the most common farming sectors in the region are Mixed farming (mostly comprised of sheep and/or beef farming), Dairy farming, and Arable farming (cropping). Many farms on the Canterbury Plains require some form of irrigation and are increasingly capital intensive, reliant on built infrastructure, technology and critical services. Farms are of great significance to their local rural economies, with many rural non-farming organisations dependent on the health of local farming organisations. Despite the economic significance of the sector, there have been few, if any studies analysing how modern intensive farms are affected by earthquakes. The aim of this report is to (1) summarise the impacts the Darfield earthquake had on farming organisations and outline in general terms how farms are vulnerable to the effects of an earthquake; (2) identify what factors helped mitigate earthquake-related impacts. Data for this paper was collected through two surveys of farming and rural non-farming organisations following the earthquake and contextual interviews with affected organisations. In total, 78 organisations participated in the study (Figure 1). Farming organisations represented 72% (N=56) of the sample.
This book is the result of an investigation into the vulnerability of the infrastructure serving metropolitan Christchurch (including Lyttelton). The work was undertaken by the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group and the objectives are: to identify the vulnerability of engineering lifeline services to damage from earthquakes, flooding, tsunami and meteorological hazards; to identify practical engineering strategies for reducing the risk or impact of such damage and for providing for reinstatement following such events; and to communicate the issues to people involved in the management of these services and to raise the awareness of the public to their importance.
The Canterbury earthquakes have generated economic demand and supply volatility, highlighting geographical and structural interdependencies. Post-earthquake reconstruction and new developments have seen skills training, relocation, recruitment and importation of skills becoming crucial for construction companies to meet demand and compete effectively. This report presents 15 case studies from a range of organisations involved in the Canterbury rebuild, exploring the business dynamics and outcomes of their resourcing initiatives. A key finding of this research is that, for many construction organisations, resourcing initiatives have become part of their organisational longer-term development strategies, rather than simply a response to ‘supply and demand’ pressures. Organisations are not relying on any single resourcing solution to drive their growth but use a combination of initiatives to create lasting business benefits, such as cost savings, improved brand and reputation, a stable and productive workforce, enhanced efficiency and staff morale, as well as improved skill levels.
The Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage in the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch central business district (CBD), presented decision-makers with many recovery challenges. This paper identifies major government decisions, challenges, and lessons in the early recovery of Christchurch based on 23 key-informant interviews conducted 15 months after the February 2011 earthquake. It then focuses on one of the most important decisions – maintaining the cordon around the heavily damaged CBD – and investigates its impacts. The cordon displaced 50,000 central city jobs, raised questions about (and provided new opportunities for) the long-term viability of downtown, influenced the number and practice of building demolitions, and affected debris management; despite being associated with substantial losses, the cordon was commonly viewed as necessary, and provided some benefits in facilitating recovery. Management of the cordon poses important lessons for planning for catastrophic urban earthquakes around the world.
Improving community resilience requires a way of thinking about the nature of a community. Two complementary aspects are proposed: the flows connecting the community with its surrounding environment and the resources the community needs for its ongoing life. The body of necessary resources is complex, with many interactions between its elements. A systems approach is required to understand the issues adequately. Community resilience is discussed in general terms together with strategies for improving it. The ideas are then illustrated and amplified by an extended case study addressing means of improving the resilience of a community on the West Coast of New Zealand to natural disasters. The case study is in two phases. The first relies on a mix of on-the-ground observations and constructed scenarios to provide recommendations for enhancing community resilience, while the second complements the first by developing a set of general lessons and issues to be addressed from observations of the Christchurch earthquakes of 2010 and 2011.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence in New Zealand’s South Island induced widespread liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area on four occasions (4 Sept 2010; 22 Feb; 13 June; 23 Dec 2011), that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand. This impacted transport networks as well as infiltrated and contaminated the damaged storm water system, making rapid clean-up an immediate post-earthquake priority. In some places the ejecta was contaminated by raw sewage and was readily remobilised in dry windy conditions, creating a long-term health risk to the population. Thousands of residential properties were inundated with liquefaction ejecta, however residents typically lacked the capacity (time or resources) to clean-up without external assistance. The liquefaction silt clean-up response was co-ordinated by the Christchurch City Council and executed by a network of contractors and volunteer groups, including the ‘Farmy-Army’ and the ‘Student-Army’. The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately 2 months for each of the 3 main liquefaction inducing earthquakes; despite each event producing different volumes of ejecta. Preliminary cost estimates indicate total clean-up costs will be over NZ$25 million. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill since the beginning of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence. The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as a valuable case study to support further analysis and research on the coordination, management and costs of large volume deposition of fine grained sediment in urban areas.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
This study analyses the Earthquake Commission’s (EQC) insurance claims database to investigate the influence of seismic intensity and property damage resulting from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) on the repair costs and claim settlement duration for residential buildings. Firstly, the ratio of building repair cost to its replacement cost was expressed as a Building Loss Ratio (BLR), which was further extended to Regional Loss Ratio (RLR) for greater Christchurch by multiplying the average of all building loss ratios with the proportion of building stock that lodged an insurance claim. Secondly, the total time required to settle the claim and the time taken to complete each phase of the claim settlement process were obtained. Based on the database, the regional loss ratio for greater Christchurch for three events producing shakings of intensities 6, 7, and 8 on the modified Mercalli intensity scale were 0.013, 0.066, and 0.171, respectively. Furthermore, small (less than NZD15,000), medium (between NZD15,000 and NZD100,000), and large (more than NZD100,000) claims took 0.35-0.55, 1.95-2.45, and 3.35-3.85 years to settle regardless of the building’s construction period and earthquake intensities. The number of claims was also disaggregated by various building characteristics to evaluate their relative contribution to the damage and repair costs.
