This paper provides a comparison between the strong ground motions observed in the Christchurch central business district in the 4 September 2010 Mw7.1 Darfield, and 22 February 2011 Mw6.3 Christchurch earthquakes with those observed in Tokyo during the 11 March 2011 Mw9.0 Tohoku earthquake. Despite Tokyo being located approximately 110km from the nearest part of the causative rupture, the ground motions observed from the Tohoku earthquake were strong enough to cause structural damage in Tokyo and also significant liquefaction to loose reclaimed soils in Tokyo bay. Comparisons include the strong motion time histories, response spectra, significant durations and arias intensity. The implications for large earthquakes in New Zealand are also briefly discussed.
The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in supporting lifelines utilities.
The Christchurch earthquake sequence has been on-going since September 4th 2010. The largest two earthquakes, magnitude (M) 7.1 on September 4th and the M 6.3 on February 22nd 2011 caused immediate and significant damage to the city of Christchurch. As a consequence of the earthquakes, the tourism sector in the Canterbury region has been heavily impacted, with broader impacts being felt throughout the South Island. Resilient Organisations and the University of Canterbury began a series of quantitative investigations into the recovery and response of key business sectors to the earthquakes. The purpose of this study was to build on this work by exploring the outcomes of the earthquakes on the tourism sector, a critical economic driver in the region. Two postal surveys were sent to 719 tourism business managers; the first to businesses in the ‘Impact Zone’ defined as areas that experienced Modified Mercalli intensities greater than 6. The second survey was sent to the remaining businesses throughout the Canterbury region (‘Rest of Canterbury’). Response rates were 46% response for the Impact Zone, and 29% for the Rest of Canterbury. Key findings:
The 22nd February 2011, Mw 6.3 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand caused major damage to critical infrastructure, including the healthcare system. The Natural Hazard Platform of NZ funded a short-term project called “Hospital Functions and Services” to support the Canterbury District Health Board’s (CDHB) efforts in capturing standardized data that describe the effects of the earthquake on the Canterbury region’s main hospital system. The project utilised a survey tool originally developed by researchers at Johns Hopkins University (JHU) to assess the loss of function of hospitals in the Maule and Bío-Bío regions following the 27th February 2010, Mw 8.8 Maule earthquake in Chile. This paper describes the application of the JHU tool for surveying the impact of Christchurch earthquake on the CDHB Hospital System, including the system’s residual capacity to deliver emergency response and health care. A short summary of the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on other CDHB public and private hospitals is also provided. This study demonstrates that, as was observed in other earthquakes around the world, the effects of damage to non-structural building components, equipment, utility lifelines, and transportation were far more disruptive than the minor structural damage observed in buildings (FEMA 2007). Earthquake related complications with re-supply and other organizational aspects also impacted the emergency response and the healthcare facilities’ residual capacity to deliver services in the short and long terms.
On Tuesday 22 February 2011, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch, New Zealand’s second largest city. The ‘earthquake’ was in fact an aftershock to an earlier 7.1 magnitude earthquake that had occurred on Saturday 4 September 2010. There were a number of key differences between the two events that meant they had dramatically different results for Christchurch and its inhabitants. The 22 February 2011 event resulted in one of New Zealand’s worst natural disasters on record, with 185 fatalities occurring and hundreds more being injured. In addition, a large number of buildings either collapsed or were damaged to the point where they needed to be totally demolished. Since the initial earthquake in September 2010, a large amount of building-related research has been initiated in New Zealand to investigate the impact of the series of seismic events – the major focus of these research projects has been on seismic, structural and geotechnical engineering matters. One project, however, conducted jointly by the University of Canterbury, the Fire Protection Association of New Zealand and BRANZ, has focused on the performance of fire protection systems in the earthquakes and the effectiveness of the systems in the event of post-earthquake fires occurring. Fortunately, very few fires actually broke out following the series of earthquake events in Christchurch, but fire after earthquakes still has significant implications for the built environment in New Zealand, and the collaborative research has provided some invaluable insight into the potential threat posed by post-earthquake fires in buildings. As well as summarising the damage caused to fire protection systems, this paper discusses the flow-on effect for designing structures to withstand post-earthquake fires. One of the underlying issues that will be explored is the existing regulatory framework in New Zealand whereby structural earthquake design and structural design for fire are treated as discrete design scenarios.
On the second day of teaching for 2011, the University of Canterbury (UC) faced the most significant crisis of its 138-year history. After being shaken severely by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on 4 September 2010, UC felt it was well along the pathway to getting back to ‘normal’. That all changed at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011, when Christchurch city was hit by an even more devastating event. A magnitude 6.3 (Modified Mercalli intensity ten – MM X) earthquake, just 13km south-east of the Christchurch city centre, caused vertical peak ground accelerations amongst the highest ever recorded in an urban environment, in some places more than twice the acceleration due to gravity. The earthquake caused immediate evacuation of the UC campus and resulted in significant damage to many buildings. Thankfully there were no serious injuries or fatalities on campus, but 185 people died in the city and many more suffered serious injuries. At the time of writing, eighteen months after the first earthquake in September, Christchurch is still experiencing regular earthquakes. Seismologists warn that the region may experience heightened seismicity for a decade or more. While writing this report we have talked with many different people from across the University. People’s experiences are different and we have not managed to talk with everyone, but we hope that by drawing together many different perspectives from across the campus that this report will serve two purposes; to retain our institutional memory of what we have learnt over the past eighteen months, and also to share our learnings with other organisations in New Zealand and around the world who, we hope, will benefit from learning about our experience.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
Following the 22 February 2011, MW 6.2 earthquake located on a fault beneath the Port Hills of Christchurch, fissuring of up to several hundred metres in length was observed in the loess and loess-colluvium of foot-slope positions in north-facing valleys of the Port Hills. The fissuring was observed in all major valleys, occurred at similar low altitudes, showing a contour-parallel orientation and often accompanied by both lateral compression/extension features and spring formation in the valley floor below. Fissuring locations studied in depth included Bowenvale Valley, Hillsborough Valley, Huntlywood Terrace–Lucas Lane, Bridle Path Road, and Maffeys Road–La Costa Lane. Investigations into loess soil, its properties and mannerisms, as well as international examples of its failure were undertaken, including study of the Loess Plateau of China, the Teton Dam, and palaeo-fissuring on Banks Peninsula. These investigations lead to the conclusion that loess has the propensity to fail, often due to the infiltration of water, the presence of which can lead to its instantaneous disaggregation. Literature study and laboratory analysis of Port Hills loess concluded that is has the ability to be stable in steep, sub-vertical escarpments, and often has a sub-vertically jointed internal structure and has a peak shear strength when dry. Values for cohesion, c (kPa) and the internal friction angle, ϕ (degrees) of Port Hills loess were established. The c values for the 40 Rapaki Road, 3 Glenview Terrace loess samples were 13.4 kPa and 19.7 kPa, respectively. The corresponding ϕ values were thought unusually high, at 42.0° and 43.4°.The analysed loess behaved very plastically, with little or no peak strength visible in the plots as the test went almost directly to residual strength. A geophysics resistivity survey showed an area of low resistivity which likely corresponds to a zone of saturated clayey loess/loess colluvium, indicating a high water table in the area. This is consistent with the appearances of local springs which are located towards the northern end of each distinct section of fissure trace and chemical analysis shows that they are sourced from the Port Hills volcanics. Port Hills fissuring may be sub-divided into three categories, Category A, Category B, and Category C, each characterised by distinctive features of the fissures. Category A includes fissures which display evidence of, spring formation, tunnel-gullying, and lateral spreading-like behaviour or quasi-toppling. These fissures are several metres down-slope of the loess-bedrock interface, and are in valleys containing a loess-colluvium fill. Category B fissures are in wider valleys than those in Category A, and the valleys contain estuarine silty sediments which liquefied during the earthquake. Category C fissures occurred at higher elevations than the fissures in the preceding categories, being almost coincident with bedrock outcropping. It is believed that the mechanism responsible for causing the fissuring is a complex combination of three mechanisms: the trampoline effect, bedrock fracturing, and lateral spreading. These three mechanisms can be applied in varying degrees to each of the fissuring sites in categories A, B, and C, in order to provide explanation for the observations made at each. Toppling failure can describe the soil movement as a consequence of the a three causative mechanisms, and provides insight into the movement of the loess. Intra-loess water coursing and tunnel gullying is thought to have encouraged and exacerbated the fissuring, while not being the driving force per se. Incipient landsliding is considered to be the least likely of the possible fissuring interpretations.
