The connections between walls of unreinforced masonry (URM) buildings and flexible timber diaphragms are critical building components that must perform adequately before desirable earthquake response of URM buildings may be achieved. Field observations made during the initial reconnaissance and the subsequent damage surveys of clay brick URM buildings following the 2010/2011 Canterbury, New Zealand, earthquakes revealed numerous cases where anchor connections joining masonry walls or parapets with roof or floor diaphragms appeared to have failed prematurely. These observations were more frequent for adhesive anchor connections than for through-bolt connections (i.e., anchorages having plates on the exterior facade of the masonry walls). Subsequently, an in-field test program was undertaken in an attempt to evaluate the performance of adhesive anchor connections between unreinforced clay brick URM walls and roof or floor diaphragm. The study consisted of a total of almost 400 anchor tests conducted in eleven existing URM buildings located in Christchurch, Whanganui and Auckland. Specific objectives of the study included the identification of failure modes of adhesive anchors in existing URM walls and the influence of the following variables on anchor load-displacement response: adhesive type, strength of the masonry materials (brick and mortar), anchor embedment depth, anchor rod diameter, overburden level, anchor rod type, quality of installation, and the use of metal mesh sleeves. In addition, the comparative performance of bent anchors (installed at an angle of minimum 22.5° to the perpendicular projection from the wall surface) and anchors positioned horizontally was investigated. Observations on the performance of wall-to-diaphragm connections in the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes, a summary of the performed experimental program and test results, and a proposed pull-out capacity relationship for adhesive anchors installed into multi-leaf clay brick masonry are presented herein. AM - Accepted Manuscript
Following a damaging earthquake, the immediate emergency response is focused on individual collapsed buildings or other "hotspots" rather than the overall state of damage. This lack of attention to the global damage condition of the affected region can lead to the reporting of misinformation and generate confusion, causing difficulties when attempting to determine the level of postdisaster resources required. A pre-planned building damage survey based on the transect method is recommended as a simple tool to generate an estimate of the overall level of building damage in a city or region. A methodology for such a transect survey is suggested, and an example of a similar survey conducted in Christchurch, New Zealand, following the 22 February 2011 earthquake is presented. The transect was found to give suitably accurate estimates of building damage at a time when information was keenly sought by government authorities and the general public. VoR - Version of Record
On 22 February 2011，a magnitude Mw 6.3 earthquake occurred with an epicenter located near Lyttelton at about 10km from Christchurch in Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1). Since this earthquake occurred in the midst of the aftershock activity which had continued since the 4 September 2010 Darfield Earthquake occurrence, it was considered to be an aftershock of the initial earthquake. Because of the short distance to the city and the shallower depth of the epicenter, this earthquake caused more significant damage to pipelines, traffic facilities, residential houses/properties and multi-story buildings in the central business district than the September 2010 Darfield Earthquake in spite of its smaller earthquake magnitude. Unfortunately, this earthquake resulted in significant number of casualties due to the collapse of multi-story buildings and unreinforced masonry structures in the city center of Christchurch. As of 4 April, 172 casualties were reported and the final death toll is expected to be 181. While it is extremely regrettable that Christchurch suffered a terrible number of victims, civil and geotechnical engineers have this hard-to-find opportunity to learn the response of real ground from two gigantic earthquakes which occurred in less than six months from each other. From geotechnical engineering point of view, it is interesting to discuss the widespread liquefaction in natural sediments, repeated liquefaction within short period and further damage to earth structures which have been damaged in the previous earthquake. Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence and perishable data from this event. The team included the following members: Misko Cubrinovski (University of Canterbury, NZ, Team Leader), Susumu Yasuda (Tokyo Denki University, Japan, JGS Team Leader), Rolando Orense (University of Auckland, NZ), Kohji Tokimatsu (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan), Ryosuke Uzuoka (Tokushima University, Japan), Takashi Kiyota (University of Tokyo, Japan), Yasuyo Hosono (Toyohashi University of Technology, Japan) and Suguru Yamada (University of Tokyo, Japan).
This article argues that active coordination of research engagement after disasters has the potential to maximize research opportunities, improve research quality, increase end-user engagement, and manage escalating research activity to mitigate ethical risks posed to impacted populations. The focus is on the coordination of research activity after the 22nd February 2011 Mw6.2 Christchurch earthquake by the then newly-formed national research consortium, the Natural Hazards Research Platform, which included a social science research moratorium during the declared state of national emergency. Decisions defining this organisation’s functional and structural parameters are analyzed to identify lessons concerning the need for systematic approaches to the management of post disaster research, in collaboration with the response effort. Other lessons include the importance of involving an existing, broadly-based research consortium, ensuring that this consortium's coordination role is fully integrated into emergency management structures, and ensuring that all aspects of decision-making processes are transparent and easily accessed.
