In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
During the Christchurch earthquake of February 2011, several midrise buildings of Reinforced Concrete Masonry (RCM) construction achieved performance levels in the range of life safety to near collapse levels. These buildings were subjected to seismic demands higher than the building code requirements of the time and higher than the current New Zealand Loadings Standard (NZS-1170.5:2004). Structural damage to these buildings has been documented and is currently being studied to establish lessons to be learned from their performance and how to incorporate these lessons into future RCM design and construction practices. This paper presents a case study of a six story RCM building deemed to have reached the near collapse performance level. The RCM walls on the 2nd floor failed due to toe crushing reducing the building’s lateral resistance in the east-west direction. A nonlinear dynamic analysis on a 3D model was conducted to simulate the development of the governing failure mechanism. Preliminary analysis results show that the damaged walls were initially under large compression forces from gravity loads which caused increase in their lateral strength and reduced their ductility. After toe crushing failure developed, axial instability of the model was prevented by a redistribution of gravity loads.
Small, tight-knit communities, are complex to manage from outside during a disaster. The township of Lyttelton, New Zealand, and the communities of Corsair Bay, Cass Bay, and Rapaki to the east, are especially more so difficult due to the terrain that encloses them, which caused them to be cut-off from Christchurch, the largest city in the South Island, barely 10 km away, after the Mw 7.1 Darfield Earthquake and subsequent Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Lyttelton has a very strong and deep-rooted community spirit that draws people to want to be a part of Lyttelton life. It is predominantly residential on the slopes, with retail space, service and light industry nestled near the harbour. It has heritage buildings stretching back to the very foundation of Canterbury yet hosts the largest, modern deep-water port for the region. This study contains two surveys: one circulated shortly before the Darfield Earthquake and one circulated in July 2011, after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes. An analytical comparison of the participants’ household preparedness for disaster before the Darfield Earthquake and after the Christchurch and Sumner Earthquakes was performed. A population spatiotemporal distribution map was produced that shows the population in three-hourly increments over a week to inform exposure to vulnerability to natural hazards. The study went on to analyse the responses of the participants in the immediate period following the Chrsitchurch and Sumner Earthquakes, including their homeward and subsequent journeys, and the decision to evacuate or stay in their homes. Possible predictors to a decision to evacuate some or all members of the household were tested. The study also asked participants’ views on the events since September 2010 for analysis.
On the second day of teaching for 2011, the University of Canterbury (UC) faced the most significant crisis of its 138-year history. After being shaken severely by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on 4 September 2010, UC felt it was well along the pathway to getting back to ‘normal’. That all changed at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011, when Christchurch city was hit by an even more devastating event. A magnitude 6.3 (Modified Mercalli intensity ten – MM X) earthquake, just 13km south-east of the Christchurch city centre, caused vertical peak ground accelerations amongst the highest ever recorded in an urban environment, in some places more than twice the acceleration due to gravity. The earthquake caused immediate evacuation of the UC campus and resulted in significant damage to many buildings. Thankfully there were no serious injuries or fatalities on campus, but 185 people died in the city and many more suffered serious injuries. At the time of writing, eighteen months after the first earthquake in September, Christchurch is still experiencing regular earthquakes. Seismologists warn that the region may experience heightened seismicity for a decade or more. While writing this report we have talked with many different people from across the University. People’s experiences are different and we have not managed to talk with everyone, but we hope that by drawing together many different perspectives from across the campus that this report will serve two purposes; to retain our institutional memory of what we have learnt over the past eighteen months, and also to share our learnings with other organisations in New Zealand and around the world who, we hope, will benefit from learning about our experience.
