"The nuclear meltdown at Fukushima ... the Fonterra botulism scare ... the Christchurch earthquakes – in all these recent crises the role played by scientists has been under the spotlight. What is the first duty of scientists in a crisis – to the government, to their employer, or to the wider public desperate for information? And what if these different objectives clash? In this penetrating BWB Text, leading scientist Shaun Hendy finds that in New Zealand, the public obligation of the scientist is often far from clear and that there have been many disturbing instances of scientists being silenced. Experts who have information the public seeks, he finds, have been prevented from speaking out. His own experiences have led him to conclude that New Zealanders have few scientific institutions that feel secure enough to criticise the government of the day." - Publisher information. http://librarysearch.auckland.ac.nz/UOA2_A:Combined_Local:uoa_alma21259423940002091
This study followed two similarly affected, but socio-economically disparate suburbs as residents responded to and attempted to recover from the devastating 6.3 magnitude earthquake that struck Christchurch, New Zealand, on February 22, 2011. More specifically, it focuses on the role of local churches, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), here referred to broadly as civil society, in meeting the immediate needs of local residents and assisting with the longer-term recovery of each neighbourhood. Despite considerable socioeconomic differences between the two neighbourhoods, civil society in both suburbs has been vital in addressing the needs of locals in the short and long term following the earthquake. Institutions were able to utilise local knowledge of both residents and the extent of damage in the area to a) provide a swifter local response than government or civil defence and then help direct the relief these agencies provided locally; b) set up central points for distribution of supplies and information where locals would naturally gather; c) take action on what were perceived to be unmet needs; and d) act as a way of bridging locals to a variety of material, informational, and emotional resources. However the findings also support literature which indicates that other factors are also important in understanding neighbourhood recovery and the role of civil society, including: local leadership; a shared, place-based identity; the type and form of civil society organizations; social capital; and neighbourhood- and household-level indicators of relative vulnerability and inequality. The intertwining of these various factors seems to influence how these neighbourhoods have coped with and taken steps in recovering from this disaster. It is recommended that future research be directed at developing a better understanding of how this occurs. It is suggested that a model similar to Yasui’s (2007) Community Vulnerability and Capacity model be developed as a useful way to approach future research in this area.
Group case study report prepared for lecturers Ton Buhrs and Roy Montgomery by students of ERST 635 at Lincoln University, 2013.The New Zealand Government’s decision to establish a unitary authority in the Auckland Region has provided much of the context and impetus for this review of current governance arrangements in the Canterbury region, to determine whether or not they are optimal for taking the communities of greater Christchurch into the future. A number of local governance academics, as well as several respected political pundits, have prophesised that the Auckland ‘Super City’ reforms of 2009 will have serious implications and ramifications for local governance arrangements in other major cities, particularly Wellington and Christchurch. Wellington councils have already responded to the possibility of change by undertaking a series of reports on local governance arrangements, as well as a major review led by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, to investigate options for governance reform. Alongside these developments, the Christchurch earthquakes beginning in September 2010 have raised a myriad of new and complex governance issues, which may or may not be able to be addressed under the status quo, while the replacement of Regional Councillors’ with centrally-appointed Commissioners is suggestive of government dissatisfaction with current arrangements. With these things in mind, the research group has considered local government in Canterbury and the greater Christchurch area in the wider governance context. It does not limit discussion to only the structure of local government in Canterbury but rather, as the brief (Appendix 1) indicates, considers more broadly the relationship between central, regional, and local tiers of government, as well as the relationship between local government and local communities.
The lived reality of the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquakes and its implications for the Waimakariri District, a small but rapidly growing district (third tier of government in New Zealand) north of Christchurch, can illustrate how community well-being, community resilience, and community capitals interrelate in practice generating paradoxical results out of what can otherwise be conceived as a textbook ‘best practice’ case of earthquake recovery. The Waimakariri District Council’s integrated community based recovery framework designed and implemented post-earthquakes in the District was built upon strong political, social, and moral capital elements such as: inter-institutional integration and communication, participation, local knowledge, and social justice. This approach enabled very positive community outputs such as artistic community interventions of the urban environment and communal food forests amongst others. Yet, interests responding to broader economic and political processes (continuous central government interventions, insurance and reinsurance processes, changing socio-cultural patterns) produced a significant loss of community capitals (E.g.: social fragmentation, participation exhaustion, economic leakage, etc.) which simultaneously, despite local Council and community efforts, hindered community well-being in the long term. The story of the Waimakariri District helps understand how resilience governance operates in practice where multi-scalar, non-linear, paradoxical, dynamic, and uncertain outcomes appear to be the norm that underpins the construction of equitable, transformative, and sustainable pathways towards the future.
As far as suburbs with bad reputations go, Aranui in Christchurch often seems to dominate local public perceptions. High crime, high unemployment, low incomes, run-down state houses and uncared-for neighbourhoods have been the key words and phrases used over many decades. This reputation achieved national standing over the same period and in 2001 Aranui gained the dubious distinction of becoming the pilot project for the Labour Government’s state housing Community Renewal Programme initiated in 2001. It is common to read “Don’t buy or rent here” comments on websites and blogs advising prospective immigrants on where to live. One of the dispiriting moments in Aranui’s history came in September 2009 with the discovery of two bodies under the floorboards of a Hampshire Street property and the subsequent charge of double-homicide and conviction of local resident Jason Somerville for the murder of his wife Rebecca Chamberlain and neighbour Tisha Lowry.
Planning in New Zealand in 2014 has largely been dominated by housing and urban development, potential local government and legislative reforms, and water issues. This volume’s peer reviewed research, which combines Issues 1 and 2, focuses on these issues, but with perspectives and issues that are outside the mainstream. In our lead research article, John Ryks and his co-authors review the opportunities from Treaty settlements and legislative provisions and challenges for Māori participation in urban development, such as the balancing of matawaka and mana whenua perspectives. Water issues are picked up by Ronlyn Duncan and Phil Holland who each take constructively critical views toward some currently well-regarded approaches to resolutions. We have reflective and somewhat contrasting contributions from two highly respected semi-retired planners, Malcolm Douglass (FNZPI) and Derek Hall, that challenge aspects of New Zealand’s current approach to planning. In our outreach part of this Volume we include the response of some political parties to questions put to them about planning by LPR team member Nicole Read. Finally, Lincoln University appears to have turned a corner after the earthquakes, at least in the planning programmes.
The world experiences a number of disasters each year. Following a disaster, the affected area moves to a phase of recovery which involves multiple stakeholders. An important element of recovery is planning the rebuild of the affected environment guided by the legislative framework to which planning is bound to (March & Kornakova, 2017). Yet, there appears to be little research that has investigated the role of planners in a recovery setting and the implications of recovery legislative planning frameworks. This study was conducted to explore the role of the planner in the Canterbury earthquake recovery process in New Zealand and the impact of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) on planners’ roles and how they operated. The methodology comprised a combination of document analysis of legislation and related recovery material and 21 semi-structured interviews with key planners, politicians and professionals involved in the recovery. The results suggest that the majority of planners interviewed were affected by the CER Act in their role and how they operated, although institutional context, especially political constraints, was a key factor in determining the degree of impact. It is argued that planners played a key role in recovery and were generally equipped in terms of skills needed in a recovery setting. In order to better utilise planners in post-disaster recovery or disaster risk management, two suggestions are proposed. Firstly, better promote planners and their capabilities to improve awareness of what planners can do. Secondly, educate and build an understanding between central government politicians and planners over each others role to produce better planning outcomes.
There are many things that organisations of any size can do to prepare for a disaster or crisis. Traditionally, the advice given to business has focused on identifying risks, reducing their likely occurrence, and planning in advance how to respond. More recently, there is growing interest in the broader concept of organisational resilience which includes planning for crisis but also considers traits that lead to organisational adaptability and ability to thrive despite adverse circumstances. In this paper we examine the policy frameworks1 within New Zealand that influence the resilience of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs). The first part of the paper focuses on the New Zealand context, including the prevailing political and economic ideologies, the general nature of New Zealand SMEs and the nature of New Zealand’s hazard environment. The paper then goes on to outline the key policy frameworks in place relevant to SMEs and hazards. The final part of the paper examines the way the preexisting policy environment influenced the response of SMEs and Government following the Canterbury earthquakes.
Under the framework of New Public Management, the government has decentralised the responsibility for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) to regional, local, and community levels in New Zealand. This decentralisation serves political agendas related to resource allocation and is supported by empirical evidence suggesting that involving communities in DRM during recovery decision-making enhances disaster resilience. Extensive evidence indicates that community participation in DRM, especially during recovery decision-making, can significantly improve recovery outcomes at the community level. However, there has been limited research into whether the legal framework in New Zealand effectively facilitates meaningful public engagement to empower the public in influencing disaster recovery decisions. To address this gap in the literature, this thesis aims to explore the extent to which legislative and governance arrangements transfer the responsibility, liability, and costs of managing disaster risks to local levels without enabling meaningful public contribution to and influence on recovery decisions affecting them. Situated within Public Law and Disaster Risk and Resilience disciplines and using a case study of Greater Christchurch, New Zealand, this interdisciplinary thesis examines both common law and statutory provisions in the legal framework impacting public engagement before and during recovery from the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. In particular, this thesis assesses how legislative, and governance frameworks influenced communities’ ability to influence recovery decision-making following the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). This thesis shows that before the CES, the New Zealand public engagement system closely adhered to the common law principle of the ‘duty to consult’, which remains the current legal standard. This principle required decision-makers to use the 'public notice and comment' approach as a minimum, limiting meaningful community participation in decision-making. After the earthquakes, reliance on this traditional approach caused growing frustration and division locally, as the public struggled to effectively engage in and influence recovery decisions, resulting in new community activism. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act (CER Act), introduced following the Christchurch Earthquake, included innovative provisions on public engagement. However, for various reasons, this Act appeared to have minimal impact on meaningful public engagement in recovery decision-making, which continued to align with the broader, existing public engagement system and associated norms. The empirical findings indicate that despite the novel legislative language, the traditional public engagement framework in New Zealand constrained effective engagement, leading to a broader erosion of trust between the public and the government. This was largely attributed to the default ‘public notice and comment’ approach at the local government level, with inadequate mechanisms for community engagement in central government decision-making shaping the expectations of recovery decision-makers still operating within this framework. Notable departures from this traditional approach were evident in the practices of the Waimakariri District Council and Christchurch City Council. Particularly noteworthy was the ‘Share an Idea’ public engagement campaign. Unlike conventional processes, it did not commence with a near-final or draft document. Instead, it utilised participatory mechanisms that fostered meaningful dialogue, enabling the public to significantly shape the content of the draft Christchurch Central Recovery Plan. The initial success of such participatory engagement underscores its potential effectiveness throughout the entire recovery planning process, an option that was not exercised by the central government. In conclusion, this thesis argues that New Zealand should move beyond the entrenched ‘public notice and comment’ approach and adopt more open and inclusive public participation mechanisms. It contends that supplementing this approach with proactive participatory methods before disasters could yield favorable outcomes during disaster recovery, thereby ensuring meaningful public involvement in future decisions that affect communities.
In September 2010 and February 2011, the Canterbury region experienced devastating earthquakes with an estimated economic cost of over NZ$40 billion (Parker and Steenkamp, 2012; Timar et al., 2014; Potter et al., 2015). The insurance market played an important role in rebuilding the Canterbury region after the earthquakes. Homeowners, insurance and reinsurance markets and New Zealand government agencies faced a difficult task to manage the rebuild process. From an empirical and theoretic research viewpoint, the Christchurch disaster calls for an assessment of how the insurance market deals with such disasters in the future. Previous studies have investigated market responses to losses in global catastrophes by focusing on the insurance supply-side. This study investigates both demand-side and supply-side insurance market responses to the Christchurch earthquakes. Despite the fact that New Zealand is prone to seismic activities, there are scant previous studies in the area of earthquake insurance. This study does offer a unique opportunity to examine and document the New Zealand insurance market response to catastrophe risk, providing results critical for understanding market responses after major loss events in general. A review of previous studies shows higher premiums suppress demand, but how higher premiums and a higher probability of risk affect demand is still largely unknown. According to previous studies, the supply of disaster coverage is curtailed unless the market is subsidised, however, there is still unsettled discussion on why demand decreases with time from the previous disaster even when the supply of coverage is subsidised by the government. Natural disaster risks pose a set of challenges for insurance market players because of substantial ambiguity associated with the probability of such events occurring and high spatial correlation of catastrophe losses. Private insurance market inefficiencies due to high premiums and spatially concentrated risks calls for government intervention in the provision of natural disaster insurance to avert situations of noninsurance and underinsurance. Political economy considerations make it more likely for government support to be called for if many people are uninsured than if few people are uninsured. However, emergency assistance for property owners after catastrophe events can encourage most property owners to not buy insurance against natural disaster and develop adverse selection behaviour, generating larger future risks for homeowners and governments. On the demand-side, this study has developed an intertemporal model to examine how demand for insurance changes post-catastrophe, and how to model it theoretically. In this intertemporal model, insurance can be sought in two sequential periods of time, and at the second period, it is known whether or not a loss event happened in period one. The results show that period one demand for insurance increases relative to the standard single period model when the second period is taken into consideration, period two insurance demand is higher post-loss, higher than both the period one demand and the period two demand without a period one loss. To investigate policyholders experience from the demand-side perspective, a total of 1600 survey questionnaires were administered, and responses from 254 participants received representing a 16 percent response rate. Survey data was gathered from four institutions in Canterbury and is probably not representative of the entire population. The results of the survey show that the change from full replacement value policy to nominated replacement value policy is a key determinant of the direction of change in the level of insurance coverage after the earthquakes. The earthquakes also highlighted the plight of those who were underinsured, prompting policyholders to update their insurance coverage to reflect the estimated cost of re-building their property. The survey has added further evidence to the existing literature, such as those who have had a recent experience with disaster loss report increased risk perception if a similar event happens in future with females reporting a higher risk perception than males. Of the demographic variables, only gender has a relationship with changes in household cover. On the supply-side, this study has built a risk-based pricing model suitable to generate a competitive premium rate for natural disaster insurance cover. Using illustrative data from the Christchurch Red-zone suburbs, the model generates competitive premium rates for catastrophe risk. When the proposed model incorporates the new RMS high-definition New Zealand Earthquake Model, for example, insurers can find the model useful to identify losses at a granular level so as to calculate the competitive premium. This study observes that the key to the success of the New Zealand dual insurance system despite the high prevalence of catastrophe losses are; firstly the EQC’s flat-rate pricing structure keeps private insurance premiums affordable and very high nationwide homeowner take-up rates of natural disaster insurance. Secondly, private insurers and the EQC have an elaborate reinsurance arrangement in place. By efficiently transferring risk to the reinsurer, the cost of writing primary insurance is considerably reduced ultimately expanding primary insurance capacity and supply of insurance coverage.
