This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
As damage and loss caused by natural hazards have increased worldwide over the past several decades, it is important for governments and aid agencies to have tools that enable effective post-disaster livelihood recovery to create self-sufficiency for the affected population. This study introduces a framework of critical components that constitute livelihood recovery and the critical factors that lead to people’s livelihood recovery. A comparative case study is employed in this research, combined with questionnaire surveys and interviews with those communities affected by large earthquakes in Lushan, China and in Christchurch and Kaikōura, New Zealand. In Lushan, China, a framework with four livelihood components was established, namely, housing, employment, wellbeing and external assistance. Respondents considered recovery of their housing to be the most essential element for livelihood diversification. External assistance was also rated highly in assisting with their livelihood recovery. Family ties and social connections seemed to have played a larger role than that of government agencies and NGOs. However, the recovery of livelihood cannot be fully achieved without wellbeing aspects being taken into account, and people believed that quality of life and their physical and mental health were essential for livelihood restoration. In Christchurch, New Zealand, the identified livelihood components were validated through in-depth interviews. The results showed that the above framework presenting what constitutes successful livelihood recovery could also be applied in Christchurch. This study also identified the critical factors to affect livelihood recovery following the Lushan and Kaikōura earthquakes, and these include community safety, availability of family support, level of community cohesion, long-term livelihood support, external housing recovery support, level of housing recovery and availability of health and wellbeing support. The framework developed will provide guidance for policy makers and aid agencies to prioritise their strategies and initiatives in assisting people to reinstate their livelihood in a timely manner post-disaster. It will also assist the policy makers and practitioners in China and New Zealand by setting an agenda for preparing for livelihood recovery in non-urgent times so the economic impact and livelihood disruption of those affected can be effectively mitigated.
