The city of Christchurch has experienced over 10,000 aftershocks since the 4th of September 2010 earthquake of which approximately 50 have been greater than magnitude 5. The damage caused to URM buildings in Christchurch over this sequence of earthquakes has been well documented. Due to the similarity in age and construction of URM buildings in Adelaide, South Australia and Christchurch (they are sister cities, of similar age and heritage), an investigation was conducted to learn lessons for Adelaide based on the Christchurch experience. To this end, the number of URM buildings in the central business districts of both cities, the extent of seismic strengthening that exists in both cities, and the relative earthquake hazards for both cities were considered. This paper will report on these findings and recommend strategies that the city of Adelaide could consider to significantly reduce the seismic risk posed by URM buildings in future earthquake.
On 14 November 2016 a magnitude Mw 7.8 earthquake struck the upper South Island of New Zealand with effects also being observed in the capital city, Wellington. The affected area has low population density but is the largest wine production region in New Zealand and also hosts the main national highway and railway routes connecting the country’s three largest cities of Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, with Marlborough Port in Picton providing connection between the South and North Islands. These transport facilities sustained substantial earthquake related damage, causing major disruptions. Thousands of landslides and multiple new faults were counted in the area. The winery facilities and a large number of commercial buildings and building components (including brick masonry veneers, historic masonry construction, and chimneys), sustained damage due to the strong vertical and horizontal acceleration. Presented herein are field observations undertaken the day immediately after the earthquake, with the aim to document earthquake damage and assess access to the affected area.
Unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings have repeatedly been shown to perform poorly in large magnitude earthquakes, with both New Zealand and Australia having a history of past earthquakes that have resulted in fatalities due to collapsed URM buildings. A comparison is presented here of the URM building stock and the seismic vulnerability of Christchurch and Adelaide in order to demonstrate the relevance to Australian cities of observations in Christchurch resulting from the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquake swarm. It is shown that the materials, architecture and hence earthquake strength of URM buildings in both countries is comparable and that Adelaide and other cities of Australia have seismic vulnerability sufficient to cause major damage to their URM buildings should a design level earthquake occur. Such an earthquake is expected to cause major building damage, and fatalities should be expected.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
Between September 4, 2010 and December 23, 2011, a series of earthquakes struck the South Island of New Zealand including the city of Christchurch producing heavy damage. During the strongest shaking, the unreinforced masonry (URM) building stock in Christchurch was subjected to seismic loading equal to approximately 150-200% of code values. Post-earthquake reconnaissance suggested numerous failures of adhesive anchors used for retrofit connection of roof and floor diaphragms to masonry walls. A team of researchers from the Universities of Auckland (NZ) and Minnesota (USA) conducted a field investigation on the performance of new adhesive anchors installed in existing masonry walls. Variables included adhesive type, anchor diameter, embedment length, anchor inclination, and masonry quality. Buildings were selected that had been slated for demolition but which featured exterior walls that had not been damaged. A summary of the deformation response measured during the field tests are presented. AM - Accepted Manuscript
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 2010-2011 (CES) induced widespread liquefaction in many parts of Christchurch city. Liquefaction was more commonly observed in the eastern suburbs and along the Avon River where the soils were characterised by thick sandy deposits with a shallow water table. On the other hand, suburbs to the north, west and south of the CBD (e.g. Riccarton, Papanui) exhibited less severe to no liquefaction. These soils were more commonly characterised by inter-layered liquefiable and non-liquefiable deposits. As part of a related large-scale study of the performance of Christchurch soils during the CES, detailed borehole data including CPT, Vs and Vp have been collected for 55 sites in Christchurch. For this subset of Christchurch sites, predictions of liquefaction triggering using the simplified method (Boulanger & Idriss, 2014) indicated that liquefaction was over-predicted for 94% of sites that did not manifest liquefaction during the CES, and under-predicted for 50% of sites that did manifest liquefaction. The focus of this study was to investigate these discrepancies between prediction and observation. To assess if these discrepancies were due to soil-layer interaction and to determine the effect that soil stratification has on the develop-ment of liquefaction and the system response of soil deposits.
An UnReinforced clay brick Masonry (URM) chimney is composed of a cantilever URM appendage above a roofline and is considered one of the most earthquake prone non-structural compo¬nents within vintage URM and timber-framed buildings. Observations from past earthquakes including the 1992 Big Bear City earthquake, 1994 Northridge earthquake, 2001 Nisqually earthquake, 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes, 2012 Northern Italy earthquakes, and 2014 South Napa earthquake served repeatedly as a reminder of the hazard induced by URM chimneys. The observed failure types included several cases where the adopted retrofit techniques were not adequate to effectively secure chimneys dur¬ing the earthquake. Data collected during the 2010/2011 post-earthquake building assessments in Christchurch and insur¬ance claims are reported herein. Five full-scale solid clay brick URM chimneys which replicated the most encountered geometrical and construction characteristics were subjected to shake table testing. Two chim¬ney samples were representative of the as-built conditions, while three samples were retrofitted using two different configurations of Near-Surface-Mounted (NSM) Carbon-Fibre-Reinforced-Polymer (CFRP) strips and post-tensioning techniques. The adopted securing techniques allowed an increase in seismic acceleration capacity of more than five times for chimneys constructed with ultra-weak mortar and more than twice for chimneys built with weak mortar. http://www.16ibmac.com/
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
