This paper presents preliminary field observations on the performance of selected steel structures in Christchurch during the earthquake series of 2010 to 2011. This comprises 6 damaging earthquakes, on 4 September and 26 December 2010, February 22, June 6 and two on June 13, 2011. Most notable of these was the 4 September event, at Ms7.1 and MM7 (MM as observed in the Christchurch CBD) and most intense was the 22 February event at Ms6.3 and MM9-10 within the CBD. Focus is on performance of concentrically braced frames, eccentrically braced frames, moment resisting frames and industrial storage racks. With a few notable exceptions, steel structures performed well during this earthquake series, to the extent that inelastic deformations were less than what would have been expected given the severity of the recorded strong motions. Some hypotheses are formulated to explain this satisfactory performance. http://db.nzsee.org.nz/SpecialIssue/44%284%290297.pdf
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
Following the 2010/2011 Canterbury, New Zealand earthquakes, a detailed door-to-door survey was conducted in the Christchurch region to establish the earthquake performance of lightweight timber-framed residential dwellings with a masonry veneer external cladding system. The post-earthquake survey involved documenting the condition of dwellings in areas that had experienced different levels of earthquake shaking, allowing comparison between the performance of different veneer systems and different shaking intensities. In total, just fewer than 1,100 residential dwellings were inspected throughout the wider Christchurch area. The survey included parameters such as level of veneer damage, type of veneer damage, observed crack widths, and level of repair required. It is concluded that based on observed earthquake performance at the shaking intensities matching or exceeding ultimate limit state loading, the post-1996 veneer fixing details performed satisfactorily and continued use of the detail is recommended without further modification. AM - Accepted Manuscript
The 2010 Darfield earthquake is the largest earthquake on record to have occurred within 40 km of a major city and not cause any fatalities. In this paper the authors have reflected on their experiences in Christchurch following the earthquake with a view to what worked, what didn’t, and what lessons can be learned from this for the benefit of Australian earthquake preparedness. Owing to the fact that most of the observed building damage occurred in Unreinforced Masonry (URM) construction, this paper focuses in particular on the authors’ experience conducting rapid building damage assessment during the first 72 hours following the earthquake and more detailed examination of the performance of unreinforced masonry buildings with and without seismic retrofit interventions.
Unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings have repeatedly been shown to perform poorly in large magnitude earthquakes, with both New Zealand and Australia having a history of past earthquakes that have resulted in fatalities due to collapsed URM buildings. A comparison is presented here of the URM building stock and the seismic vulnerability of Christchurch and Adelaide in order to demonstrate the relevance to Australian cities of observations in Christchurch resulting from the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake swarm. It is shown that the materials, architecture and hence earthquake strength of URM buildings in both countries is comparable and that Adelaide and other cities of Australia have seismic vulnerability sufficient to cause major damage to their URM buildings should a design level earthquake occur. Such an earthquake is expected to cause major building damage, and fatalities should be expected.
In the early morning of 4th September 2010 the region of Canterbury, New Zealand, was subjected to a magnitude 7.1 earthquake. The epicentre was located near the town of Darfield, 40 km west of the city of Christchurch. This was the country’s most damaging earthquake since the 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake (GeoNet, 2010). Since 4th September 2010 the region has been subjected to thousands of aftershocks, including several more damaging events such as a magnitude 6.3 aftershock on 22nd February 2011. Although of a smaller magnitude, the earthquake on 22nd February produced peak ground accelerations in the Christchurch region three times greater than the 4th September earthquake and in some cases shaking intensities greater than twice the design level (GeoNet, 2011; IPENZ, 2011). While in September 2010 most earthquake shaking damage was limited to unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings, in February all types of buildings sustained damage. Temporary shoring and strengthening techniques applied to buildings following the Darfield earthquake were tested in February 2011. In addition, two large aftershocks occurred on 13th June 2011 (magnitudes 5.7 and 6.2), further damaging many already weakened structures. The damage to unreinforced and retrofitted clay brick masonry buildings in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake has already been reported by Ingham and Griffith (2011) and Dizhur et al. (2010b). A brief review of damage from the 22nd February 2011 earthquake is presented here
The city of Christchurch has experienced over 10,000 aftershocks since the 4th of September 2010 earthquake of which approximately 50 have been greater than magnitude 5. The damage caused to URM buildings in Christchurch over this sequence of earthquakes has been well documented. Due to the similarity in age and construction of URM buildings in Adelaide, South Australia and Christchurch (they are sister cities, of similar age and heritage), an investigation was conducted to learn lessons for Adelaide based on the Christchurch experience. To this end, the number of URM buildings in the central business districts of both cities, the extent of seismic strengthening that exists in both cities, and the relative earthquake hazards for both cities were considered. This paper will report on these findings and recommend strategies that the city of Adelaide could consider to significantly reduce the seismic risk posed by URM buildings in future earthquake.
Churches are an important part of New Zealand's historical and architectural heritage. Various earthquakes around the world have highlighted the significant seismic vulnerability of religious buildings, with the extensive damage that occurred to stone and clay-brick unreinforced masonry churches after the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes emphasising the necessity to better understand this structural type. Consequently, a country-wide inventory of unreinforced masonry churches is here identified. After a bibliographic and archival investigation, and a 10 000 km field trip, it is estimated that currently 297 unreinforced masonry churches are present throughout New Zealand, excluding 12 churches demolished in Christchurch because of heavy damage sustained during the Canterbury earthquake sequence. The compiled database includes general information about the buildings, their architectural features and structural characteristics, and any architectural and structural transformations that have occurred in the past. Statistics about the occurrence of each feature are provided and preliminary interpretations of their role on seismic vulnerability are discussed. The list of identified churches is reported in annexes, supporting their identification and providing their address.
As part of the 'Project Masonry' Recovery Project funded by the New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform, commencing in March 2011, an international team of researchers was deployed to document and interpret the observed earthquake damage to masonry buildings and to churches as a result of the 22nd February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. The study focused on investigating commonly encountered failure patterns and collapse mechanisms. A brief summary of activities undertaken is presented, detailing the observations that were made on the performance of and the deficiencies that contributed to the damage to approximately 650 inspected unreinforced clay brick masonry (URM) buildings, to 90 unreinforced stone masonry buildings, to 342 reinforced concrete masonry (RCM) buildings, to 112 churches in the Canterbury region, and to just under 1100 residential dwellings having external masonry veneer cladding. In addition, details are provided of retrofit techniques that were implemented within relevant Christchurch URM buildings prior to the 22nd February earthquake and brief suggestions are provided regarding appropriate seismic retrofit and remediation techniques for stone masonry buildings. http://www.nzsee.org.nz/publications/nzsee-quarterly-bulletin/
