On November 14 2016 a magnitude 7.8 earthquake struck the south island of New Zealand. The earthquake lasted for just two minutes with severe seismic shaking and damage in the Hurunui and Kaikōura districts. Although these are predominantly rural areas, with scattered small towns and mountainous topography, they also contain road and rail routes that are essential parts of the national transport infrastructure. This earthquake and the subsequent recovery are of particular significance as they represent a disaster following in close proximity to another similar disaster, with the Canterbury earthquakes occurring in a neighboring district five years earlier. The research used an inductive qualitative case study to explore the nature of the Kaikōura recovery. That recovery process involved a complex interplay between the three parties; (a) the existing local government in the district, (b) central government agencies funding the recovery of the local residents and the national transport infrastructure, and (c) recovery leaders arriving with recent expertise from the earlier Canterbury disaster. It was evident that three groups: locals, government, and experts represented a multi-party governance debate in which the control of the Kaikōura earthquake recovery was shared amongst them. Each party had their own expertise, adgenda and networks that they brought to the Kaikōura recovery, but this created tensions between external expertise and local, community leadership. Recent earthquake research suggests that New Zealand is currently in the midst of an earthquake cluster, with further seismic disasters likely to occur in relatively close succession. This is likely to be compounded by the increasing frequency of other natural disasters with the effects of climate change. The present study investigates a phenomenon that may become increasingly common, with the transfer of disaster expertise from one event to another, and the interface between those experts with local and national government in directing recoveries. The findings of this study have implications for practitioners and policy makers in NZ and other countries where disasters are experienced in close spatial and temporal proximity.
Media law developments have continued across many areas in the period to mid-2013. In defamation, the New Zealand courts have begun to consider the issue of third party liability for publication on the internet, with cases involving Google searches and comments on a Facebook page. A parliamentary inquiry into a case that restricted parliamentary privilege has recommended a Parliamentary Privilege Act containing a definition of ‘proceedings in Parliament’. A satirical website increased its popularity when it fought off threatened defamation proceedings. In breach of confidence, a government body, the Earthquake Commission, obtained an interim injunction prohibiting publication of information accidentally released that dealt with the repair of earthquake-damaged properties in Christchurch, and a blogger made the information available online in breach of the order.
The Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 had a significant impact on landlords and tenants of commercial buildings in the city of Christchurch. The devastation wrought on the city was so severe that in an unprecedented response to this disaster a cordon was erected around the central business district for nearly two and half years while demolition, repairs and rebuilding took place. Despite the destruction, not all buildings were damaged. Many could have been occupied and used immediately if they had not been within the cordoned area. Others had only minor damage but repairs to them could not be commenced, let alone completed, owing to restrictions on access caused by the cordon. Tenants were faced with a major problem in that they could not access their buildings and it was likely to be a long time before they would be allowed access again. The other problem was uncertainty about the legal position as neither the standard form leases in use, nor any statute, provided for issues arising from an inaccessible building. The parties were therefore uncertain about their legal rights and obligations in this situation. Landlords and tenants were unsure whether tenants were required to pay rent for a building that could not be accessed or whether they could terminate their leases on the basis that the building was inaccessible. This thesis looks at whether the common law doctrine of frustration could apply to leases in these circumstances, where the lease had made no provision. It analyses the history of the doctrine and how it applies to a lease, the standard form leases in use at the time of the earthquakes and the unexpected and extraordinary nature of the earthquakes. It then reports on the findings of the qualitative empirical research undertaken to look at the experiences of landlords and tenants after the earthquakes. It is argued that the circumstances of landlords and tenants met the test for the doctrine of frustration. Therefore, the doctrine could have applied to leases to enable the parties to terminate them. It concludes with a suggestion for reform in the form of a new Act to govern the special relationship between commercial landlords and tenants, similar to legislation already in place covering other types of relationships like those in residential tenancies and employment. Such legislation could provide dispute resolution services to enable landlords and tenants to have access to justice to determine their legal rights at all times, and in particular, in times of crisis.
Planning in New Zealand in 2014 has largely been dominated by housing and urban development, potential local government and legislative reforms, and water issues. This volume’s peer reviewed research, which combines Issues 1 and 2, focuses on these issues, but with perspectives and issues that are outside the mainstream. In our lead research article, John Ryks and his co-authors review the opportunities from Treaty settlements and legislative provisions and challenges for Māori participation in urban development, such as the balancing of matawaka and mana whenua perspectives. Water issues are picked up by Ronlyn Duncan and Phil Holland who each take constructively critical views toward some currently well-regarded approaches to resolutions. We have reflective and somewhat contrasting contributions from two highly respected semi-retired planners, Malcolm Douglass (FNZPI) and Derek Hall, that challenge aspects of New Zealand’s current approach to planning. In our outreach part of this Volume we include the response of some political parties to questions put to them about planning by LPR team member Nicole Read. Finally, Lincoln University appears to have turned a corner after the earthquakes, at least in the planning programmes.
There has not been substantial research conducted in the area of fraud and natural disasters. Therefore, this study sought to examine the perceptions of Canterbury residents toward the recovery process following the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes and whether residents felt as though contractor fraud occurs in Canterbury. A questionnaire was developed to gauge information about Canterbury residents’ self-reports involving the earthquakes, specific contractors involved, parties involved with the recovery process in general, and demographic information. Participants included a total of 213 residents from the Canterbury region who had been involved with contractors and/or insurance companies due to the recovery process. Results indicated that a high percentage of the participants were not satisfied with the recovery process and that almost half of the participants reported feeling scammed by contractors in Canterbury after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Moreover, the results indicate that participants neither agreed with the assessments made about their property losses nor the plans made to recover their properties. In many cases, participants felt pressured and even reluctant to accept these assessments and/or plans. The present study does not seek to explain why contractor fraud exists or what motivates scammers. Conversely, it attempts to demonstrate the perceptions of contractor fraud and satisfaction that have taken place in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes.
The 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes generated damage in several Reinforced Concrete (RC) buildings, which had RC walls as the principal resistant element against earthquake demand. Despite the agreement between structural engineers and researchers in an overall successfully performance there was a lack of knowledge about the behaviour of the damaged structures, and even deeper about a repaired structure, which triggers arguments between different parties that remains up to these days. Then, it is necessary to understand the capacity of the buildings after the earthquake and see how simple repairs techniques improve the building performance. This study will assess the residual capacity of ductile slender RC walls according to current standards in New Zealand, NZS 3101.1 2006 A3. First, a Repaired RC walls Database is created trying to gather previous studies and to evaluate them with existing international guidelines. Then, an archetype building is designed, and the wall is extracted and scaled. Four half-scale walls were designed and will be constructed and tested at the Structures Testing Laboratory at The University of Auckland. The overall dimensions are 3 [m] height, 2 [m] length and 0.175 [m] thick. All four walls will be identical, with differences in the loading protocol and the presence or absence of a repair technique. Results are going to be useful to assess the residual capacity of a damaged wall compare to the original behaviour and also the repaired capacity of walls with simpler repair techniques. The expected behaviour is focussed on big changes in stiffness, more evident than in previously tested RC beams found in the literature.
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
Organisations play a vital role in assisting communities to recover from disasters. They are the key providers of goods and services needed in both response and recovery efforts. They provide the employment which both anchors people to place and supports the taxation base to allow for necessary recovery spending. Finally, organisations are an integral part of much day to day functioning contributing immensely to people’s sense of ‘normality’ and psychological wellbeing. Yet, despite their overall importance in the recovery process, there are significant gaps in our existing knowledge with regard to how organisations respond and recover following disaster. This research fills one part of this gap by examining collaboration as an adaptive strategy enacted by organisations in the Canterbury region of New Zealand, which was heavily impacted by a series of major earthquakes, occurring in 2010 and 2011. Collaboration has been extensively investigated in a variety of settings and from numerous disciplinary perspectives. However, there are few studies that investigate the role of collaborative approaches to support post-disaster business recovery. This study investigates the type of collaborations that have occurred and how they evolved as organisations reacted to the resource and environmental change caused by the disaster. Using data collected through semi-structured interviews, survey and document analysis, a rich and detailed picture of the recovery journey is created for 26 Canterbury organisations including 14 collaborators, six non-traders, five continued traders and one new business. Collaborations included two or more individual businesses collaborating along with two multi-party, place based projects. Comparative analysis of the organisations’ experiences enabled the assessment of decisions, processes and outcomes of collaboration, as well as insight into the overall process of business recovery. This research adopted a primarily inductive, qualitative approach, drawing from both grounded theory and case study methodologies in order to generate theory from this rich and contextually situated data. Important findings include the importance of creating an enabling context which allows organisations to lead their own recovery, the creation of a framework for effective post-disaster collaboration and the importance of considering both economic and other outcomes. Collaboration is found to be an effective strategy enabling resumption of trade at a time when there seemed few other options available. While solving this need, many collaborators have discovered significant and unexpected benefits not just in terms of long term strategy but also with regard to wellbeing. Economic outcomes were less clear-cut. However, with approximately 70% of the Central Business District demolished and rebuilding only gaining momentum in late 2014, many organisations are still in a transition stage moving towards a new ‘normal’.
The increase of the world's population located near areas prone to natural disasters has given rise to new ‘mega risks’; the rebuild after disasters will test the governments’ capabilities to provide appropriate responses to protect the people and businesses. During the aftermath of the Christchurch earthquakes (2010-2012) that destroyed much of the inner city, the government of New Zealand set up a new partnership between the public and private sector to rebuild the city’s infrastructure. The new alliance, called SCIRT, used traditional risk management methods in the many construction projects. And, in hindsight, this was seen as one of the causes for some of the unanticipated problems. This study investigated the risk management practices in the post-disaster recovery to produce a specific risk management model that can be used effectively during future post-disaster situations. The aim was to develop a risk management guideline for more integrated risk management and fill the gap that arises when the traditional risk management framework is used in post-disaster situations. The study used the SCIRT alliance as a case study. The findings of the study are based on time and financial data from 100 rebuild projects, and from surveying and interviewing risk management professionals connected to the infrastructure recovery programme. The study focussed on post-disaster risk management in construction as a whole. It took into consideration the changes that happened to the people, the work and the environment due to the disaster. System thinking, and system dynamics techniques have been used due to the complexity of the recovery and to minimise the effect of unforeseen consequences. Based on an extensive literature review, the following methods were used to produce the model. The analytical hierarchical process and the relative importance index have been used to identify the critical risks inside the recovery project. System theory methods and quantitative graph theory have been used to investigate the dynamics of risks between the different management levels. Qualitative comparative analysis has been used to explore the critical success factors. And finally, causal loop diagrams combined with the grounded theory approach has been used to develop the model itself. The study identified that inexperienced staff, low management competency, poor communication, scope uncertainty, and non-alignment of the timing of strategic decisions with schedule demands, were the key risk factors in recovery projects. Among the critical risk groups, it was found that at a strategic management level, financial risks attracted the highest level of interest, as the client needs to secure funding. At both alliance-management and alliance-execution levels, the safety and environmental risks were given top priority due to a combination of high levels of emotional, reputational and media stresses. Risks arising from a lack of resources combined with the high volume of work and the concern that the cost could go out of control, alongside the aforementioned funding issues encouraged the client to create the recovery alliance model with large reputable construction organisations to lock in the recovery cost, at a time when the scope was still uncertain. This study found that building trust between all parties, clearer communication and a constant interactive flow of information, established a more working environment. Competent and clear allocation of risk management responsibilities, cultural shift, risk prioritisation, and staff training were crucial factors. Finally, the post-disaster risk management (PDRM) model can be described as an integrated risk management model that considers how the changes which happened to the environment, the people and their work, caused them to think differently to ease the complexity of the recovery projects. The model should be used as a guideline for recovery systems, especially after an earthquake, looking in detail at all the attributes and the concepts, which influence the risk management for more effective PDRM. The PDRM model is represented in Causal Loops Diagrams (CLD) in Figure 8.31 and based on 10 principles (Figure 8.32) and 26 concepts (Table 8.1) with its attributes.
