This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
As damage and loss caused by natural hazards have increased worldwide over the past several decades, it is important for governments and aid agencies to have tools that enable effective post-disaster livelihood recovery to create self-sufficiency for the affected population. This study introduces a framework of critical components that constitute livelihood recovery and the critical factors that lead to people’s livelihood recovery. A comparative case study is employed in this research, combined with questionnaire surveys and interviews with those communities affected by large earthquakes in Lushan, China and in Christchurch and Kaikōura, New Zealand. In Lushan, China, a framework with four livelihood components was established, namely, housing, employment, wellbeing and external assistance. Respondents considered recovery of their housing to be the most essential element for livelihood diversification. External assistance was also rated highly in assisting with their livelihood recovery. Family ties and social connections seemed to have played a larger role than that of government agencies and NGOs. However, the recovery of livelihood cannot be fully achieved without wellbeing aspects being taken into account, and people believed that quality of life and their physical and mental health were essential for livelihood restoration. In Christchurch, New Zealand, the identified livelihood components were validated through in-depth interviews. The results showed that the above framework presenting what constitutes successful livelihood recovery could also be applied in Christchurch. This study also identified the critical factors to affect livelihood recovery following the Lushan and Kaikōura earthquakes, and these include community safety, availability of family support, level of community cohesion, long-term livelihood support, external housing recovery support, level of housing recovery and availability of health and wellbeing support. The framework developed will provide guidance for policy makers and aid agencies to prioritise their strategies and initiatives in assisting people to reinstate their livelihood in a timely manner post-disaster. It will also assist the policy makers and practitioners in China and New Zealand by setting an agenda for preparing for livelihood recovery in non-urgent times so the economic impact and livelihood disruption of those affected can be effectively mitigated.
Welcome to the Recover newsletter Issue 6 from the Marine Ecology Research Group (MERG) of the University of Canterbury. Recover is designed to keep you updated on our MBIE-funded earthquake recovery project called RECOVER (Reef Ecology, Coastal Values & Earthquake Recovery). This 6th instalment features the ‘new land’ created by the earthquake uplift of the coastline, recreational uses of beaches in Marlborough, and pāua survey work and hatchery projects with our partners in Kaikōura.
This report contributes to a collaborative project between the Marlborough District Council (MDC) and University of Canterbury (UC) which aims to help protect and promote the recovery of native dune systems on the Marlborough coast. It is centred around the mapping of dune vegetation and identification of dune protection zones for old-growth seed sources of the native sand-binders spinifex (Spinifex sericeus) and pīngao (Ficinia spiralis). Both are key habitat-formers associated with nationally threatened dune ecosystems, and pīngao is an important weaving resource and Ngāi Tahu taonga species. The primary goal is to protect existing seed sources that are vital for natural regeneration following major disturbances such as the earthquake event. Several additional protection zones are also identified for areas where new dunes are successfully regenerating, including areas being actively restored in the Beach Aid project that is assisting new native dunes to become established where there is available space.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010-2011 wrought ruptures in not only the physical landscape of Canterbury and Christchurch’s material form, but also in its social, economic, and political fabrics and the lives of Christchurch inhabitants. In the years that followed, the widespread demolition of the CBD that followed the earthquakes produced a bleak landscape of grey rubble punctuated by damaged, abandoned buildings. It was into this post-earthquake landscape that Gap Filler and other ‘transitional’ organisations inserted playful, creative, experimental projects to bring life and energy back into the CBD. This thesis examines those interventions and the development of the ‘Transitional Movement’ between July 2013 and June 2015 via the methods of walking interviews and participant observation. This critical period in Christchurch’s recovery serves as an example of what happens when do-it-yourself (DIY) urbanism is done at scale across the CBD and what urban experimentation can offer city-making. Through an understanding of space as produced, informed by Lefebvre’s thinking, I explore how these creative urban interventions manifested a different temporality to orthodox planning and demonstrate how the ‘soft’ politics of these interventions contain the potential for gentrification and also a more radical politics of the city, by creating an opening space for difference.
This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
