Successful urban regeneration projects generate benefits that are realised over a much longer timeframe than normal market developments and benefits well beyond those that can be uplifted by a market developer. Consequently there is substantial evidence in the literature that successful place-making and urban regeneration projects are usually public-private partnerships and involve a funder, usually local or central government, willing to contribute ‘patient’ capital. Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes that devastated the centre of Christchurch, there was an urgent need to rebuild and revitalise the heart of the city, and increasing the number of people living in or near the city centre was seen as a key ingredient of that. In October 2010, an international competition was launched to design and build an Urban Village, a project intended to stimulate renewed residential development in the city. The competition attracted 58 entrants from around world, and in October 2013 the winning team was chosen from four finalists. However the team failed to secure sufficient finance, and in November 2015 the Government announced that the development would not proceed. The Government was unwilling or unable to recognise that an insistence on a pure market approach would not deliver the innovative sustainable village asked for in the competition brief, and failed to factor in the opportunity cost to government, local government, local businesses and the wider Christchurch community of delaying by many years the residential development of the eastern side of the city. As a result, the early vision of the vitality that a thriving residential neighbourhood would bring to the city has not yet been realised.
This report presents research on the affects of the Ōtautahi/Christchurch earthquakes of 2010 to 2012 on the city’s Tangata Whaiora community, ‘people seeking health’ as Māori frame mental health clients. Drawing on the voices of 39 participants of a Kaupapa Māori provider (Te Awa o te Ora), this report presents extended quotes from Tangata Whaiora, their support staff (many of whom are Tangata Whaiora), and managers as they speak of the events, their experiences, and support that sustained them in recoveries of well-being through the worse disaster in Aotearoa/New Zealand in three generations.
Ōtautahi contains a significant urban Māori population, many living in suburbs that were seriously impacted by the earthquakes that began before dawn on September 4th, 2010, and continued throughout 2011 and 2012. The most damaging event occurred on February 22nd, 2011, and killed 185 people and severely damaged the CBD as well as many thousands of homes. The thousands of aftershocks delayed the rebuilding of homes and infrastructure and exacerbated the stress and dislocation felt by residents. The tensions and disorder continue for numerous residents into 2014 and it will be many years before full social and physical recovery can be expected.
This report presents extended excerpts from the interviews of Tangata Whaiora and their support staff. Their stories of survival through the disaster reinforce themes of community and whānau while emphasising the reality that a significant number of Tangata Whaiora do not or cannot draw on this supports. The ongoing need for focused responses in the area of housing and accommodation, sufficiently resourced psycho-social support, and the value of Kaupapa Māori provision for Māori and non-Māori mental health clients cannot be overstated. The report also collates advice from participants to other Tangata Whaiora, their whānau, providers and indeed all residents of places subject to irregular but potentially devastating disaster. Much of this advice is relevant for more daily challenges and should not be underestimated despite its simplicity.
The major earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought to an abrupt end a process of adaptive reuse, revitalisation and gentrification that was underway in the early 20th century laneways and buildings located in the south eastern corner of the Christchurch Central Business District. Up until then, this location was seen as an exemplar of how mixed use could contribute to making the central city an attractive and viable alternative to the suburban living experience predominant in New Zealand.
This thesis is the result of a comprehensive case study of this “Lichfield Lanes” area, which involved in depth interviews with business owners, observation of public meetings and examination of documents and the revitalisation research literature. Findings were that many of the factors seen to make this location successful pre-earthquakes mirror the results of similar research in other cities. These factors include: the importance of building upon historic architecture and the eclectic spaces this creates; a wide variety of uses generating street life; affordable rental levels; plus the dangers of uniformity of use brought about by focussing on business types that pay the most rent. Also critical is co-operation between businesses to create and effectively market and manage an identifiable precinct that has a coherent style and ambience that differentiates the location from competing suburban malls. In relation to the latter, a significant finding of this project was that the hospitality and retail businesses key to the success of Lichfield Lanes were not typical and could be described as quirky, bohemian, chaotic, relatively low rent, owner operated and appealing to the economically important “Creative Class” identified by Richard Florida (2002) and others. In turn, success for many of these businesses can be characterised as including psychological and social returns rather than simply conventional economic benefits. This has important implications for inner city revitalisation, as it contrasts with the traditional focus of local authorities and property developers on physical aspects and tenant profitability as measures of success. This leads on to an important conclusion from this research, which is that an almost completely inverted strategy from that applied to suburban mall development, may be most appropriate for successful inner city revitalisation. It also highlights a disconnection between the focus and processes of regulatory authorities and the outcomes and processes most acceptable to the people likely to frequent the central city. Developers are often caught in the middle of this conflicted situation. Another finding was early commitment by businesses to rebuild the case study area in the same style, but over time this waned as delay, demolition, insurance problems, political and planning uncertainty plus other issues made participation by the original owners and tenants impossible or uneconomic. In conclusion, the focus of inner city revitalisation is too often on buildings rather than the people that use them and what they now desire from the central city.
