Effective management of waste and debris generated by a disaster event is vital to ensure rapid and efficient response and recovery that supports disaster risk reduction (DRR). Disaster waste refers to any stream of debris that is created from a natural disaster that impacts the environment, infrastructure, and property. This waste can be problematic due to extensive volumes, environmental contamination and pollution, public health risks, and the disruption of response and recovery efforts. Due to the complexities in dealing with these diverse and voluminous materials, having disaster waste management (DWM) planning in place pre-event is crucial. In particular, coordinated, interagency plans that have been informed by estimates of waste volumes and types are vital to ensure management facilities, personnel, and recovery resources do not become overwhelmed. Globally, a priority when formulating DWM plans is the robust estimation of disaster waste stream types and volumes. This is a relatively under-researched area, despite the growing risk of natural disasters and increasingly inadequate waste management facilities. In Aotearoa New Zealand, a nation-wide DWM planning tool has been proposed for local government use, and waste amounts from events such as the Christchurch Earthquakes have been estimated. However, there has been little work undertaken to estimate waste types and volumes with a region-specific, multi-hazard focus, which is required to facilitate detailed regional DWM planning. This research provides estimates of potential disaster waste volumes and types in the Waitaha-Canterbury region of the South Island (Te Waipounamu) for three key hazard scenarios: a M8.0 Alpine Fault earthquake with a south-to-north rupture pattern, a far-sourced tsunami using a maximum credible event model for a Peru-sourced event, and major flooding using geospatial datasets taken from available local government modelling. Conducted in partnership with Environment Canterbury and Canterbury CDEM, this estimation work informed stakeholder engagement through multi-agency workshops at the district level. This research was comprised of two key parts. The first was enhancing and extending a disaster waste estimation model used in Wellington and applying it to the Canterbury region to quantify waste volumes and types. The second part was using this model and its estimates to inform engagement with stakeholders in multi-agency, district-level workshops in Kaikōura, Hurunui, and Waimakariri. In these workshops, the waste estimates were used to catalyse discussion around potential issues associated with the management of disaster waste. Regionally, model estimates showed that the earthquake scenario would generate the highest total volume of disaster waste (1.94 million m³), compared to the tsunami scenario (1.89 million m³) and the flood scenario (173,900 m³). Flood waste estimates are likely underrepresented due to limited flood modelling coverage, but still provide a valuable comparison. Whilst waste estimates differ significantly between districts, waste volumes were shown to be not solely dependent on building/population density. The district-level workshops showed that DWM challenges revolved around logistical constraints, public concerns, governance complexities, and environmental issues. Future work should further enhance this estimation model and apply it to other regions of Aotearoa New Zealand, to help develop a set of cohesive DWM plans for each region. The waste estimation model could also be adapted and applied internationally. The findings from this research provide a foundation for advancing DWM planning and stakeholder engagement in the Waitaha-Canterbury region. By offering region-specific waste estimates across multiple hazard scenarios, this work supports district councils and emergency managers in developing informed, proactive strategies for disaster preparedness and response. The insights gained from district-level workshops highlight key challenges that must be addressed in future planning. These outcomes contribute to a broader research agenda for DWM in Aotearoa New Zealand, and offer a framework adaptable to international contexts.
Overview of the Presentation Jarg: • The seismic context & liquefaction Tom: • Potable Water Supply • Waste Water Network
With origins in the South Bronx area of New York in the early 1970s, hip-hop culture is now produced and consumed globally. While hip-hop activities can be varied, hip-hop is generally considered to have four forms or “elements”: DJing, MCing, b-boying/b-girling, and graffiti. Although all four elements of hip-hop have become a part of many youth work initiatives across the globe, public debate and controversy continue to surround hip-hop activities. Very little research and literature has explored the complexities involved in the assembling of hip-hop activities in youth work sites of practice using these hip-hop elements. This study attends to the gap in hip-hop and human service literature by tracing how hip-hop activities were assembled in several sites of youth work activity in Christchurch, New Zealand. Actor-network theory (ANT) is the methodological framework used to map the assemblage of hip-hop-youth work activities in this study. ANT follows how action is distributed across both human and non-human actors. By recognising the potential agency of “things”, this research traces the roles played by human actors, such as young people and youth workers, together with those of non-human actors such as funding documents, social media, clothing, and youth venue equipment. This ethnographic study provides rich descriptions or “snapshots” of some of the key socio-material practices that shaped the enactment of hip-hop-youth work activities. These are derived from fieldwork undertaken between October 2009 and December 2011, where participant observation took place across a range of sites of hip-hop-youth work activity. In addition to this fieldwork, formal interviews were undertaken with 22 participants, the majority being youth workers, young people, and youth trust administrators. The ANT framework reveals the complexity of the task of assembling hip-hop in youth work worlds. The thesis traces the work undertaken by both human and non-human actors in generating youth engagement in hip-hop-youth work activities. Young people’s hip-hop interests are shown to be varied, multiple, and continually evolving. It is also shown how generating youth interest in hip-hop-youth work activities involved overcoming young people’s indifference or lack of awareness of the hip-hop resources a youth trust had on offer. Furthermore, the study highlights where hip-hop activities were edited or “tinkered” with to avoid hip-hop “bads”. The thesis also unpacks how needed resources were enlisted, and how funders’ interests were translated into supporting hip-hop groups and activities. By tracing the range of actors mobilised to enact hip-hop-youth work activities, this research reveals how some youth trusts could avoid having to rely on obtaining government funds for their hip-hop activities. The thesis also includes an examination of one youth trust’s efforts to reconfigure its hip-hop activities after the earthquakes that struck Christchurch city in 2010 and 2011. Working both in and on the world, the text that is this thesis is also understood as an intervention. This study constitutes a deliberate attempt to strengthen understandings of hip-hop as a complex, multiple, and fluid entity. It therefore challenges traditional media and literature representations that simplify and thus either stigmatise or celebrate hip-hop. As such, this study opens up possibilities to consider the opportunities, as well as the complexities of assembling hip-hop in youth work sites of practice.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in supporting lifelines utilities.
The Resilient Organisations Research Programme and the University of Canterbury are undertaking a longitudinal study to examine the resilience and recovery of organisations within the Canterbury region following the 4 September Canterbury earthquake. The preliminary data suggest the physical, economic and social effects of the earthquake were varied across industry sectors within Canterbury. These preliminary results catalogue organisations’ perceptions of the: - disruptions to their ability to do business - challenges faced in the aftermath of the earthquake - factors that have helped mitigate the effects of the earthquake - revenue changes and projections for the duration of this change - financing options for recovery
In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
On 4 September 2010 the Magnitude 7.1 'Darfield' Earthquake marked the beginning of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. The Darfield earthquake produced strong ground shaking throughout the centralCanterbury Plains, affecting rural areas, small towns and the city of Christchurch. The event produced a 29km long surface rupture through intensive farmland, causing localised flooding and liquefaction. The central Canterbury plains were subjected to a sustained period of thousands of aftershocks in the months after the Darfield earthquake. The primary sector is a major component of the in New Zealand economy. Business units are predominantly small family-run farm organisations, though there are increasing levels of corporate farming. The agribusiness sector contributes 20 per cent of real GDP and 47 per cent of total exports for New Zealand. Of the approximately 2,000 farms that are located in the Canterbury Plains, the most common farming sectors in the region are Mixed farming (mostly comprised of sheep and/or beef farming), Dairy farming, and Arable farming (cropping). Many farms on the Canterbury Plains require some form of irrigation and are increasingly capital intensive, reliant on built infrastructure, technology and critical services. Farms are of great significance to their local rural economies, with many rural non-farming organisations dependent on the health of local farming organisations. Despite the economic significance of the sector, there have been few, if any studies analysing how modern intensive farms are affected by earthquakes. The aim of this report is to (1) summarise the impacts the Darfield earthquake had on farming organisations and outline in general terms how farms are vulnerable to the effects of an earthquake; (2) identify what factors helped mitigate earthquake-related impacts. Data for this paper was collected through two surveys of farming and rural non-farming organisations following the earthquake and contextual interviews with affected organisations. In total, 78 organisations participated in the study (Figure 1). Farming organisations represented 72% (N=56) of the sample.
This paper presents the preliminary findings of a study on the resilience and recovery of organisations following the Darfield earthquake in New Zealand on 4 September 2010. Sampling included organisations proximal and distal to the fault trace, organisations located within central business districts, and organisations from seven diverse industry sectors. The research captured information on the challenges to, the impacts on, and the reflections of the organisations in the first months of recovery. Organisations in central business districts and in the hospitality sector were most likely to close while organisations that had perishable stock and livestock were more heavily reliant on critical services. Staff well-being, cash flow, and customer loss were major concerns for organisations across all sectors. For all organisations, the most helpful factors in mitigating the effects of the earthquake to be their relationship with staff, the design and type of buildings, and critical service continuity or swift reinstatement of services.
The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
Recent tsunami events have highlighted the importance of effective tsunami risk management strategies (including land-use planning, structural and natural mitigation, warning systems, education and evacuation planning). However, the rarity of tsunami means that empirical data concerning reactions to tsunami warnings and evacuation behaviour is rare when compared to findings for evacuations from other hazards. More knowledge is required to document the full evacuation process, including responses to warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics, and the return home. Tsunami evacuation modelling has the potential to inform evidence-based tsunami risk planning and response. However, to date, tsunami evacuation models have largely focused on the timings of evacuations, rather than behaviours of those evacuating. In this research, survey data was gathered from coastal communities in Banks Peninsula and Christchurch, New Zealand, relating to behaviours and actions during the November 14th 2016 Kaikōura earthquake tsunami. Survey questions asked about immediate actions following the earthquake shaking, reactions to tsunami warnings, pre-evacuation actions, evacuation dynamics and details on congestion. This data was analysed to characterise trends and identify factors that influenced evacuation actions and behaviour, and was further used to develop a realistic evacuation model prototype to evaluate the capacity of the roading network in Banks Peninsula during a tsunami evacuation. The evacuation model incorporated tsunami risk management strategies that have been implemented by local authorities, and exposure and vulnerability data, alongside the empirical data collected from the survey. This research enhances knowledge of tsunami evacuation behaviour and reactions to tsunami warnings, and can be used to refine evacuation planning to ensure that people can evacuate efficiently, thereby reducing their tsunami exposure and personal risk.
This article argues that active coordination of research engagement after disasters has the potential to maximize research opportunities, improve research quality, increase end-user engagement, and manage escalating research activity to mitigate ethical risks posed to impacted populations. The focus is on the coordination of research activity after the 22nd February 2011 Mw6.2 Christchurch earthquake by the then newly-formed national research consortium, the Natural Hazards Research Platform, which included a social science research moratorium during the declared state of national emergency. Decisions defining this organisation’s functional and structural parameters are analyzed to identify lessons concerning the need for systematic approaches to the management of post disaster research, in collaboration with the response effort. Other lessons include the importance of involving an existing, broadly-based research consortium, ensuring that this consortium's coordination role is fully integrated into emergency management structures, and ensuring that all aspects of decision-making processes are transparent and easily accessed.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence in New Zealand’s South Island induced widespread liquefaction phenomena across the Christchurch urban area on four occasions (4 Sept 2010; 22 Feb; 13 June; 23 Dec 2011), that resulted in widespread ejection of silt and fine sand. This impacted transport networks as well as infiltrated and contaminated the damaged storm water system, making rapid clean-up an immediate post-earthquake priority. In some places the ejecta was contaminated by raw sewage and was readily remobilised in dry windy conditions, creating a long-term health risk to the population. Thousands of residential properties were inundated with liquefaction ejecta, however residents typically lacked the capacity (time or resources) to clean-up without external assistance. The liquefaction silt clean-up response was co-ordinated by the Christchurch City Council and executed by a network of contractors and volunteer groups, including the ‘Farmy-Army’ and the ‘Student-Army’. The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately 2 months for each of the 3 main liquefaction inducing earthquakes; despite each event producing different volumes of ejecta. Preliminary cost estimates indicate total clean-up costs will be over NZ$25 million. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill since the beginning of the Canterbury earthquakes sequence. The liquefaction clean-up experience in Christchurch following the 2010-2011 earthquake sequence has emerged as a valuable case study to support further analysis and research on the coordination, management and costs of large volume deposition of fine grained sediment in urban areas.
The 22nd February 2011, Mw 6.3 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand caused major damage to critical infrastructure, including the healthcare system. The Natural Hazard Platform of NZ funded a short-term project called “Hospital Functions and Services” to support the Canterbury District Health Board’s (CDHB) efforts in capturing standardized data that describe the effects of the earthquake on the Canterbury region’s main hospital system. The project utilised a survey tool originally developed by researchers at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) to assess the loss of function of hospitals in the Maule and Bío-Bío regions following the 27th February 2010, Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake in Chile. This paper describes the application of the JHU tool for surveying the impact of Christchurch earthquake on the CDHB Hospital System, including the system’s residual capacity to deliver emergency response and health care. A short summary of the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on other CDHB public and private hospitals is also provided. This study demonstrates that, as was observed in other earthquakes around the world, the effects of damage to non-structural building components, equipment, utility lifelines, and transportation were far more disruptive than the minor structural damage observed in buildings (FEMA 2007). Earthquake related complications with re-supply and other organizational aspects also impacted the emergency response and the healthcare facilities’ residual capacity to deliver services in the short and long terms.
On 22 February 2011, Canterbury and its largest city Christchurch experienced its second major earthquake within six months. The region is facing major economic and organisational challenges in the aftermath of these events. Approximately 25% of all buildings in the Christchurch CBD have been “red tagged” or deemed unsafe to enter. The New Zealand Treasury estimates that the combined cost of the February earthquake and the September earthquake is approximately NZ$15 billion[2]. This paper examines the national and regional economic climate prior to the event, discusses the immediate economic implications of this event, and the challenges and opportunities faced by organisations affected by this event. In order to facilitate recovery of the Christchurch area, organisations must adjust to a new norm; finding ways not only to continue functioning, but to grow in the months and years following these earthquakes. Some organisations relocated within days to areas that have been less affected by the earthquakes. Others are taking advantage of government subsidised aid packages to help retain their employees until they can make long-term decisions about the future of their organisation. This paper is framed as a “report from the field” in order to provide insight into the early recovery scenario as it applies to organisations affected by the February 2011 earthquake. It is intended both to inform and facilitate discussion about how organisations can and should pursue recovery in Canterbury, and how organisations can become more resilient in the face of the next crisis.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
