INTRODUCTION This project falls under the Flagship 3: Wellington Coordinated Project. It supports other projects within FP3 to create a holistic understanding of risks posed by collapsed buildings due to future earthquake/s and the secondary consequences of cordoning in the short, mid and long term. Cordoning of the Christchurch CBD for more than two years and its subsequent implications on people and businesses had a significant impact on the recovery of Christchurch. Learning from this and experiences from the Kaikōura earthquake (where cordons were also established around selected buildings, Figure 3) have highlighted the need to understand the effects of cordons and plan for it before an earthquake occurs
Post-earthquake cordons have been used after seismic events around the world. However, there is limited understanding of cordons and how contextual information of place such as geography, socio-cultural characteristics, economy, institutional and governance structure etc. affect decisions, operational procedures as well as spatial and temporal attributes of cordon establishment. This research aims to fill that gap through a qualitative comparative case study of two cities: Christchurch, New Zealand (Mw 6.2 earthquake, February 2011) and L’Aquila, Italy (Mw 6.3 earthquake, 2009). Both cities suffered comprehensive damage to its city centre and had cordons established for extended period. Data collection was done through purposive and snowball sampling methods whereby 23 key informants were interviewed in total. The interviewee varied in their roles and responsibilities i.e. council members, emergency managers, politicians, business/insurance representatives etc. We found that cordons were established to ensure safety of people and to maintain security of place in both the sites. In both cities, the extended cordon was met with resistance and protests. The extent and duration of establishment of cordon was affected by recovery approach taken in the two cities i.e. in Christchurch demolition was widely done to support recovery allowing for faster removal of cordons where as in L’Aquila, due to its historical importance, the approach to recovery was based on saving all the buildings which extended the duration of cordon. Thus, cordons are affected by site specific needs. It should be removed as soon as practicable which could be made easier with preplanning of cordons.
The use of post-earthquake cordons as a tool to support emergency managers after an event has been documented around the world. However, there is limited research that attempts to understand the use, effectiveness, inherent complexities, impacts and subsequent consequences of cordoning once applied. This research aims to fill that gap by providing a detailed understanding of first, the cordons and associated processes, and their implications in a post-earthquake scenario. We use a qualitative method to understand cordons through case studies of two cities where it was used in different temporal and spatial scales: Christchurch (2011) and Wellington (Kaikōura earthquake 2016), New Zealand. Data was collected through 21 expert interviews obtained through purposive and snowball sampling of key informants who were directly or indirectly involved in a decision-making role and/or had influence in relation to the cordoning process. The participants were from varying backgrounds and roles i.e. emergency managers, council members, business representatives, insurance representatives, police and communication managers. The data was transcribed, coded in Nvivo and then grouped based on underlying themes and concepts and then analyzed inductively. It is found that cordons are used primarily as a tool to control access for the purpose of life safety and security. But cordons can also be adapted to support recovery. Broadly, it can be synthesized and viewed based on two key aspects, ‘decision-making’ and ‘operations and management’, which overlap and interact as part of a complex system. The underlying complexity arises in large part due to the multitude of sectors it transcends such as housing, socio-cultural requirements, economics, law, governance, insurance, evacuation, available resources etc. The complexity further increases as the duration of cordon is extended.
The Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage in the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch central business district (CBD), presented decision-makers with many recovery challenges. This paper identifies major government decisions, challenges, and lessons in the early recovery of Christchurch based on 23 key-informant interviews conducted 15 months after the February 2011 earthquake. It then focuses on one of the most important decisions – maintaining the cordon around the heavily damaged CBD – and investigates its impacts. The cordon displaced 50,000 central city jobs, raised questions about (and provided new opportunities for) the long-term viability of downtown, influenced the number and practice of building demolitions, and affected debris management; despite being associated with substantial losses, the cordon was commonly viewed as necessary, and provided some benefits in facilitating recovery. Management of the cordon poses important lessons for planning for catastrophic urban earthquakes around the world.
Many buildings with relatively low damage from the 2010-2011 Canterbury were deemed uneconomic to repair and were replaced [1,2]. Factors that affected commercial building owners’ decisions to replace rather than repair, included capital availability, uncertainty with regards to regional recovery, local market conditions and ability to generate cash flow, and repair delays due to limited property access (cordon). This poster provides a framework for modeling decision-making in a case where repair is feasible but replacement might offer greater economic value – a situation not currently modeled in engineering risk analysis.
The Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011 had a significant impact on landlords and tenants of commercial buildings in the city of Christchurch. The devastation wrought on the city was so severe that in an unprecedented response to this disaster a cordon was erected around the central business district for nearly two and half years while demolition, repairs and rebuilding took place. Despite the destruction, not all buildings were damaged. Many could have been occupied and used immediately if they had not been within the cordoned area. Others had only minor damage but repairs to them could not be commenced, let alone completed, owing to restrictions on access caused by the cordon. Tenants were faced with a major problem in that they could not access their buildings and it was likely to be a long time before they would be allowed access again. The other problem was uncertainty about the legal position as neither the standard form leases in use, nor any statute, provided for issues arising from an inaccessible building. The parties were therefore uncertain about their legal rights and obligations in this situation. Landlords and tenants were unsure whether tenants were required to pay rent for a building that could not be accessed or whether they could terminate their leases on the basis that the building was inaccessible. This thesis looks at whether the common law doctrine of frustration could apply to leases in these circumstances, where the lease had made no provision. It analyses the history of the doctrine and how it applies to a lease, the standard form leases in use at the time of the earthquakes and the unexpected and extraordinary nature of the earthquakes. It then reports on the findings of the qualitative empirical research undertaken to look at the experiences of landlords and tenants after the earthquakes. It is argued that the circumstances of landlords and tenants met the test for the doctrine of frustration. Therefore, the doctrine could have applied to leases to enable the parties to terminate them. It concludes with a suggestion for reform in the form of a new Act to govern the special relationship between commercial landlords and tenants, similar to legislation already in place covering other types of relationships like those in residential tenancies and employment. Such legislation could provide dispute resolution services to enable landlords and tenants to have access to justice to determine their legal rights at all times, and in particular, in times of crisis.
Organisations locate strategically within Business Districts (CBDs) in order to cultivate their image, increase their profile, and improve access to customers, suppliers, and services. While CBDs offer an economic benefit to organisations, they also present a unique set of hazard vulnerabilities and planning challenges for businesses. As of May 2012, the Christchurch CBD has been partially cordoned off for over 14 months. Economic activity within the cordoned CBD, which previously contained 6,000 businesses and over 51,000 workers, has been significantly diminished and organisations have been forced to find new ways of operating. The vulnerabilities and resilience of CBDs not only influences outcomes for CBD organisations, but also the broader interconnected (urban/regional/national) system. A CBD is a hub of economic, social, and built infrastructure within a network of links and nodes. When the hub is disrupted all of the people, objects, and transactions that usually flow into and out of the hub must be redirected elsewhere. In an urban situation this means traffic jams in peripheries of the city, increased prices of commercial property, and capital flight; all of which are currently being faced in Canterbury. This report presents the lessons learned from organisations in CBDs affected by the Canterbury earthquakes. Here we focus on the Christchurch CBD; however, several urban town centres were extensively disrupted by the earthquakes. The statistics and discussion presented in this report are based on the results of an ongoing study conducted by Resilient Organisations (www.resorgs.org.nz). The data was captured using two questionnaire surveys of Canterbury organisations (issued November 2010 and May 2011), interviews with key informants, and in-depth case studies of organisations. Several industry sectors were sampled, and geographic samples of organisations in the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and the Kaiapoi town centre were also collected. Results in this report describing “non-CBD organisations” refer to all organisations outside of the Christchurch CBD, Lyttelton, and Kaiapoi town centres.
The Civil Defense understanding of the role of radio in disaster tends to focus on its value in providing essential information during and after the event. However this role is compromised when a station’s premises are destroyed, or rendered inaccessible by official cordons. The Radio Quake study examines how radio stations in Christchurch managed to resume broadcasting in the aftermath of the earthquake of February 22, 2011. In New Zealand’s heavily networked and commercialised radio environment there is a significant disparity between networked and independent stations’ broadcast commitments and resourcing. All Christchurch radio broadcasters were forced to improvise new locations, complex technical workarounds, and responsive styles of broadcasting after the February 22 earthquake, but the need to restore, or maintain, a full on air presence after the earthquake, rested entirely on often financially tenuous, locally owned and staffed independent radio: student, Iwi, community access, and local commercial stations. This paper will explore the resourcefulness and resilience of broadcasters riding out the aftershocks in hotels, motels, bedrooms, and a horse truck, using digital technologies in new ways to reimagine the practice of radio in Christchurch.
Local independent radio stations in Christchurch, New Zealand, had their operations severely disrupted by major earthquakes in September 2010 and February 2011. This article examines the experiences of three radio stations that were shut out of their central city premises by the cordon drawn around the city after the 22 February quake. One of the stations continued broadcasting automatically, while the others were unable to fully get back on air for several weeks afterwards. All of the stations had to manage access to workspaces, the emotional needs of staff and volunteers, the technical ability to broadcast, and the need to adapt content appropriately when back on air. For the locally based radio managers decisions had to be made about the future of the stations in a time of significant emotional, physical, and geological upheaval. The article explores how these radio stations were disrupted by the earthquake, and how they returned to air through new combinations and interconnections of people, workspace, technology, content and transmission.
On 14 November 2016, the Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake caused widespread damage along the east coast of the South Island, New Zealand. Kaikōura town itself was isolated from the rest of the country by landslides blocking off major roads. While impacts from the Kaikōura earthquake on large, urban population centres have been generally well documented, this thesis aims to fill gaps in academic knowledge regarding small rural towns. This thesis investigates what, where and when critical infrastructure and lifeline service disruption occurred following the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake in a selection of small towns, and how the communities in these areas adapted to disruption. Following a robust review of literature and news media, four small rural towns were selected from North Canterbury (Culverden & Waiau) and Marlborough (Seddon & Ward) in the South Island, New Zealand. Semi-structured interview sessions with a special focus on these towns were held with infrastructure managers, emergency response and recovery officials, and organisation leaders with experience or expertise in the 2016 Kaikōura earthquake. Findings were supplemented with emergency management situation reports to produce hazard maps and infrastructure exposure maps. A more detailed analysis was conducted for Waiau involving interdependence analyses and a level of service timeline for select lifeline services. The earthquake impacted roads by blocking them with landslides, debris and surface rupture. Bridges where shaken off their abutments, breaking infrastructure links such as fibre landlines as they went. Water supplies and other forms of infrastructure relied heavily on the level of service of roads, as rough rural terrain left few alternatives. Adapting to an artificial loss of road service, some Waiau locals created their own detour around a road cordon in order to get home to family and farms. Performance of dwellings was tied to socioeconomic factors as much as proximity to the epicentre. Farmers who lost water access pulled out fences to allow stock to drink from rivers. Socioeconomic differences between farmland and township residents also contributed to resilience variations between the towns assessed in this study. Understanding how small rural towns respond and adapt to disaster allows emergency management officials and policy to be well informed and flexible with planning for multiple size classes of towns.
