The collapse of Redcliffs’ cliff in the 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011 earthquakes were the first times ever a major failure incident occurred at Redcliffs in approximately 6000 years. This master’s thesis is a multidisciplinary engineering geological investigation sought to study these particular failure incidents, focusing on collecting the data necessary to explain the cause and effect of the cliff collapsing in the event of two major earthquakes. This study provides quantitative and qualitative data about the geotechnical attributes and engineering geological nature of the sea-cut cliff located at Redcliffs. Results from surveying the geology of Redcliffs show that the exposed lithology of the cliff face is a variably jointed rock body of welded and (relatively intact) unwelded ignimbrite, a predominantly massive unit of brecciated tuff, and a covering of wind-blown loess and soil deposit (commonly found throughout Canterbury) on top of the cliff. Moreover, detailing the external component of the slope profile shows that Redcliffs’ cliff is a 40 – 80 m cliff with two intersecting (NE and SE facing) slope aspects. The (remotely) measured geometry of the cliff face comprises of multiple outstanding gradients, averaging a slope angle of ~67 degrees (post-13 June 2011), where the steepest components are ~80 degrees, whereas the gentle sloping sections are ~44 degrees. The physical structure of Redcliffs’ cliff drastically changed after each collapse, whereby seismically induced alterations to the slope geometry resulted in material deposited on the talus at the base of the cliff. Prior to the first collapse, the variance of the gradient down the slope was minimal, with the SE Face being the most variable with up to three major gradients on one cross section. However, after each major collapse, the variability increased with more parts of the cliff face having more than one major gradient that is steeper or gentler than the remainder of the slope. The estimated volume of material lost as a result of the gradient changes was 28,267 m³ in February and 11,360 m³ in June 2011. In addition, surveys of the cliff top after the failure incidents revealed the development of fissures along the cliff edge. Monitoring 10 fissures over three months indicated that fissured by the cliff edge respond to intense seismicity (generally ≥ Mw 4) by widening. Redcliffs’ cliff collapsed on two separate occasions as a result of an accumulated amount of damage of the rock masses in the cliff (caused by weathering and erosion over time), and two Mw 6.2 trigger earthquakes which shook the Redcliffs and the surrounding area at a Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) estimated to be around 2 g. The results of the theoretical study suggests that PGA levels felt on-site during both instances of failure are the result of three major factors: source of the quake and the site affected; topographic amplification of the ground movement; the short distance between the source and the cliff for both fault ruptures; the focus of seismic energy in the direction of thrust faulting along a path that intercepts Redcliffs (and the Port Hills). Ultimately, failure on the NE and SE Faces of Redcliffs’ cliff was concluded to be global as every part of the exposed cliff face deposited a significant volume of material on the talus at the base of the cliff, with the exception of one section on the NE Face. The cliff collapses was a concurrent process that is a single (non-monotonic) event that operated as a complex series of (primarily) toppling rock falls, some sliding of blocks, and slumping of the soil mantle on top of the cliff. The first collapse had a mixture of equivalent continua slope movement of the heavily weathered / damaged surface of the cliff face, and discontinuous slope movement of the jointed inner slope (behind the heavily weathered surface); whereas the second collapse resulted in only discontinuous slope movement on account of the freshly exposed cliff face that had damage to the rock masses, in the form of old and (relatively) new discontinuous fractures, induced by earthquakes and aftershocks leading up to the point of failure.
This thesis is concerned with modelling rockfall parameters associated with cliff collapse debris and the resultant “ramp” that formed following the high peak ground acceleration (PGA) events of 22 February 2011 and 13 June 2011. The Christchurch suburb of Redcliffs, located at the base of the Port Hills on the northern side of Banks Peninsula, New Zealand, is comprised of Miocene-age volcanics with valley-floor infilling marine sediments. The area is dominated by basaltic lava flows of the Mt Pleasant Formation, which is a suite of rocks forming part of the Lyttelton Volcanic Group that were erupted 11.0-10.0Ma. Fresh exposure enabled the identification of a basaltic ignimbrite unit at the study site overlying an orange tuff unit that forms a marker horizon spanning the length of the field area. Prior to this thesis, basaltic ignimbrite on Banks Peninsula has not been recorded, so descriptions and interpretations of this unit are the first presented. Mapping of the cliff face by remote observation, and analysis of hand samples collected from the base of the debris slopes, has identified a very strong (>200MPa), columnar-jointed, welded unit, and a very weak (<5MPa), massive, so-called brecciated unit that together represent the end-member components of the basaltic ignimbrite. Geochemical analysis shows the welded unit is picrite basalt, and the brecciated unit is hawaiite, making both clearly distinguishable from the underlying trachyandesite tuff. RocFall™ 4.0 was used to model future rockfalls at Redcliffs. RocFall™ is a two-dimensional (2D), hybrid, probabilistic modelling programme for which topographical profile data is used to generate slope profiles. GNS Science collected the data used for slope profile input in March 2011. An initial sensitivity analysis proved the Terrestrial Laser Scan (TLS)-derived slope to be too detailed to show any results when the slope roughness parameter was tested. A simplified slope profile enabled slope roughness to be varied, however the resulting model did not correlate with field observations as well. By using slope profile data from March 2011, modelled rockfall behaviour has been calibrated with observed rockfall runout at Redcliffs in the 13 June 2011 event to create a more accurate rockfall model. The rockfall model was developed on a single slope profile (Section E), with the chosen model then applied to four other section lines (A-D) to test the accuracy of the model, and to assess future rockfall runout across a wider area. Results from Section Lines A, B, and E correlate very well with field observations, with <=5% runout exceeding the modelled slope, and maximum bounce height at the toe of the slope <=1m. This is considered to lie within observed limits given the expectation that talus slopes will act as a ramp on which modelled rocks travel further downslope. Section Lines C and D produced higher runout percentage values than the other three section lines (23% and 85% exceeding the base of the slope, respectively). Section D also has a much higher maximum bounce height at the toe of the slope (~8.0m above the slope compared to <=1.0m for the other four sections). Results from modelling of all sections shows the significance of the ratio between total cliff height (H) and horizontal slope distance (x), and of maximum drop height to the top of the talus (H*) and horizontal slope distance (x). H/x can be applied to the horizontal to vertical ratio (H:V) as used commonly to identify potential slope instability. Using the maximum value from modelling at Redcliffs, the future runout limit can be identified by applying a 1.4H:1V ratio to the remainder of the cliff face. Additionally, the H*/x parameter shows that when H*/x >=0.6, the percentage of rock runout passing the toe of the slope will exceed 5%. When H*/x >=0.75, the maximum bounce height at the toe of the slope can be far greater than when H*/x is below this threshold. Both of these parameters can be easily obtained, and can contribute valuable guideline data to inform future land-use planning decisions. This thesis project has demonstrated the applicability of a 2D probabilistic-based model (RocFall™ 4.0) to evaluate rockfall runout on the talus slope (or ramp) at the base of ~35-70m high cliff with a basaltic ignimbrite source. Limitations of the modelling programme have been identified, in particular difficulties with adjusting modelled roughness of the slope profile and the inability to consider fragmentation. The runout profile using RocFall™ has been successfully calibrated against actual profiles and some anomalous results have been identified.
A major hazard accompanying earthquake shaking in areas of steep topography is the detachment of rocks from bedrock outcrops that subsequently slide, roll, or bounce downslope (i.e. rockfalls). The 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence caused recurrent and severe rockfall in parts of southern Christchurch. Coseismic rockfall caused five fatalities and significant infrastructural damage during the 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake. Here we examine a rockfall site in southern Christchurch in detail using geomorphic mapping, lidar analysis, geochronology (cosmogenic 3He dating, radiocarbon dating, optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) from quartz, infrared stimulated luminescence from K-feldspar), numerical modeling of rockfall boulder trajectories, and ground motion prediction equations (GMPEs). Rocks fell from the source cliff only in earthquakes with interpolated peak ground velocities exceeding ~10 cm/s; hundreds of smaller earthquakes did not produce rockfall. On the basis of empirical observations, GMPEs and age chronologies we attribute paleo-rockfalls to strong shaking in prehistoric earthquakes. We conclude that earthquake shaking of comparable intensity to the strongest contemporary earthquakes in Christchurch last occurred at this site approximately 5000 to 7000 years ago, and that in some settings, rockfall deposits provide useful proxies for past strong ground motions.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
The Lake Coleridge Rock Avalanche Deposits (LCRADs) are located on Ryton Station in the middle Rakaia Valley, approximately 80 km west of Christchurch. Torlesse Supergroup greywacke is the basement material and has been significantly influenced by both active tectonics and glaciation. Both glacial and post-glacial processes have produced large volumes of material which blanket the bedrock on slopes and in the valley floors. The LCRADs were part of a regional study of rock avalanches by WHITEHOUSE (1981, 1983) and WHITEHOUSE and GRIFFITHS (1983), and a single rock avalanche event was recognised with a weathering rind age of 120 years B.P. that was later modified to 150 ± 40 years B.P. The present study has refined details of both the age and the sequence of events at the site, by identifying three separate rock avalanche deposits (termed the LCRA1, LCRA2 and LCRA3 deposits), which are all sourced from near the summit of Carriage Drive. The LCRA1 deposit is lobate in shape and had an estimated original deposit volume of 12.5 x 10⁶ m³, although erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the present day debris volume to 5.1 x 10⁶ m³. An optically stimulated luminescence date taken from sandy loess immediately beneath the LCRA1 deposit provided a maximum age for the rock avalanche event of 9,720 ± 750 years B.P., which is believed to be realistic given that this is shortly after the retreat of Acheron 3 ice from this part of the valley. Emplacement of rock avalanche material into an ancestral Ryton riverbed created a natural dam with a ~17 M m³ lake upstream. The river is thought to have created a natural spillway over the dam structure at ~557 m (a.s.l), and to have existed for a number of years before any significant downcutting occurred. Although a triggering mechanism for the LCRA1 deposit was poorly constrained, it is thought that stress rebound after glacial ice removal may have initiated failure. Due to the event occurring c.10,000 years ago, there was a lack of definition for a possible earthquake trigger, though the possibility is obvious. The LCRA₂ event had an original deposit volume of 0.66 x 10⁶ m³, and was constrained to the low-lying area adjacent to the Ryton River that had been created by river erosion of the LCRA1 deposit. Further erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the deposit volume to 0.4 x 10⁶ m³. A radiocarbon date from a piece of mānuka found within the LCRA2 deposit provided an age of 668 ± 36 years B.P., and this is thought to reliably date the event. The LCRA2 event also dammed the Ryton River, and the preservation of dam-break outwash terraces downstream from the deposit provides clear evidence of rapid dam erosion and flooding after overtopping, and breaching by the Ryton River. Based on the mean annual flow of the Ryton River, the LCRA2 lake would have taken approximately two weeks to fill assuming that there were no preferred breach paths and the material was relatively impermeable. The LCRA2 event is thought to have been coseismic with a fault rupture along the western segment of the PPAFZ, which has been dated at 600 ± 100 years B.P. by SMITH (2003). The small LCRA3 event was not able to be dated, but it is believed to have failed shortly after the LCRA2 event and it may in fact be a lag deposit of the second rock avalanche event possibly triggered by an aftershock. The deposit is only visible at one locality within the cliffs that line the Ryton River, and its lack of geomorphic expression is attributed to it occurring closely after the LCRA2 event, while the Ryton River was still dammed from the second rock avalanche event. A wedge-block of some 35,000 m³ of source material for a future rock avalanche was identified at the summit of Carriage Drive. The dilation of the rock mass, combined with unfavourably oriented sub-vertical bedding in the Torlesse Supergroup bedrock, has allowed toppling-style failure on both of the main ridge lines around the source area for the LCRADs. In the event of a future rock avalanche occurring within the Ryton riverbed an emergency response plan has been developed to provide a staged response, especially in relation to the camping ground located at the mouth of the Ryton River. A long-term management plan has also been developed for mitigation measures for the Ryton riverbed and adjacent floodplain areas downstream of a future rock avalanche at the LCRAD site.
