We examine the role of business interruption (BI) insurance in business recovery following the Christchurch earthquake in 2011. First, we ask whether BI insurance increases the likelihood of business survival in the immediate (3-6 months) aftermath of a disaster. We find positive but statistically insignificant evidence that those firms that had incurred damage, but were covered by BI insurance, had higher likelihood of survival post-quake compared with those firms that did not have any insurance. For the medium-term (2-3 years) survival of firms, our results show a more explicit role for insurance. Firms with BI insurance experience increased productivity and improved performance following a catastrophe. Furthermore, we find that those organisations that receive prompt and full payments of their claims have a better recovery than those that had protracted or inadequate claims payments, but this difference between the two groups is not statistically significant. We find no statistically significant evidence that the latter group (inadequate payment) did any better than those organisations that had damage but no insurance coverage. In general, our analysis indicates the importance not only of adequate insurance coverage, but also of an insurance system that delivers prompt claim payments.
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in 'The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice'. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41288-017-0067-y. The following terms of use apply: https://www.springer.com/gp/open-access/publication-policies/aam-terms-of-use.
We measure the longer-term effect of a major earthquake on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and investigate whether insurance claim payments for damaged residential property affected the local recovery process. We focus on the destructive Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) 2010 -2011 as our case study. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance, but insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery and describe the recovery’s determinants. We also find that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of economic recovery after the earthquake, but delayed payments were less affective and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs in contributing to local recovery.
The 2010–2011 Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage during the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch Central Business District, left this community with more than $NZD 40 billion in losses (~20 % GDP), demolition of approximately 60 % of multi-storey concrete buildings (3 storeys and up), and closure of the core business district for over 2 years. The aftermath of the earthquake sequence has revealed unique issues and complexities for the owners of commercial and multi-storey residential buildings in relation to unexpected technical, legal, and financial challenges when making decisions regarding the future of their buildings impacted by the earthquakes. The paper presents a framework to understand the factors influencing post-earthquake decisions (repair or demolish) on multi-storey concrete buildings in Christchurch. The study, conducted in 2014, includes in-depth investigations on 15 case-study buildings using 27 semi-structured interviews with various property owners, property managers, insurers, engineers, and government authorities in New Zealand. The interviews revealed insights regarding the multitude of factors influencing post-earthquake decisions and losses. As expected, the level of damage and repairability (cost to repair) generally dictated the course of action. There is strong evidence, however, that other variables have significantly influenced the decision on a number of buildings, such as insurance, business strategies, perception of risks, building regulations (and compliance costs), and government decisions. The decision-making process for each building is complex and unique, not solely driven by structural damage. Furthermore, the findings have put the spotlight on insurance policy wordings and the paradoxical effect of insurance on the recovery of Christchurch, leading to other challenges and issues going forward.
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner’s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from StatNZ, this project empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and what were the implications of these choices for the owners’ wealth and income.
The use of post-earthquake cordons as a tool to support emergency managers after an event has been documented around the world. However, there is limited research that attempts to understand the use, effectiveness, inherent complexities, impacts and subsequent consequences of cordoning once applied. This research aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed understanding of first, the cordons and associated processes, and their implications in a post-earthquake scenario. We use a qualitative method to understand cordons through case studies of two cities where it was used in different temporal and spatial scales: Christchurch (2011) and Wellington (Kaikōura earthquake 2016), New Zealand. Data was collected through 21 expert interviews obtained through purposive and snowball sampling of key informants who were directly or indirectly involved in a decision-making role and/or had influence in relation to the cordoning process. The participants were from varying backgrounds and roles i.e. emergency managers, council members, business representatives, insurance representatives, police and communication managers. The data was transcribed, coded in Nvivo and then grouped based on underlying themes and concepts and then analyzed inductively. It is found that cordons are used primarily as a tool to control access for the purpose of life safety and security. But cordons can also be adapted to support recovery. Broadly, it can be synthesized and viewed based on two key aspects, ‘decision-making’ and ‘operations and management’, which overlap and interact as part of a complex system. The underlying complexity arises in large part due to the multitude of sectors it transcends such as housing, socio-cultural requirements, economics, law, governance, insurance, evacuation, available resources etc. The complexity further increases as the duration of cordon is extended.
The Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 generated hundreds of thousands of insurance claims, many of which were disputed. The New Zealand justice system faced the same challenge encountered by other jurisdictions following a natural disaster: how to resolve these disputes quickly and at minimal cost but also fairly, to avoid compounding the disaster with injustice? The thesis is of this article is that although the earthquakes were catastrophic for New Zealand, they also created a unique opportunity to design an innovative civil justice process—the Christchurch High Court Earthquake List—and to test, over a relatively short timeframe, how well that process works. This article describes the Christchurch High Court Earthquake List and analyses it by reference to civil justice theory about the relative normative values of public adjudication and private settlement and the dialogic relationship between them. It then evaluates the List, using statistics available five years on from the earthquakes and by reference to the author’s own experience mediating earthquake disputes.
The lived reality of the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes and its implications for the Waimakariri District, a small but rapidly growing district (third tier of government in New Zealand) north of Christchurch, can illustrate how community well-being, community resilience, and community capitals interrelate in practice generating paradoxical results out of what can otherwise be conceived as a textbook ‘best practice’ case of earthquake recovery. The Waimakariri District Council’s integrated community based recovery framework designed and implemented post-earthquakes in the District was built upon strong political, social, and moral capital elements such as: inter-institutional integration and communication, participation, local knowledge, and social justice. This approach enabled very positive community outputs such as artistic community interventions of the urban environment and communal food forests amongst others. Yet, interests responding to broader economic and political processes (continuous central government interventions, insurance and reinsurance processes, changing socio-cultural patterns) produced a significant loss of community capitals (E.g.: social fragmentation, participation exhaustion, economic leakage, etc.) which simultaneously, despite local Council and community efforts, hindered community well-being in the long term. The story of the Waimakariri District helps understand how resilience governance operates in practice where multi-scalar, non-linear, paradoxical, dynamic, and uncertain outcomes appear to be the norm that underpins the construction of equitable, transformative, and sustainable pathways towards the future.
Seismic isolation is an effective technology for significantly reducing damage to buildings and building contents. However, its application to light-frame wood buildings has so far been unable to overcome cost and technical barriers such as susceptibility to movement during high-wind loading. The precursor to research in the field of isolation of residential buildings was the 1994 Northridge Earthquake (6.7 MW) in the United States and the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (6.9 MW) in Japan. While only a small number of lives were lost in residential buildings in these events, the economic impact was significant with over half of earthquake recovery costs given to repair and reconstruction of residential building damage. A value case has been explored to highlight the benefits of seismically isolated residential buildings compared to a standard fixed-base dwellings for the Wellington region. Loss data generated by insurance claim information from the 2011 Christchurch Earthquake has been used by researchers to determine vulnerability functions for the current light-frame wood building stock. By further considering the loss attributed to drift and acceleration sensitive components, and a simplified single degree of freedom (SDOF) building model, a method for determining vulnerability functions for seismic isolated buildings was developed. Vulnerability functions were then applied directly in a loss assessment using the GNS developed software, RiskScape. Vulnerability was shown to dramatically reduce for isolated buildings compared to an equivalent fixed-base building and as a result, the monetary savings in a given earthquake scenario were significant. This work is expected to drive further interest for development of solutions for the seismic isolation of residential dwellings, of which one option is further considered and presented herein.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
