This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
There has not been substantial research conducted in the area of fraud and natural disasters. Therefore, this study sought to examine the perceptions of Canterbury residents toward the recovery process following the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes and whether residents felt as though contractor fraud occurs in Canterbury. A questionnaire was developed to gauge information about Canterbury residents’ self-reports involving the earthquakes, specific contractors involved, parties involved with the recovery process in general, and demographic information. Participants included a total of 213 residents from the Canterbury region who had been involved with contractors and/or insurance companies due to the recovery process. Results indicated that a high percentage of the participants were not satisfied with the recovery process and that almost half of the participants reported feeling scammed by contractors in Canterbury after the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. Moreover, the results indicate that participants neither agreed with the assessments made about their property losses nor the plans made to recover their properties. In many cases, participants felt pressured and even reluctant to accept these assessments and/or plans. The present study does not seek to explain why contractor fraud exists or what motivates scammers. Conversely, it attempts to demonstrate the perceptions of contractor fraud and satisfaction that have taken place in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes.
The 2010 and 2011 earthquakes in the region of Canterbury, New Zealand caused widespread damage and the deaths of 185 people. Suburbs on the eastern side of Christchurch and in the satellite town of Kaiapoi, 20 kilometres north of Christchurch, were badly damaged by liquefaction. The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA), a government organisation set up in the wake of the earthquakes, began to systematically zone all residential land in 2011. Based on the possibility for land remediation, 7860 houses in Christchurch and Kaiapoi were zoned red. Those who were in this zone were compensated and had to buy or build elsewhere. The other zone examined within this research – that of TC3 – lies within the green zone. Residents, in this zone, were able to stay in their houses but land was moderately damaged and required site-specific geotechnical investigations. This research sought to understand how residents’ senses of home were impacted by a disaster and the response efforts. Focusing on the TC3 and red zone of the eastern suburbs and the satellite town of Kaiapoi, this study interviewed 29 residents within these zones. The concept of home was explored with the respondents at three scales: home as a household; home as a community; and home as a city. There was a large amount of resistance to the zoning process and the handling of claims by insurance companies and the Earthquake Commission (EQC) after the earthquakes. Lack of transparency and communication, as well as extremely slow timelines were all documented as failings of these agencies. This research seeks to understand how participant’s sense of home changed on an individual level and how it was impacted by outside agencies. Homemaking techniques were also focused on showing that a changed sense of home will impact on how a person interacts with a space.
This study is a qualitative investigation into the decision-making behaviour of commercial property owners (investors and developers) who are rebuilding in a city centre after a major disaster. In 2010/2011, Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island of New Zealand, was a site of numerous earthquakes. The stronger earthquakes destroyed many buildings and public infrastructure in the commercial inner city. As a result, affected property owners lost all or most of their buildings, a significant proportion of which were old and in the last phase of their life span. They had to negotiate pay-outs with insurance companies and decide, once paid out, whether they should rebuild in Christchurch or sell up and invest elsewhere. The clear majority of those who decided to reinvest in and rebuild the city are ‘locals’, almost all of whom had no prior experience of property development. Thus, in a post-disaster environment, most of these property owners have transitioned from being just being passive investors to active property developers. Their experience was interpreted using primary data gathered from in-depth and semi-structured interviews with twenty-one “informed property people” who included commercial property owners; property agents or consultants; representatives of public-sector agencies and financial institutions. The study findings showed that the decision-making behaviour of property investors and developers rebuilding after a major disaster did not necessarily follow a strict financial or profit motive as prescribed in the mainstream or neo-classical economics property literature. Rather, their decision-making behaviour has been largely shaped by emotional connections and external factors associated with their immediate environment. The theoretical proposition emerging from this study is that after a major disaster, local urban property owners are faced with two choices “to stay” or “to go”. Those who decide to stay and rebuild are typically very committed individuals who have a feeling of ownership, belonging and attachment to the city in which they live and work. These are people who will often take the lead in commercial property development, proactively making decisions and seeking positive investment outcomes for themselves which in turn result in revitalised commercial urban precincts.
During 2010 and 2011, a series of major earthquakes caused widespread damage in the city of Christchurch, New Zealand. The magnitude 6.3 quake in February 2011 caused 185 fatalities. In the ensuing months, the government progressively zoned residential land in Christchurch on the basis of its suitability for future occupation (considering damage from these quakes and future earthquake risk). Over 6,000 homes were placed in the ‘red-zone’, meaning that property owners were forced to sell their land to the Crown. This study analysed patterns of residential mobility amongst thirty-one red-zone households from the suburb of Southshore, Christchurch. Drawing on interviews and surveys, the research traced their experience from the zoning announcement until they had moved to a new residence. The research distinguished between short (before the zoning announcement) and long term (post the red zone ‘deadline’) forms of household relocation. The majority of households in the study were highly resistant to short term movement. Amongst those which did relocate before the zoning decision, the desire to maintain a valued social connection with a person outside of the earthquake environment was often an important factor. Some households also moved out of perceived necessity (e.g. due to lack of power or water). In terms of long-term relocation, concepts of affordability and safety were much more highly valued by the sample when purchasing post-quake property. This resulted in a distinct patterning of post-quake housing location choices. Perceived control over the moving process, relationship with government organisations and insurance companies, and time spent in the red-zone before moving all heavily influenced participants’ disaster experience. Contrary to previous studies, households in this study recorded higher levels of subjective well-being after relocating. The study proposed a typology of movers in the Christchurch post-disaster environment. Four mobility behaviours, or types, are identified: the Committed Stayers (CSs), the Environment Re-Creators (ERCs), the Resigned Acceptors (RAs), and the Opportunistic Movers (OMs). The CSs were defined by their immobility rather than their relocation aspirations, whilst the ERCs attempted to recreate or retain aspects of Southshore through their mobility. The RAs expressed a form of apathy towards the post-quake environment, whereas, on the other hand, the OMs moved relative to pre-earthquake plans, or opportunities that arose from the earthquake itself. Possibilities for further research include examining household adaptability to new residential environments and tracking further mobility patterns in the years following relocation from the red- zone.
One of the most controversial issues highlighted by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquake series and more recently the 2016 Kaikoura earthquake, has been the evident difficulty and lack of knowledge and guidelines for: a) evaluation of the residual capacity damaged buildings to sustain future aftershocks; b) selection and implementation of a series of reliable repairing techniques to bring back the structure to a condition substantially the same as prior to the earthquake; and c) predicting the cost (or cost-effectiveness) of such repair intervention, when compared to fully replacement costs while accounting for potential aftershocks in the near future. As a result of such complexity and uncertainty (i.e., risk), in combination with the possibility (unique in New Zealand when compared to most of the seismic-prone countries) to rely on financial support from the insurance companies, many modern buildings, in a number exceeding typical expectations from past experiences at an international level, have ended up being demolished. This has resulted in additional time and indirect losses prior to the full reconstruction, as well as in an increase in uncertainty on the actual relocation of the investment. This research project provides the main end-users and stakeholders (practitioner engineers, owners, local and government authorities, insurers, and regulatory agencies) with comprehensive evidence-based information to assess the residual capacity of damage reinforced concrete buildings, and to evaluate the feasibility of repairing techniques, in order to support their delicate decision-making process of repair vs. demolition or replacement. Literature review on effectiveness of epoxy injection repairs, as well as experimental tests on full-scale beam-column joints shows that repaired specimens have a reduced initial stiffness compared with the undamaged specimen, with no apparent strength reduction, sometimes exhibiting higher displacement ductility capacities. Although the bond between the steel and concrete is only partially restored, it still allows the repaired specimen to dissipate at least the same amount of hysteretic energy. Experimental tests on buildings subjected to earthquake loading demonstrate that even for severe damage levels, the ability of the epoxy injection to restore the initial stiffness of the structure is significant. Literature review on damage assessment and repair guidelines suggests that there is consensus within the international community that concrete elements with cracks less than 0.2 mm wide only require cosmetic repairs; epoxy injection repairs of cracks less and 2.0 mm wide and concrete patching of spalled cover concrete (i.e., minor to moderate damage) is an appropiate repair strategy; and for severe damaged components (e.g., cracks greater than 2.0 mm wide, crushing of the concrete core, buckling of the longitudinal reinforcement) local replacement of steel and/or concrete in addition to epoxy crack injection is more appropriate. In terms of expected cracking patterns, non-linear finite element investigations on well-designed reinforced concrete beam-to-column joints, have shown that lower number of cracks but with wider openings are expected to occur for larger compressive concrete strength, f’c, and lower reinforcement content, ρs. It was also observed that the tensile concrete strength, ft, strongly affects the expected cracking pattern in the beam-column joints, the latter being more uniformly distributed for lower ft values. Strain rate effects do not seem to play an important role on the cracking pattern. However, small variations in the cracking pattern were observed for low reinforcement content as it approaches to the minimum required as per NZS 3101:2006. Simple equations are proposed in this research project to relate the maximum and residual crack widths with the steel strain at peak displacement, with or without axial load. A literature review on fracture of reinforcing steel due to low-cycle fatigue, including recent research using steel manufactured per New Zealand standards is also presented. Experimental results describing the influence of the cyclic effect on the ultimate strain capacity of the steel are also discussed, and preliminary equations to account for that effect are proposed. A literature review on the current practice to assess the seismic residual capacity of structures is also presented. The various factors affecting the residual fatigue life at a component level (i.e., plastic hinge) of well-designed reinforced concrete frames are discussed, and equations to quantify each of them are proposed, as well as a methodology to incorporate them into a full displacement-based procedure for pre-earthquake and post-earthquake seismic assessment.
