The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake ruptured ~200 km at the ground surface across the New Zealand plate boundary zone in the northern South Island. This study was conducted in an area of ~600 km2 in the epicentral region where the faults comprise two main non-coplanar sets that strike E-NE and NNE-NW with mainly steep dips (60о-80°). Analysis of the surface rupture using field and LiDAR data provides new information on the dimensions, geometries and kinematics of these faults which was not previously available from pre-earthquake active faults or bedrock structure. The more northerly striking fault set are sub-parallel to basement bedding and accommodated predominantly left-lateral reverse slip with net slips of ~1 and ~5 m for the Stone Jug and Leader faults, respectively. The E-NE striking Conway-Charwell and The Humps faults accrued right-lateral to oblique reverse with net slips of ~2 and ~3 m, respectively. The faults form a hard-linked system dominated by kinematics consistent with the ~260° trend of the relative plate motion vector and the transpressional structures recorded across the plate boundary in the NE South Island. Interaction and intersection of the main fault sets facilitated propagation of the earthquake and transfer of slip northwards across the plate boundary zone.
The magnitude Mw7.8 ‘Kaikōura’ earthquake occurred shortly after midnight on 14 November 2016. This paper presents an overview of the geotechnical impacts on the South Island of New Zealand recorded during the postevent reconnaissance. Despite the large moment magnitude of this earthquake, relatively little liquefaction was observed across the South Island, with the only severe manifestation occurring in the young, loose alluvial deposits in the floodplains of the Wairau and Opaoa Rivers near Blenheim. The spatial extent and volume of liquefaction ejecta across South Island is significantly less than that observed in Christchurch during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and the impact of its occurrence to the built environment was largely negligible on account of the severe manifestations occurring away from the areas of major development. Large localised lateral displacements occurred in Kaikōura around Lyell Creek. The soft fine-grained material in the upper portions of the soil profile and the free face at the creek channel were responsible for the accumulation of displacement during the ground shaking. These movements had severely impacted the houses which were built close (within the zone of large displacement) to Lyell Creek. The wastewater treatment facility located just north of Kaikōura also suffered tears in the liners of the oxidation ponds and distortions in the aeration system due to ground movements. Ground failures on the Amuri and Emu Plains (within the Waiau Valley) were small considering the large peak accelerations (in excess of 1g) experienced in the area. Minor to moderate lateral spreading and ejecta was observed at some bridge crossings in the area. However, most of the structural damage sustained by the bridges was a result of the inertial loading, and the damage resulting from geotechnical issues were secondary.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
