Creativity that is driven by a need for physical or economic survival, which disasters are likely to inspire, raises the question of whether such creativity fits with conventional theories and perspectives of creativity. In this paper we use the opportunity afforded by the 2010-2013 Christchurch, New Zealand earthquakes to follow and assess the creative practices and responses of a number of groups and individuals. We use in-depth interviews to tease out motivations and read these against a range of theoretical propositions about creativity. In particular, we focus on the construct of “elite panic” and the degree to which this appeared to be evident in the Christchurch earthquakes context. Bureaucratic attempts to control or limit creativity were present but they did not produce a completely blanket dampening effect. Certain individuals and groups seemed to be pre-equipped to navigate or ignore potential blocks to creativity. We argue, using Geir Kaufmann’s novelty-creativity matrix and aspects of Teresa Amabile’s and Michael G. Pratt’s revised componential theory of creativity that a special form of disaster creativity does exist.
Disasters are often followed by a large-scale stimulus supporting the economy through the built environment, which can last years. During this time, official economic indicators tend to suggest the economy is doing well, but as activity winds down, the sentiment can quickly change. In response to the damaging 2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand, the regional economy outpaced national economic growth rates for several years during the rebuild. The repair work on the built environment created years of elevated building activity. However, after the peak of the rebuilding activity, as economic and employment growth retracts below national growth, we are left with the question of how the underlying economy performs during large scale stimulus activity in the built environment. This paper assesses the performance of the underlying economy by quantifying the usual, demand-driven level of building activity at this time. Applying an Input–Output approach and excluding the economic benefit gained from the investment stimulus reveals the performance of the underlying economy. The results reveal a strong growing underlying economy, and while convergence was expected as the stimulus slowed down, the results found that growth had already crossed over for some time. The results reveal that the investment stimulus provides an initial 1.5% to 2% growth buffer from the underlying economy before the growth rates cross over. This supports short-term economic recovery and enables the underlying economy to transition away from a significant rebuild stimulus. Once the growth crosses over, five years after the disaster, economic growth in the underlying economy remains buoyant even if official regional economic data suggest otherwise.
