The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
Two projects are documented within this MEM Report: I. The first project examined what was learnt involving the critical infrastructure in the aftermath of natural disasters in the Canterbury region of New Zealand – the most prominent being the series of earthquakes between 2010 and 2011. The project identified several learning gaps, leading to recommendations for further investigations that could add significant value for the lifeline infrastructure community. II. Following the Lifeline Lesson Learnt Project, the Disaster Mitigation Guideline series was initiated with two booklets, one on Emergency Potable Water and a second on Emergency Sanitation. The key message from both projects is that we can and must learn from disasters. The projects described are part of the emergency management, and critical infrastructure learning cycles – presenting knowledge captured by others in a digestible format, enabling the lessons to be reapplied. Without these kinds of projects, there will be fewer opportunities to learn from other’s successes and failures when it comes to preparing for natural disasters.
In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised through regular practice.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) play acrucial role in times of disasters. Therefore it is crucial to understand more thoroughly the communication roles and responsibilities of interagency team members and to examine how individual members communicate within a complex, evolving, and unstable environment. It is also important to understand how different organisational identities and their spatial geographies contribute to the interactional dynamics. Earthquakes hit the Canterbury region on September, 2010 and then on February 2011 a more devastating shallow earthquake struck resulting in severe damage to the Aged Residential Care (ARC) sector. Over 600 ARC beds were lost and 500 elderly and disabled people were displaced. Canterbury District Health Board (CDHB) set up an interagency emergency response team to address the issues of vulnerable people with significant health and disability needs who were unable to access their normal supports due to the effects of the earthquake. The purpose of this qualitative interpretive study is to focus on the case study of the response and evacuation of vulnerable people by interagencies responding to the event. Staff within these agencies were interviewed with a focus on the critical incidents that either stabilised or negatively influenced the outcome of the response. The findings included the complexity of navigating multiple agencies communication channels; understanding the different hierarchies and communication methods within each agency; data communication challenges when infrastructures were severely damaged; the importance of having the right skills, personal attributes and understanding of the organisations in the response; and the significance of having a liaison in situ representing and communicating through to agencies geographically dispersed from Canterbury. It is hoped that this research will assist in determining a future framework for interagency communication best practice and policy.
This research examines a surprising partner in emergency management - a local community time bank. Specifically, we explain the role of the Lyttelton Time Bank in promoting community resiliency following the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011. A time bank is a grassroots exchange system in which members trade services non-reciprocally. This exchange model assumes that everyone has tradable skills and all labour is equal in value. One hour of any labour earns a member one time bank hour, which can be used to purchase another member’s services. Before the earthquakes struck, the Lyttelton Time Bank (TB) had organised over 10% of the town’s residents and 18 local organisations. It was documenting, developing, and mobilising skills to solve individual and collective problems. This report examines the Lyttelton Time Bank and its’ role before, during, and after the earthquakes based on the analysis of over three and a half years of fieldwork, observations, interviews, focus groups, trading activity, and secondary data.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
Disasters can create the equivalent of 20 years of waste in only a few days. Disaster waste can have direct impacts on public health and safety, and on the environment. The management of such waste has a great direct cost to society in terms of labor, equipment, processing, transport and disposal. Disaster waste management also has indirect costs, in the sense that slow management can slow down a recovery, greatly affecting the ability of commerce and industry to re-start. In addition, a disaster can lead to the disruption of normal solid waste management systems, or result in inappropriate management that leads to expensive environmental remediation. Finally, there are social impacts implicit in disaster waste management decisions because of psychological impact we expect when waste is not cleared quickly or is cleared too quickly. The paper gives an overview of the challenge of disaster waste management, examining issues of waste quantity and composition; waste treatment; environmental, economic, and social impacts; health and safety matters; and planning. Christchurch, New Zealand, and the broader region of Canterbury were impacted during this research by a series of shallow earthquakes. This has led to the largest natural disaster emergency in New Zealand’s history, and the management of approximately 8 million tons of building and infrastructure debris has become a major issue. The paper provides an overview of the status of disaster waste management in Christchurch as a case study. A key conclusion is the vital role of planning in effective disaster waste management. In spite of the frequency of disasters, in most countries the ratio of time spent on planning for disaster waste management to the time spent on normal waste management is extremely low. Disaster waste management also requires improved education or training of those involved in response efforts. All solid waste professionals have a role to play to respond to the challenges of disaster waste management.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
The Master of Engineering Management Project was sponsored by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) and consisted of two phases: The first was an analysis of existing information detailing the effects of hazardous natural events on Canterbury Lifeline Utilities in the past 15 years. The aim of this “Lessons Learned” project was to produce an analysis report that identified key themes from the research, gaps in the existing data and to provide recommendations from these “Lessons Learned.” The Second phase was the development of a practical “Disaster Mitigation Guideline” that outlined lessons in the field of Emergency Sanitation. This research would build upon the first stage and would draw from international reference to develop a guideline that has practical implementation possibilities throughout the world.
At 00:02 on 14th November 2016, a Mw 7.8 earthquake occurred in and offshore of the northeast of the South Island of New Zealand. Fault rupture, ground shaking, liquefaction, and co-seismic landslides caused severe damage to distributed infrastructure, and particularly transportation networks; large segments of the country’s main highway, State Highway 1 (SH1), and the Main North Line (MNL) railway line, were damaged between Picton and Christchurch. The damage caused direct local impacts, including isolation of communities, and wider regional impacts, including disruption of supply chains. Adaptive measures have ensured immediate continued regional transport of goods and people. Air and sea transport increased quickly, both for emergency response and to ensure routine transport of goods. Road diversions have also allowed critical connections to remain operable. This effective response to regional transport challenges allowed Civil Defence Emergency Management to quickly prioritise access to isolated settlements, all of which had road access 23 days after the earthquake. However, 100 days after the earthquake, critical segments of SH1 and the MNL remain closed and their ongoing repairs are a serious national strategic, as well as local, concern. This paper presents the impacts on South Island transport infrastructure, and subsequent management through the emergency response and early recovery phases, during the first 100 days following the initial earthquake, and highlights lessons for transportation system resilience.
Depending on their nature and severity, disasters can create large volumes of debris and waste. Waste volumes from a single event can be the equivalent of many times the annual waste generation rate of the affected community. These volumes can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities and personnel. Mismanagement of disaster waste can affect both the response and long term recovery of a disaster affected area. Previous research into disaster waste management has been either context specific or event specific, making it difficult to transfer lessons from one disaster event to another. The aim of this research is to develop a systems understanding of disaster waste management and in turn develop context- and disaster-transferrable decision-making guidance for emergency and waste managers. To research this complex and multi-disciplinary problem, a multi-hazard, multi-context, multi-case study approach was adopted. The research focussed on five major disaster events: 2011 Christchurch earthquake, 2009 Victorian Bushfires, 2009 Samoan tsunami, 2009 L’Aquila earthquake and 2005 Hurricane Katrina. The first stage of the analysis involved the development of a set of ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators. The indicators demonstrate a method by which disaster managers, planners and researchers can simplify the very large spectra of possible disaster impacts, into some key decision-drivers which will likely influence post-disaster management requirements. The second stage of the research was to develop a set of criteria to represent the desirable environmental, economic, social and recovery effects of a successful disaster waste management system. These criteria were used to assess the effectiveness of the disaster waste management approaches for the case studies. The third stage of the research was the cross-case analysis. Six main elements of disaster waste management systems were identified and analysed. These were: strategic management, funding mechanisms, operational management, environmental and human health risk management, and legislation and regulation. Within each of these system elements, key decision-making guidance (linked to the ‘disaster & disaster waste’ indicators) and management principles were developed. The ‘disaster & disaster waste’ impact indicators, the effects assessment criteria and management principles have all been developed so that they can be practically applied to disaster waste management planning and response in the future.
This article argues that active coordination of research engagement after disasters has the potential to maximize research opportunities, improve research quality, increase end-user engagement, and manage escalating research activity to mitigate ethical risks posed to impacted populations. The focus is on the coordination of research activity after the 22nd February 2011 Mw6.2 Christchurch earthquake by the then newly-formed national research consortium, the Natural Hazards Research Platform, which included a social science research moratorium during the declared state of national emergency. Decisions defining this organisation’s functional and structural parameters are analyzed to identify lessons concerning the need for systematic approaches to the management of post disaster research, in collaboration with the response effort. Other lessons include the importance of involving an existing, broadly-based research consortium, ensuring that this consortium's coordination role is fully integrated into emergency management structures, and ensuring that all aspects of decision-making processes are transparent and easily accessed.
The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The potential for a gastroenteritis outbreak in a post-earthquake environment may increase because of compromised infrastructure services, contaminated liquefaction (lateral spreading and surface ejecta), and the presence of gastroenteritis agents in the drinking water network. A population in a post-earthquake environment might be seriously affected by gastroenteritis because it has a short incubation period (about 10 hours). The aim of this multidisciplinary research was to retrospectively analyse the gastroenteritis prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The first focus was to assess whether earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis agents spatially explained the recorded gastroenteritis cases over the period of 35 days following the February 22, 2011 earthquake in Christchurch. The gastroenteritis agents considered in this study were Escherichia coli found in the drinking water supply (MPN/100mL) and Non-Compliant Free Associated Chlorine (FAC-NC) (less than <0.02mg/L). The second focus was the protocols that averted a gastroenteritis outbreak at three Emergency Centres (ECs): Burnside High School Emergency Centre (BEC); Cowles Stadium Emergency Centre (CEC); and Linwood High School Emergency Centre (LEC). Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols and indirect themes included type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. This research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally Using a mixed-method approach, gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors were quantitatively analysed. A damage profile was created by amalgamating different types of damage for the considered factors for each Census Area Unit (CAU) in Christchurch. The damage profile enabled the application of a variety of statistical methods which included Moran’s I , Hot Spot (HS) analysis, Spearman’s Rho, and Besag–York–Mollié Model using a range of software. The qualitative analysis involved interviewing 30 EC staff members. The data was evaluated by adopting the Grounded Theory (GT) approach. Spatial analysis of considered factors showed that highly damaged CAUs were statistically clustered as demonstrated by Moran’s I statistic and hot spot analysis. Further modelling showed that gastroenteritis point prevalence clustering could not be fully explained by infrastructure damage alone, and other factors influenced the recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence. However, the results of this research suggest that there was a tenuous, indirect relationship between recorded gastroenteritis point prevalence and the considered factors: earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction and FAC-NC. Two ECs were opened as part of the post-earthquake response in areas with severe infrastructure damage and liquefaction (BEC and CEC). The third EC (CEC) provided important lessons that were learnt from the previous September 4, 2010 earthquake, and implemented after the February 22, 2011 earthquake. The ECs were selected to represent the Christchurch area, and were situated where potential for gastroenteritis was high. BEC represented the western side of Christchurch; whilst, CEC and LEC represented the eastern side, where the potential for gastroenteritis was high according to the outputs of the quantitative spatial modelling. Qualitative analysis from the interviews at the ECs revealed that evacuees were arriving at the ECs with gastroenteritis-like symptoms. Participants believed that those symptoms did not originate at the ECs. Two types of interwoven themes identified: direct and indirect. The direct themes were preventive protocols that included prolific use of hand sanitisers; surveillance; and the services offered. Indirect themes included the EC layout, type of EC building (school or a sports stadium), and EC staff. Indirect themes governed the quality and sustainability of the direct themes implemented, which in turn averted gastroenteritis outbreaks at the ECs. The main limitations of the research were Modifiable Areal Units (MAUP), data detection, and memory loss. It was concluded that gastroenteritis point prevalence following the February 22, 2011 earthquake could not be solely explained by earthquake-induced infrastructure damage, liquefaction, and gastroenteritis causative agents alone. However, this research provides a practical method that can be adapted to assess gastroenteritis risk in a post-earthquake environment. Creating a damage profile for each CAU and using spatial data analysis can isolate vulnerable areas, and qualitative data analysis provides localised information. Thus, this mixed method approach can be used in other disaster contexts to study gastroenteritis prevalence, and can serve as an appendage to the existing framework for assessing infectious diseases. Furthermore, the lessons learnt from qualitative analysis can inform the current infectious disease management plans, designed for a post-disaster response in New Zealand and internationally.
The University of Canterbury Dept. of Chemistry has weathered the Canterbury Earthquake of September 4, 2010 very well due to a combination of good luck, good planning and dedicated effort. We owe a great deal to university Emergency Response Team and Facilities Management Personnel. The overall emergency preparedness of the university was tested to a degree far beyond anything else in its history and shown to be well up to scratch. A strong cooperative relationship between the pan-campus controlling body and the departmental response teams greatly facilitated our efforts. Information and assistance was provided promptly, as and when we needed it without unnecessary bureaucratic overheads. At the departmental level we are indebted to the technical staff who implemented the invaluable pre-quake mitigation measures and carried the majority of the post-quake clean-up workload. These people put aside their personal concerns and anxieties at a time when magnitude-5 aftershocks were still a regular occurrence.
In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand. Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads. While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption. Following a robust review of literature and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Findings were supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and infrastructure exposure maps. A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services. The earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture. Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre landlines as they went. Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives. Adapting to an artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road cordon in order to get home to family and farms. Performance of dwellings was tied to socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre. Farmers who lost water access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers. Socioeconomic differences between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between the towns assessed in this study. Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and flexible with planning for multiple size classes of towns.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
One of the great challenges facing human systems today is how to prepare for, manage, and adapt successfully to the profound and rapid changes wreaked by disasters. Wellington, New Zealand, is a capital city at significant risk of devastating earthquake and tsunami, potentially requiring mass evacuations with little or short notice. Subsequent hardship and suffering due to widespread property damage and infrastructure failure could cause large areas of the Wellington Region to become uninhabitable for weeks to months. Previous research has shown that positive health and well-being are associated with disaster-resilient outcomes. Preventing adverse outcomes before disaster strikes, through developing strengths-based skill sets in health-protective attitudes and behaviours, is increasingly advocated in disaster research, practise, and management. This study hypothesised that well-being constructs involving an affective heuristic play vital roles in pathways to resilience as proximal determinants of health-protective behaviours. Specifically, this study examined the importance of health-related quality of life and subjective well-being in motivating evacuation preparedness, measured in a community sample (n=695) drawn from the general adult population of Wellington’s isolated eastern suburbs. Using a quantitative epidemiological approach, the study measured the prevalence of key quality of life indicators (physical and mental health, emotional well-being or “Sense of Coherence”, spiritual well-being, social well-being, and life satisfaction) using validated psychometric scales; analysed the strengths of association between these indicators and the level of evacuation preparedness at categorical and continuous levels of measurement; and tested the predictive power of the model to explain the variance in evacuation preparedness activity. This is the first study known to examine multi-dimensional positive health and global well-being as resilient processes for engaging in evacuation preparedness behaviour. A cross-sectional study design and quantitative survey were used to collect self-report data on the study variables; a postal questionnaire was fielded between November 2008 and March 2009 to a sampling frame developed through multi-stage cluster randomisation. The survey response rate was 28.5%, yielding a margin of error of +/- 3.8% with 95% confidence and 80% statistical power to detect a true correlation coefficient of 0.11 or greater. In addition to the primary study variables, data were collected on demographic and ancillary variables relating to contextual factors in the physical environment (risk perception of physical and personal vulnerability to disaster) and the social environment (through the construct of self-determination), and other measures of disaster preparedness. These data are reserved for future analyses. Results of correlational and regression analyses for the primary study variables show that Wellingtonians are highly individualistic in how their well-being influences their preparedness, and a majority are taking inadequate action to build their resilience to future disaster from earthquake- or tsunami-triggered evacuation. At a population level, the conceptual multi-dimensional model of health-related quality of life and global well-being tested in this study shows a positive association with evacuation preparedness at statistically significant levels. However, it must be emphasised that the strength of this relationship is weak, accounting for only 5-7% of the variability in evacuation preparedness. No single dimension of health-related quality of life or well-being stands out as a strong predictor of preparedness. The strongest associations for preparedness are in a positive direction for spiritual well-being, emotional well-being, and life satisfaction; all involve a sense of existential meaningfulness. Spiritual well-being is the only quality of life variable making a statistically significant unique contribution to explaining the variance observed in the regression models. Physical health status is weakly associated with preparedness in a negative direction at a continuous level of measurement. No association was found at statistically significant levels for mental health status and social well-being. These findings indicate that engaging in evacuation preparedness is a very complex, holistic, yet individualised decision-making process, and likely involves highly subjective considerations for what is personally relevant. Gender is not a factor. Those 18-24 years of age are least likely to prepare and evacuation preparedness increases with age. Multidimensional health and global well-being are important constructs to consider in disaster resilience for both pre-event and post-event timeframes. This work indicates a need for promoting self-management of risk and building resilience by incorporating a sense of personal meaning and importance into preparedness actions, and for future research into further understanding preparedness motivations.
Tsunami have the potential to cause significant disruptions to society, including damage to infrastructure, critical to the every-day operation of society. Effective risk management is required to reduce the potential tsunami impacts to them. Christchurch city, situated on the eastern coast of New Zealand’s South Island, is exposed to a number of far-field tsunami hazards. Although the tsunami hazard has been well identified for Christchurch city infrastructure, the likely impacts have not been well constrained. To support effective risk management a credible and realistic infrastructure impact model is required to inform risk management planning. The objectives of this thesis are to assess the impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure from a credible, hypothetical far-field tsunami scenario. To achieve this an impact assessment process is adopted, using tsunami hazard and exposure measures to determine asset vulnerability and subsequent impacts. However, the thesis identified a number of knowledge gaps in infrastructure vulnerability to tsunami. The thesis addresses this by using two approaches: a tsunami damage matrix; and the development of tsunami fragility functions. The tsunami damage matrix pools together tsunami impacts on infrastructure literature, and post-event field observations. It represents the most comprehensive ‘look-up’ resource for tsunami impacts to infrastructure to date. This damage matrix can inform the assessment of tsunami impacts on Christchurch city infrastructure by providing a measure of damage likelihood at various hazard intensities. A more robust approach to tsunami vulnerability of infrastructure are fragility functions, which are also developed in this thesis. These were based on post-event tsunami surveys of the 2011 ‘Tohoku’ earthquake tsunami in Japan. The fragility functions are limited to road and bridge infrastructure, but represent the highest resolution measure of vulnerability for the given assets. As well as providing a measure of damage likelihood for a given tsunami hazard intensity, these also indicate a level of asset damage. The impact assessment process, and synthesized vulnerability measures, are used to run tsunami impact models for Christchurch infrastructure to determine the probability of asset damage occurring and to determine if impact will reach or exceed a given damage state. The models suggest that infrastructure damage is likely to occur in areas exposed to tsunami inundation in this scenario, with significant damage identified for low elevation roads and bridges. The results are presented and discussed in the context of the risk management framework, with emphasis on using risk assessment to inform risk treatment, monitoring and review. In summary, this thesis A) advances tsunami vulnerability and impact assessment methodologies for infrastructure and B) provides a tsunami impact assessment framework for Christchurch city infrastructure which will inform infrastructure tsunami risk management for planners, emergency managers and lifelines groups.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.
Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.
Recent surface-rupturing earthquakes in New Zealand have highlighted significant exposure and vulnerability of the road network to fault displacement. Understanding fault displacement hazard and its impact on roads is crucial for mitigating risks and enhancing resilience. There is a need for regional-scale assessments of fault displacement to identify vulnerable areas within the road network for the purposes of planning and prioritising site-specific investigations. This thesis employs updated analysis of data from three historical surface-rupturing earthquakes (Edgecumbe 1987, Darfield 2010, and Kaikoūra 2016) to develop an empirical model that addresses the gap in regional fault displacement hazard analysis. The findings contribute to understanding of • How to use seismic hazard model inputs for regional fault displacement hazard analysis • How faulting type and sediment cover affects the magnitude and spatial distribution of fault displacement • How the distribution of displacement and regional fault displacement hazard is impacted by secondary faulting • The inherent uncertainties and limitations associated with employing an empirical approach at a regional scale • Which sections of New Zealand’s roading network are most susceptible to fault displacement hazard and warrant site-specific investigations • Which regions should prioritise updating emergency management plans to account for post-event disruptions to roading. I used displacement data from the aforementioned historical ruptures to generate displacement versus distance-to-fault curves for various displacement components, fault types, and geological characteristics. Using those relationships and established relationships for along-strike displacement, displacement contours were generated surrounding active faults within the NZ Community Fault Model. Next, I calculated a new measure of 1D strain along roads as well as relative hazard, which integrated 1D strain and normalised slip rate data. Summing these values at the regional level identified areas of heightened relative hazard across New Zealand, and permits an assessment of the susceptibility of road networks using geomorphon land classes as proxies for vulnerability. The results reveal that fault-parallel displacements tend to localise near the fault plane, while vertical and fault-perpendicular displacements sustain over extended distances. Notably, no significant disparities were observed in off-fault displacement between the hanging wall and footwall sides of the fault, or among different surface geology types, potentially attributed to dataset biases. The presence of secondary faulting in the dataset contributes to increased levels of tectonic displacement farther from the fault, highlighting its significance in hazard assessments. Furthermore, fault displacement contours delineate broader zones around dip-slip faults compared to strike-slip faults, with correlations identified between fault length and displacement width. Road ‘strain’ values are higher around dip-slip faults, with notable examples observed in the Westland and Buller Districts. As expected, relative hazard analysis revealed elevated values along faults with high slip rates, notably along the Alpine Fault. A regional-scale analysis of hazard and exposure reveals heightened relative hazard in specific regions, including Wellington, Southern Hawke’s Bay, Central Bay of Plenty, Central West Coast, inland Canterbury, and the Wairau Valley of Marlborough. Notably, the Central West Coast exhibits the highest summed relative hazard value, attributed to the fast-slipping Alpine Fault. The South Island generally experiences greater relative hazard due to larger and faster-slipping faults compared to the North Island, despite having fewer roads. Central regions of New Zealand face heightened risk compared to Southern or Northern regions. Critical road links intersecting high-slipping faults, such as State Highways 6, 73, 1, and 2, necessitate prioritisation for site-specific assessments, emergency management planning and targeted mitigation strategies. Roads intersecting with the Alpine Fault are prone to large parallel displacements, requiring post-quake repair efforts. Mitigation strategies include future road avoidance of nearby faults, modification of road fill and surface material, and acknowledgement of inherent risk, leading to prioritised repair efforts of critical roads post-quake. Implementing these strategies enhances emergency response efforts by improving accessibility to isolated regions following a major surface-rupturing event, facilitating faster supply delivery and evacuation assistance. This thesis contributes to the advancement of understanding fault displacement hazard by introducing a novel regional, empirical approach. The methods and findings highlight the importance of further developing such analyses and extending them to other critical infrastructure types exposed to fault displacement hazard in New Zealand. Enhancing our comprehension of the risks associated with fault displacement hazard offers valuable insights into various mitigation strategies for roading infrastructure and informs emergency response planning, thereby enhancing both national and global infrastructure resilience against geological hazards.
Disasters that significantly affect people typically result in the production of documents detailing disaster lessons. This was the case in the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes, as government and emergency response agencies, community organisations, and the media, engaged in the practice of producing and reporting disaster lessons. This thesis examines the disaster lessons that were developed by emergent groups following the Canterbury earthquakes (4 September 2010 and 22 February 2011). It adopts a Foucauldian analysis approach to investigate both the construction of disaster lessons and to document how this practice has come to dominate postdisaster activity following the Canterbury earthquakes. The study involved an analysis of academic literature, public documents and websites and interviews with key members of a range of Canterbury based emergent community groups. This material was used to generate a genealogy of disaster lessons, which was given in order to generate an account of how disaster lessons emerged and have come to dominate as a practice of disaster management. The thesis then examines the genealogy through the concept of governmentality so as to demonstrate how this discourse of disaster lessons has come to be used as a governing rationale that shapes and guides the emergent groups conduct in postdisaster New Zealand.
After a high-intensity seismic event, inspections of structural damages need to be carried out as soon as possible in order to optimize the emergency management, as well as improving the recovery time. In the current practice, damage inspections are performed by an experienced engineer, who physically inspect the structures. This way of doing not only requires a significant amount of time and high skilled human resources, but also raises the concern about the inspector’s safety. A promising alternative is represented using new technologies, such as drones and artificial intelligence, which can perform part of the damage classification task. In fact, drones can safely access high hazard components of the structures: for instance, bridge piers or abutments, and perform the reconnaissance by using highresolution cameras. Furthermore, images can be automatically processed by machine learning algorithms, and damages detected. In this paper, the possibility of applying such technologies for inspecting New Zealand bridges is explored. Firstly, a machine-learning model for damage detection by performing image analysis is presented. Specifically, the algorithm was trained to recognize cracks in concrete members. A sensitivity analysis was carried out to evaluate the algorithm accuracy by using database images. Depending on the confidence level desired,i.e. by allowing a manual classification where the alghortim confidence is below a specific tolerance, the accuracy was found reaching up to 84.7%. In the second part, the model is applied to detect the damage observed on the Anzac Bridge (GPS coordinates -43.500865, 172.701138) in Christchurch by performing a drone reconnaissance. Reults show that the accuracy of the damage detection was equal to 88% and 63% for cracking and spalling, respectively.
Sewerage systems convey sewage, or wastewater, from residential or commercial buildings through complex reticulation networks to treatment plants. During seismic events both transient ground motion and permanent ground deformation can induce physical damage to sewerage system components, limiting or impeding the operability of the whole system. The malfunction of municipal sewerage systems can result in the pollution of nearby waterways through discharge of untreated sewage, pose a public health threat by preventing the use of appropriate sanitation facilities, and cause serious inconvenience for rescuers and residents. Christchurch, the second largest city in New Zealand, was seriously affected by the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) in 2010-2011. The CES imposed widespread damage to the Christchurch sewerage system (CSS), causing a significant loss of functionality and serviceability to the system. The Christchurch City Council (CCC) relied heavily on temporary sewerage services for several months following the CES. The temporary services were supported by use of chemical and portable toilets to supplement the damaged wastewater system. The rebuild delivery agency -Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was created to be responsible for repair of 85 % of the damaged horizontal infrastructure (i.e., water, wastewater, stormwater systems, and roads) in Christchurch. Numerous initiatives to create platforms/tools aiming to, on the one hand, support the understanding, management and mitigation of seismic risk for infrastructure prior to disasters, and on the other hand, to support the decision-making for post-disaster reconstruction and recovery, have been promoted worldwide. Despite this, the CES in New Zealand highlighted that none of the existing platforms/tools are either accessible and/or readable or usable by emergency managers and decision makers for restoring the CSS. Furthermore, the majority of existing tools have a sole focus on the engineering perspective, while the holistic process of formulating recovery decisions is based on system-wide approach, where a variety of factors in addition to technical considerations are involved. Lastly, there is a paucity of studies focused on the tools and frameworks for supporting decision-making specifically on sewerage system restoration after earthquakes. This thesis develops a decision support framework for sewerage pipe and system restoration after earthquakes, building on the experience and learning of the organisations involved in recovering the CSS following the CES in 2010-2011. The proposed decision support framework includes three modules: 1) Physical Damage Module (PDM); 2) Functional Impact Module (FIM); 3) Pipeline Restoration Module (PRM). The PDM provides seismic fragility matrices and functions for sewer gravity and pressure pipelines for predicting earthquake-induced physical damage, categorised by pipe materials and liquefaction zones. The FIM demonstrates a set of performance indicators that are categorised in five domains: structural, hydraulic, environmental, social and economic domains. These performance indicators are used to assess loss of wastewater system service and the induced functional impacts in three different phases: emergency response, short-term recovery and long-term restoration. Based on the knowledge of the physical and functional status-quo of the sewerage systems post-earthquake captured through the PDM and FIM, the PRM estimates restoration time of sewer networks by use of restoration models developed using a Random Forest technique and graphically represented in terms of restoration curves. The development of a decision support framework for sewer recovery after earthquakes enables decision makers to assess physical damage, evaluate functional impacts relating to hydraulic, environmental, structural, economic and social contexts, and to predict restoration time of sewerage systems. Furthermore, the decision support framework can be potentially employed to underpin system maintenance and upgrade by guiding system rehabilitation and to monitor system behaviours during business-as-usual time. In conjunction with expert judgement and best practices, this framework can be moreover applied to assist asset managers in targeting the inclusion of system resilience as part of asset maintenance programmes.
The Lake Coleridge Rock Avalanche Deposits (LCRADs) are located on Ryton Station in the middle Rakaia Valley, approximately 80 km west of Christchurch. Torlesse Supergroup greywacke is the basement material and has been significantly influenced by both active tectonics and glaciation. Both glacial and post-glacial processes have produced large volumes of material which blanket the bedrock on slopes and in the valley floors. The LCRADs were part of a regional study of rock avalanches by WHITEHOUSE (1981, 1983) and WHITEHOUSE and GRIFFITHS (1983), and a single rock avalanche event was recognised with a weathering rind age of 120 years B.P. that was later modified to 150 ± 40 years B.P. The present study has refined details of both the age and the sequence of events at the site, by identifying three separate rock avalanche deposits (termed the LCRA1, LCRA2 and LCRA3 deposits), which are all sourced from near the summit of Carriage Drive. The LCRA1 deposit is lobate in shape and had an estimated original deposit volume of 12.5 x 10⁶ m³, although erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the present day debris volume to 5.1 x 10⁶ m³. An optically stimulated luminescence date taken from sandy loess immediately beneath the LCRA1 deposit provided a maximum age for the rock avalanche event of 9,720 ± 750 years B.P., which is believed to be realistic given that this is shortly after the retreat of Acheron 3 ice from this part of the valley. Emplacement of rock avalanche material into an ancestral Ryton riverbed created a natural dam with a ~17 M m³ lake upstream. The river is thought to have created a natural spillway over the dam structure at ~557 m (a.s.l), and to have existed for a number of years before any significant downcutting occurred. Although a triggering mechanism for the LCRA1 deposit was poorly constrained, it is thought that stress rebound after glacial ice removal may have initiated failure. Due to the event occurring c.10,000 years ago, there was a lack of definition for a possible earthquake trigger, though the possibility is obvious. The LCRA₂ event had an original deposit volume of 0.66 x 10⁶ m³, and was constrained to the low-lying area adjacent to the Ryton River that had been created by river erosion of the LCRA1 deposit. Further erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the deposit volume to 0.4 x 10⁶ m³. A radiocarbon date from a piece of mānuka found within the LCRA2 deposit provided an age of 668 ± 36 years B.P., and this is thought to reliably date the event. The LCRA2 event also dammed the Ryton River, and the preservation of dam-break outwash terraces downstream from the deposit provides clear evidence of rapid dam erosion and flooding after overtopping, and breaching by the Ryton River. Based on the mean annual flow of the Ryton River, the LCRA2 lake would have taken approximately two weeks to fill assuming that there were no preferred breach paths and the material was relatively impermeable. The LCRA2 event is thought to have been coseismic with a fault rupture along the western segment of the PPAFZ, which has been dated at 600 ± 100 years B.P. by SMITH (2003). The small LCRA3 event was not able to be dated, but it is believed to have failed shortly after the LCRA2 event and it may in fact be a lag deposit of the second rock avalanche event possibly triggered by an aftershock. The deposit is only visible at one locality within the cliffs that line the Ryton River, and its lack of geomorphic expression is attributed to it occurring closely after the LCRA2 event, while the Ryton River was still dammed from the second rock avalanche event. A wedge-block of some 35,000 m³ of source material for a future rock avalanche was identified at the summit of Carriage Drive. The dilation of the rock mass, combined with unfavourably oriented sub-vertical bedding in the Torlesse Supergroup bedrock, has allowed toppling-style failure on both of the main ridge lines around the source area for the LCRADs. In the event of a future rock avalanche occurring within the Ryton riverbed an emergency response plan has been developed to provide a staged response, especially in relation to the camping ground located at the mouth of the Ryton River. A long-term management plan has also been developed for mitigation measures for the Ryton riverbed and adjacent floodplain areas downstream of a future rock avalanche at the LCRAD site.
