Anyone keeping a global tally of recent disasters is likely to be asking: What role will the hazards and disasters of coastal plains play in the lives and economies of 21st century humanity? In this article, we reflect on this question using examples of how different types of coastal land performed during the Christchurch and other earthquake events to examine the complex of coastal-tectonic hazards that are being constructed in the Tokyo megacity
The city of Christchurch and its surrounds experienced widespread damage due to soil liquefaction induced by seismic shaking during the Canterbury earthquake sequence that began in September 2010 with the Mw7.1 Darfield earthquake. Prior to the start of this sequence, the city had a large network of strong motion stations (SMSs) installed, which were able to record a vast database of strong ground motions. This paper uses this database of strong ground motion recordings, observations of liquefaction manifestation at the ground surface, and data from a recently completed extensive geotechnical site investigation program at each SMS to assess a range of liquefaction evaluation procedures at the four SMSs in the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD). In general, the characteristics of the accelerograms recorded at each SMS correlated well with the liquefaction evaluation procedures, with low liquefaction factors of safety predicted at sites with clear liquefaction identifiers in the ground motions. However, at sites that likely liquefied at depth (as indicated by evaluation procedures and/or inferred from the characteristics of the recorded surface accelerograms), the presence of a non-liquefiable crust layer at many of the SMS locations prevented the manifestation of any surface effects. Because of this, there was not a good correlation between surface manifestation and two surface manifestation indices, the Liquefaction Potential Index (LPI) and the Liquefaction Severity Number (LSN).
The Canterbury earthquakes, which started with the 7.1 magnitude event on September 4, 2010, caused significant damage in the region. The September 4 earthquakes brought substantial damage to land, buildings, and infrastructure, while the 6.3 magnitude earthquake on February 22, 2011 (and its subsequent aftershocks), brought even greater property damage, but also significant loss of life in addition to the region. Thousands were injured, and 185 persons died. A national State of Emergency was declared and remained in effect until April 30, 2011. A significant number of people required immediate assistance and support to deal with loss, injury, trauma experiences, and property damages. Many had to find alternate accommodation as their houses were too damaged to stay in. Of those affected, many were already vulnerable, and others had been too traumatized by the events to effectively deal with the challenges they were faced with. A number of human service organizations in the region, from both government and non-government sectors, joined forces to be able to more effectively and efficiently help those in need. This was the start of what would become known as the Earthquake Support Coordination Service. The aim of this report is to present an evaluation of the Earthquake Support Coordination Service and its collaborative organization, based on documentation and interviews with key stakeholders of the service. The aim is also to evaluate the service based on perspectives gathered among the clients as well as the coordinators working in the service. The final aim is to offer a reflection on the service model, and on what factors enabled the service, as well as recommendations regarding aspects of the service which may require review, and aspects which may be useful in other contexts.
