Surface rupture of the previously unrecognised Greendale Fault extended west-east for ~30 km across alluvial plains west of Christchurch, New Zealand, during the Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake of September 2010. Surface rupture displacement was predominantly dextral strike-slip, averaging ~2.5 m, with maxima of ~5 m. Vertical displacement was generally less than 0.75 m. The surface rupture deformation zone ranged in width from ~30 to 300 m, and comprised discrete shears, localised bulges and, primarily, horizontal dextral flexure. About a dozen buildings, mainly single-storey houses and farm sheds, were affected by surface rupture, but none collapsed, largely because most of the buildings were relatively flexible and resilient timber-framed structures and also because deformation was distributed over a relatively wide zone. There were, however, notable differences in the respective performances of the buildings. Houses with only lightly-reinforced concrete slab foundations suffered moderate to severe structural and non-structural damage. Three other buildings performed more favourably: one had a robust concrete slab foundation, another had a shallow-seated pile foundation that isolated ground deformation from the superstructure, and the third had a structural system that enabled the house to tilt and rotate as a rigid body. Roads, power lines, underground pipes, and fences were also deformed by surface fault rupture and suffered damage commensurate with the type of feature, its orientation to the fault, and the amount, sense and width of surface rupture deformation.
The 4th of September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake had generated significant ground shaking within the Christchurch Central Business District (CBD). Despite the apparently significant shaking, the observed structural damage for pre-1970s reinforced concrete (RC) buildings was indeed limited and lower than what was expected for such typology of buildings. This paper explores analytically and qualitatively the different aspects of the "apparent‟ good seismic performance of the pre-1970s RC buildings in the Christchurch CBD, following the earthquake reconnaissance survey by the authors. Damage and building parameters survey result, based on a previously established inventory of building stock of these non-ductile RC buildings, is briefly reported. From an inventory of 75 buildings, one building was selected as a numerical case-study to correlate the observed damage with the non-linear analyses. The result shows that the pre-1970s RC frame buildings performed as expected given the intensity of the ground motion shaking during the Canterbury earthquake. Given the brittle nature of this type of structure, it was demonstrated that more significant structural damage and higher probability of collapse could occur when the buildings were subjected to alternative input signals with different frequency content and duration characteristics and still compatible to the seismicity hazard for Christchurch CBD.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
Six months after the 4 September 2010 Mw 7.1 Darfield (Canterbury) earthquake, a Mw 6.2 Christchurch (Lyttelton) aftershock struck Christchurch on the 22 February 2011. This earthquake was centred approximately 10km south-east of the Christchurch CBD at a shallow depth of 5km, resulting in intense seismic shaking within the Christchurch central business district (CBD). Unlike the 4 Sept earthquake when limited-to-moderate damage was observed in engineered reinforced concrete (RC) buildings [35], in the 22 February event a high number of RC Buildings in the Christchurch CBD (16.2 % out of 833) were severely damaged. There were 182 fatalities, 135 of which were the unfortunate consequences of the complete collapse of two mid-rise RC buildings. This paper describes immediate observations of damage to RC buildings in the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Some preliminary lessons are highlighted and discussed in light of the observed performance of the RC building stock. Damage statistics and typical damage patterns are presented for various configurations and lateral resisting systems. Data was collated predominantly from first-hand post-earthquake reconnaissance observations by the authors, complemented with detailed assessment of the structural drawings of critical buildings and the observed behaviour. Overall, the 22 February 2011 Mw 6.2 Christchurch earthquake was a particularly severe test for both modern seismically-designed and existing non-ductile RC buildings. The sequence of earthquakes since the 4 Sept 2010, particularly the 22 Feb event has confirmed old lessons and brought to life new critical ones, highlighting some urgent action required to remedy structural deficiencies in both existing and “modern” buildings. Given the major social and economic impact of the earthquakes to a country with strong seismic engineering tradition, no doubt some aspects of the seismic design will be improved based on the lessons from Christchurch. The bar needs to and can be raised, starting with a strong endorsement of new damage-resisting, whilst cost-efficient, technologies as well as the strict enforcement, including financial incentives, of active policies for the seismic retrofit of existing buildings at a national scale.
