At 4.35 a.m. on the 4th of September 2010 Christchurch residents were shaken awake by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake, the largest earthquake to hit urban New Zealand for nearly 80 years. It was a large earthquake. On average the world only has 17 earthquakes a year larger than magnitude seven. Haiti’s earthquake in January 2010 was magnitude 7.1 and Chile’s earthquake in February was magnitude 8.8. Although it was a big quake, Christchurch was lucky. In Haiti’s earthquake over 230,000 people were killed and in Chile 40,000 homes were destroyed. Happily this was not the situation in Christchurch, however the earthquake has caused considerable damage. The challenge for the Landscape Architecture community is to contribute to the city’s reconstruction in ways that will not only fix the problems of housing, and the city’s urban, suburban and neighbourhood fabric but that will do so in ways that will help solve the landscape problems that dogged the city before the earthquake struck.
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly within the civil defence and emergency management literature and informed by recent work on community participation and social capital in the building of resilient cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes as well as the substantive role communities play in their own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or hinder community involvement also needs to be better understood. This paper interrogates the assumption that recovery agencies and officials are both willing and able to engage communities who are themselves willing and able to be engaged in accordance with recovery best practice. Case studies of three community groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated with becoming a community during the disaster recovery phase. Based on my own observations and experiences, combined with data from approximately 50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents and representatives from community groups, the Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies emerging communities may use in the early disaster recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to ‘participate’ in the recovery process.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event. One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
The Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by major earthquakes on the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011. The quakes caused 185 fatalities and extensive land, infrastructure and building damage, particularly in the Eastern suburbs of Christchurch city. Almost 450 ha of residential and public land was designated as a ‘Red Zone’ unsuitable for residential redevelopment because land damage was so significant, engineering solutions were uncertain, and repairs would be protracted. Subsequent demolition of all housing and infrastructure in the area has left a blank canvas of land stretching along the Avon River corridor from the CBD to the sea. Initially the Government’s official – but enormously controversial – position was that this land would be cleared and lie fallow until engineering solutions could be found that enabled residential redevelopment. This paper presents an application of a choice experiment (CE) that identified and assessed Christchurch residents’ preferences for different land use options of this Red Zone. Results demonstrated strong public support for the development of a recreational reserve comprising a unique natural environment with native fauna and flora, healthy wetlands and rivers, and recreational opportunities that align with this vision. By highlighting the value of a range of alternatives, the CE provided a platform for public participation and expanded the conversational terrain upon which redevelopment policy took place. We conclude the method has value for land use decision-making beyond the disaster recovery context.