In the aftermath of the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the Natural Hazards Research Platform (NHRP) initiated a series of Short Term Recovery Projects (STRP) aimed at facilitating and supporting the recovery of Christchurch from the earthquake impacts. This report presents the outcomes of STRP 6: Impacts of Liquefaction on Pipe Networks, which focused on the impacts of liquefaction on the potable water and wastewater systems of Christchurch. The project was a collaborative effort of NHRP researchers with expertise in liquefaction, CCC personnel managing and designing the systems and a geotechnical practitioner with experience/expertise in Christchurch soils and seismic geotechnics.
The 22 February 2011, Mw6.2-6.3 Christchurch earthquake is the most costly earthquake to affect New Zealand, causing 181 fatalities and severely damaging thousands of residential and commercial buildings, and most of the city lifelines and infrastructure. This manuscript presents an overview of observed geotechnical aspects of this earthquake as well as some of the completed and on-going research investigations. A unique aspect, which is particularly emphasized, is the severity and spatial extent of liquefaction occurring in native soils. Overall, both the spatial extent and severity of liquefaction in the city was greater than in the preceding 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake, including numerous areas that liquefied in both events. Liquefaction and lateral spreading, variable over both large and short spatial scales, affected commercial structures in the Central Business District (CBD) in a variety of ways including: total and differential settlements and tilting; punching settlements of structures with shallow foundations; differential movements of components of complex structures; and interaction of adjacent structures via common foundation soils. Liquefaction was most severe in residential areas located to the east of the CBD as a result of stronger ground shaking due to the proximity to the causative fault, a high water table approximately 1m from the surface, and soils with composition and states of high susceptibility and potential for liquefaction. Total and differential settlements, and lateral movements, due to liquefaction and lateral spreading is estimated to have severely compromised 15,000 residential structures, the majority of which otherwise sustained only minor to moderate damage directly due to inertial loading from ground shaking. Liquefaction also had a profound effect on lifelines and other infrastructure, particularly bridge structures, and underground services. Minor damage was also observed at flood stop banks to the north of the city, which were more severely impacted in the 4th September 2010 Darfield earthquake. Due to the large high-frequency ground motion in the Port hills numerous rock falls and landslides also occurred, resulting in several fatalities and rendering some residential areas uninhabitable.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
On 22 February 2011，a magnitude Mw 6.3 earthquake occurred with an epicenter located near Lyttelton at about 10km from Christchurch in Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1). Since this earthquake occurred in the midst of the aftershock activity which had continued since the 4 September 2010 Darfield Earthquake occurrence, it was considered to be an aftershock of the initial earthquake. Because of the short distance to the city and the shallower depth of the epicenter, this earthquake caused more significant damage to pipelines, traffic facilities, residential houses/properties and multi-story buildings in the central business district than the September 2010 Darfield Earthquake in spite of its smaller earthquake magnitude. Unfortunately, this earthquake resulted in significant number of casualties due to the collapse of multi-story buildings and unreinforced masonry structures in the city center of Christchurch. As of 4 April, 172 casualties were reported and the final death toll is expected to be 181. While it is extremely regrettable that Christchurch suffered a terrible number of victims, civil and geotechnical engineers have this hard-to-find opportunity to learn the response of real ground from two gigantic earthquakes which occurred in less than six months from each other. From geotechnical engineering point of view, it is interesting to discuss the widespread liquefaction in natural sediments, repeated liquefaction within short period and further damage to earth structures which have been damaged in the previous earthquake. Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence and perishable data from this event. The team included the following members: Misko Cubrinovski (University of Canterbury, NZ, Team Leader), Susumu Yasuda (Tokyo Denki University, Japan, JGS Team Leader), Rolando Orense (University of Auckland, NZ), Kohji Tokimatsu (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan), Ryosuke Uzuoka (Tokushima University, Japan), Takashi Kiyota (University of Tokyo, Japan), Yasuyo Hosono (Toyohashi University of Technology, Japan) and Suguru Yamada (University of Tokyo, Japan).
The region in and around Christchurch, encompassing Christchurch city and the Selwyn and Waimakariri districts, contains more than 800 road, rail, and pedestrian bridges. Most of these bridges are reinforced concrete, symmetric, and have small to moderate spans (15–25 m). The 22 February 2011 moment magnitude (Mw) 6.2 Christchurch earthquake induced high levels of localized ground shaking (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011, page 853 of this issue; Guidotti et al. 2011, page 767 of this issue; Smyrou et al. 2011, page 882 of this issue), with damage to bridges mainly confined to the central and eastern parts of Christchurch. Liquefaction was evident over much of this part of the city, with lateral spreading affecting bridges spanning both the Avon and Heathcote rivers.
This manuscript provides a critical examination of the ground motions recorded in the near-source region resulting from the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake. Particular attention is given to reconciling the observed spatial distribution of ground motions in terms of physical phenomena related to source, path and site effects. The large number of near-source observed strong ground motions show clear evidence of: forward-directivity, basin generated surface waves, liquefaction and other significant nonlinear site response. The pseudo-acceleration response spectra (SA) amplitudes and significant duration of strong motions agree well with empirical prediction models, except at long vibration periods where the influence of basin-generated surface waves and nonlinear site response are significant and not adequately accounted for in empirical SA models. Pseudo-acceleration response spectra are also compared with those observed in the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake and routine design response spectra used in order to emphasise the amplitude of ground shaking and elucidate the importance of local geotechnical characteristics on surface ground motions. The characteristics of the observed vertical component accelerations are shown to be strongly dependent on source-to-site distance and are comparable with those from the 4 September 2010 Darfield earthquake, implying the large amplitudes observed are simply a result of many observations at close distances rather than a peculiar source effect.
The extent of liquefaction in the eastern suburbs of Christchurch (Aranui, Bexley, Avonside, Avonhead and Dallington) from the February 22 2011 Earthquake resulted in extensive damage to in-ground waste water pipe systems. This caused a huge demand for portable toilets (or port-a-loos) and companies were importing them from outside Canterbury and in some instances from Australia. However, because they were deemed “assets of importance” under legislation, their allocation had to be coordinated by Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently, companies supplying them had to ignore requests from residents, businesses and rest homes; and commitments to large events outside of the city such as the Hamilton 400 V8 Supercars and the Pasifika Festival in Auckland were impacted. Frustrations started to show as neighbourhoods questioned the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. The Prime Minister was reported as reassuring citizens in the eastern suburbs in the first week of March that1 “a report about the distribution of port-a-loos and chemical toilets shows allocation has been fair. Key said he has asked Civil Defence about the distribution process and where the toilets been sent. He said there aren’t enough for the scale of the event but that is quickly being rectified and the need for toilets is being reassessed all the time.” Nonetheless, there still remained a deep sense of frustration and exclusion over the equity of the port-a-loos distribution. This study took the simple approach of mapping where those port-a-loos were on 11-12 March for several areas in the eastern suburbs and this suggested that their distribution was not equitable and was not well done. It reviews the predictive tools available for estimating damage to waste water pipes and asks the question could this situation have been better planned so that pot-a-loo locations could have been better prioritised? And finally it reviews the integral roles of communication and monitoring as part of disaster management strategy. The impression from this study is that other New Zealand urban centres could or would also be at risk and that work is need to developed more rational management approaches for disaster planning.
