This study analyses the success and limitations of the recovery process following the 2010–11 earthquake sequence in Christchurch, New Zealand. Data were obtained from in-depth interviews with 32 relocated households in Christchurch, and from a review of recovery policies implemented by the government. A top-down approach to disaster recovery was evident, with the creation of multiple government agencies and processes that made grassroots input into decision-making difficult. Although insurance proceeds enabled the repair and rebuilding of many dwellings, the complexity and adversarial nature of the claim procedures also impaired recovery. Householders’ perceptions of recovery reflected key aspects of their post-earthquake experiences (e.g. the housing offer they received, and the negotiations involved), and the outcomes of their relocation (including the value of the new home, their subjective well-being, and lifestyle after relocation). Protracted insurance negotiations, unfair offers and hardships in post-earthquake life were major challenges to recovery. Less-thanfavourable recovery experiences also transformed patterns of trust in local communities, as relocated householders came to doubt both the government and private insurance companies’ ability to successfully manage a disaster. At the same time, many relocated households expressed trust in their neighbours and communities. This study illuminates how government policies influence disaster recovery while also suggesting a need to reconsider centralised, top-down approaches to managing recovery.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
As damage and loss caused by natural hazards have increased worldwide over the past several decades, it is important for governments and aid agencies to have tools that enable effective post-disaster livelihood recovery to create self-sufficiency for the affected population. This study introduces a framework of critical components that constitute livelihood recovery and the critical factors that lead to people’s livelihood recovery. A comparative case study is employed in this research, combined with questionnaire surveys and interviews with those communities affected by large earthquakes in Lushan, China and in Christchurch and Kaikōura, New Zealand. In Lushan, China, a framework with four livelihood components was established, namely, housing, employment, wellbeing and external assistance. Respondents considered recovery of their housing to be the most essential element for livelihood diversification. External assistance was also rated highly in assisting with their livelihood recovery. Family ties and social connections seemed to have played a larger role than that of government agencies and NGOs. However, the recovery of livelihood cannot be fully achieved without wellbeing aspects being taken into account, and people believed that quality of life and their physical and mental health were essential for livelihood restoration. In Christchurch, New Zealand, the identified livelihood components were validated through in-depth interviews. The results showed that the above framework presenting what constitutes successful livelihood recovery could also be applied in Christchurch. This study also identified the critical factors to affect livelihood recovery following the Lushan and Kaikōura earthquakes, and these include community safety, availability of family support, level of community cohesion, long-term livelihood support, external housing recovery support, level of housing recovery and availability of health and wellbeing support. The framework developed will provide guidance for policy makers and aid agencies to prioritise their strategies and initiatives in assisting people to reinstate their livelihood in a timely manner post-disaster. It will also assist the policy makers and practitioners in China and New Zealand by setting an agenda for preparing for livelihood recovery in non-urgent times so the economic impact and livelihood disruption of those affected can be effectively mitigated.
The Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) was the most devastating catastrophe in New Zealand‘s modern history. Fortunately, in 2011 New Zealand had a high insurance penetration ratio, with more than 95% of residences being insured for these earthquakes. This dissertation sheds light on the functions of disaster insurance schemes and their role in economic recovery post-earthquakes. The first chapter describes the demand and supply for earthquake insurance and provides insights about different public-private partnership earthquake insurance schemes around the world. In the second chapter, we concentrate on three public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand. The chapter examines what would have been the outcome had the system of insurance in Christchurch been different in the aftermath of the Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES). We focus on the California Earthquake Authority insurance program, and the Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance scheme. Overall, the aggregate cost of the earthquake to the New Zealand public insurer (the Earthquake Commission) was USD 6.2 billion. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received only around USD 1.6 billion and USD 0.7 billion from the Japanese and Californian schemes, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive aspects of these scenarios and discuss some of the policy questions that emerge from this comparison. The third chapter measures the longer-term effect of the CES on the local economy, using night-time light intensity measured from space, and focus on the role of insurance payments for damaged residential property during the local recovery process. Uniquely for this event, more than 95% of residential housing units were covered by insurance and almost all incurred some damage. However, insurance payments were staggered over 5 years, enabling us to identify their local impact. We find that night-time luminosity can capture the process of recovery; and that insurance payments contributed significantly to the process of local economic recovery after the earthquake. Yet, delayed payments were less affective in assisting recovery and cash settlement of claims were more effective than insurance-managed repairs. After the Christchurch earthquakes, the government declared about 8000 houses as Red Zoned, prohibiting further developments in these properties, and offering the owners to buy them out. The government provided two options for owners: the first was full payment for both land and dwelling at the 2007 property evaluation, the second was payment for land, and the rest to be paid by the owner‘s insurance. Most people chose the second option. Using data from LINZ combined with data from Stats NZ, the fourth chapter empirically investigates what led people to choose this second option, and how peer effect influenced the homeowners‘ choices. Due to climate change, public disclosure of coastal hazard information through maps and property reports have been used more frequently by local government. This is expected to raise awareness about disaster risks in local community and help potential property owners to make informed locational decision. However, media outlets and business sector argue that public hazard disclosure will cause a negative effect on property value. Despite this opposition, some district councils in New Zealand have attempted to implement improved disclosure. Kapiti Coast district in the Wellington region serves as a case study for this research. In the fifth chapter, we utilize the residential property sale data and coastal hazard maps from the local district council. This study employs a difference-in-difference hedonic property price approach to examine the effect of hazard disclosure on coastal property values. We also apply spatial hedonic regression methods, controlling for coastal amenities, as our robustness check. Our findings suggest that hazard designation has a statistically and economically insignificant impact on property values. Overall, the risk perception about coastal hazards should be more emphasized in communities.
We aim to investigate the role of insurance in business recovery following the devastating Christchurch earthquake in February, 22nd, 2011. We analyze data from two business surveys conducted after the earthquake to examine how insurance affected business operation in the aftermath of the earthquake both in the short-term and longer-term. For the short-term analysis, we use a combination of propensity score matching (PSM) and linear probability model (LPM) to analyze the data. We first estimate the propensity scores for insurance take-up of each firm conditional on the firm’s individual characteristics. Stratification based on the estimated propensity scores is used to match the treated (insured) and the control (uninsured) firms. We then estimate the probability of firms’ continuing operations with a set of control variables to account for the level of damage and disruption caused by the quake in each stratum. We find little evidence of any beneficial effect of insurance coverage on business continuity in the short-run. For the longer-term analysis, we analyze the available survey data using logistic regression. The result suggests that business interruption insurance significantly promotes increased level of long-term productivity for surviving firms following the earthquake.
This study explores the nature of smaller businesses’ resilience following two major earthquakes that severely disrupted their place of doing business. Data from the owners of ten smaller businesses are qualitative and longitudinal, spanning the period 2011 through 2018, providing first-hand narrative accounts of their responses in the earthquakes’ aftermath. All ten owners showed some individual resilience; six businesses survived through to 2018, of which three have recovered strongly. All three owned their premises; operated business-tobusiness models; and were able to adapt and continue to follow path-extension strategies. All the other businesses had direct business-to-customer models operating from leased premises, typically in major retail malls. Four eventually recognised path-exhaustion at different times and so did not survive through to 2018. We conclude however that post-disaster recovery is best explained in terms of business model resilience. Even the most resilient of individual owners will struggle to survive if their business model is either not resilient or cannot be made so. Individual resilience is necessary but not sufficient.
