The city of Christchurch has experienced over 10,000 aftershocks since the 4th of September 2010 earthquake of which approximately 50 have been greater than magnitude 5. The damage caused to URM buildings in Christchurch over this sequence of earthquakes has been well documented. Due to the similarity in age and construction of URM buildings in Adelaide, South Australia and Christchurch (they are sister cities, of similar age and heritage), an investigation was conducted to learn lessons for Adelaide based on the Christchurch experience. To this end, the number of URM buildings in the central business districts of both cities, the extent of seismic strengthening that exists in both cities, and the relative earthquake hazards for both cities were considered. This paper will report on these findings and recommend strategies that the city of Adelaide could consider to significantly reduce the seismic risk posed by URM buildings in future earthquake.
In the period between September 2010 and December 2011, Christchurch (New Zealand) and its surroundings were hit by a series of strong earthquakes including six significant events, all generated by local faults in proximity to the city: 4 September 2010 (Mw=7.1), 22 February 2011 (Mw=6.2), 13 June 2011 (Mw=5.3 and Mw=6.0) and 23 December 2011 (M=5.8 and (M=5.9) earthquakes. As shown in Figure 1, the causative faults of the earthquakes were very close to or within the city boundaries thus generating very strong ground motions and causing tremendous damage throughout the city. Christchurch is shown as a lighter colour area, and its Central Business District (CBD) is marked with a white square area in the figure. Note that the sequence of earthquakes started to the west of the city and then propagated to the south, south-east and east of the city through a set of separate but apparently interacting faults. Because of their strength and proximity to the city, the earthquakes caused tremendous physical damage and impacts on the people, natural and built environments of Christchurch. The 22 February 2011 earthquake was particularly devastating. The ground motions generated by this earthquake were intense and in many parts of Christchurch substantially above the ground motions used to design the buildings in Christchurch. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, collapse of two multi-storey reinforced concrete buildings, collapse or partial collapse of many unreinforced masonry structures including the historic Christchurch Cathedral. The Central Business District (CBD) of Christchurch, which is the central heart of the city just east of Hagley Park, was practically lost with majority of its 3,000 buildings being damaged beyond repair. Widespread liquefaction in the suburbs of Christchurch, as well as rock falls and slope/cliff instabilities in the Port Hills affected tens of thousands of residential buildings and properties, and shattered the lifelines and infrastructure over approximately one third of the city area. The total economic loss caused by the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquakes is currently estimated to be in the range between 25 and 30 billion NZ dollars (or 15% to 18% of New Zealand’s GDP). After each major earthquake, comprehensive field investigations and inspections were conducted to document the liquefaction-induced land damage, lateral spreading displacements and their impacts on buildings and infrastructure. In addition, the ground motions produced by the earthquakes were recorded by approximately 15 strong motion stations within (close to) the city boundaries providing and impressive wealth of data, records and observations of the performance of ground and various types of structures during this unusual sequence of strong local earthquakes affecting a city. This paper discusses the liquefaction in residential areas and focuses on its impacts on dwellings (residential houses) and potable water system in the Christchurch suburbs. The ground conditions of Christchurch including the depositional history of soils, their composition, age and groundwater regime are first discussed. Detailed liquefaction maps illustrating the extent and severity of liquefaction across Christchurch triggered by the sequence of earthquakes including multiple episodes of severe re-liquefaction are next presented. Characteristic liquefaction-induced damage to residential houses is then described focussing on the performance of typical house foundations in areas affected by liquefaction. Liquefaction impacts on the potable water system of Christchurch is also briefly summarized including correlation between the damage to the system, liquefaction severity, and the performance of different pipe materials. Finally, the characteristics of Christchurch liquefaction and its impacts on built environment are discussed in relation to the liquefaction-induced damage in Japan during the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.
On 22 February 2011,a magnitude Mw 6.3 earthquake occurred with an epicenter located near Lyttelton at about 10km from Christchurch in Canterbury region on the South Island of New Zealand (Figure 1). Since this earthquake occurred in the midst of the aftershock activity which had continued since the 4 September 2010 Darfield Earthquake occurrence, it was considered to be an aftershock of the initial earthquake. Because of the short distance to the city and the shallower depth of the epicenter, this earthquake caused more significant damage to pipelines, traffic facilities, residential houses/properties and multi-story buildings in the central business district than the September 2010 Darfield Earthquake in spite of its smaller earthquake magnitude. Unfortunately, this earthquake resulted in significant number of casualties due to the collapse of multi-story buildings and unreinforced masonry structures in the city center of Christchurch. As of 4 April, 172 casualties were reported and the final death toll is expected to be 181. While it is extremely regrettable that Christchurch suffered a terrible number of victims, civil and geotechnical engineers have this hard-to-find opportunity to learn the response of real ground from two gigantic earthquakes which occurred in less than six months from each other. From geotechnical engineering point of view, it is interesting to discuss the widespread liquefaction in natural sediments, repeated liquefaction within short period and further damage to earth structures which have been damaged in the previous earthquake. Following the earthquake, an intensive geotechnical reconnaissance was conducted to capture evidence and perishable data from this event. The team included the following members: Misko Cubrinovski (University of Canterbury, NZ, Team Leader), Susumu Yasuda (Tokyo Denki University, Japan, JGS Team Leader), Rolando Orense (University of Auckland, NZ), Kohji Tokimatsu (Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan), Ryosuke Uzuoka (Tokushima University, Japan), Takashi Kiyota (University of Tokyo, Japan), Yasuyo Hosono (Toyohashi University of Technology, Japan) and Suguru Yamada (University of Tokyo, Japan).
In September 2010 and February 2011 the Canterbury region of New Zealand was struck by two powerful earthquakes, registering magnitude 7.1 and 6.3 respectively on the Richter scale. The second earthquake was centred 10 kilometres south-east of the centre of Christchurch (the region’s capital and New Zealand’s third most populous urban area, with approximately 360,000 residents) at a depth of five kilometres. 185 people were killed, making it the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history. (66 people were killed in the collapse of one building alone, the six-storey Canterbury Television building.) The earthquake occurred during the lunch hour, increasing the number of people killed on footpaths and in buses and cars by falling debris. In addition to the loss of life, the earthquake caused catastrophic damage to both land and buildings in Christchurch, particularly in the central business district. Many commercial and residential buildings collapsed in the tremors; others were damaged through soil liquefaction and surface flooding. Over 1,000 buildings in the central business district were eventually demolished because of safety concerns, and an estimated 70,000 people had to leave the city after the earthquakes because their homes were uninhabitable. The New Zealand Government declared a state of national emergency, which stayed in force for ten weeks. In 2014 the Government estimated that the rebuild process would cost NZ$40 billion (approximately US$27.3 billion, a cost equivalent to 17% of New Zealand’s annual GDP). Economists now estimate it could take the New Zealand economy between 50 and 100 years to recover. The earthquakes generated tens of thousands of insurance claims, both against private home insurance companies and against the New Zealand Earthquake Commission, a government-owned statutory body which provides primary natural disaster insurance to residential property owners in New Zealand. These ranged from claims for hundreds of millions of dollars concerning the local port and university to much smaller claims in respect of the thousands of residential homes damaged. Many of these insurance claims resulted in civil proceedings, caused by disputes about policy cover, the extent of the damage and the cost and/or methodology of repairs, as well as failures in communication and delays caused by the overwhelming number of claims. Disputes were complicated by the fact that the Earthquake Commission provides primary insurance cover up to a monetary cap, with any additional costs to be met by the property owner’s private insurer. Litigation funders and non-lawyer claims advocates who took a percentage of any insurance proceeds also soon became involved. These two factors increased the number of parties involved in any given claim and introduced further obstacles to resolution. Resolving these disputes both efficiently and fairly was (and remains) central to the rebuild process. This created an unprecedented challenge for the justice system in Christchurch (and New Zealand), exacerbated by the fact that the Christchurch High Court building was itself damaged in the earthquakes, with the Court having to relocate to temporary premises. (The High Court hears civil claims exceeding NZ$200,000 in value (approximately US$140,000) or those involving particularly complex issues. Most of the claims fell into this category.) This paper will examine the response of the Christchurch High Court to this extraordinary situation as a case study in innovative judging practices and from a jurisprudential perspective. In 2011, following the earthquakes, the High Court made a commitment that earthquake-related civil claims would be dealt with as swiftly as the Court's resources permitted. In May 2012, it commenced a special “Earthquake List” to manage these cases. The list (which is ongoing) seeks to streamline the trial process, resolve quickly claims with precedent value or involving acute personal hardship or large numbers of people, facilitate settlement and generally work proactively and innovatively with local lawyers, technical experts and other stakeholders. For example, the Court maintains a public list (in spreadsheet format, available online) with details of all active cases before the Court, listing the parties and their lawyers, summarising the facts and identifying the legal issues raised. It identifies cases in which issues of general importance have been or will be decided, with the expressed purpose being to assist earthquake litigants and those contemplating litigation and to facilitate communication among parties and lawyers. This paper will posit the Earthquake List as an attempt to implement innovative judging techniques to provide efficient yet just legal processes, and which can be examined from a variety of jurisprudential perspectives. One of these is as a case study in the well-established debate about the dialogic relationship between public decisions and private settlement in the rule of law. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Hazel Genn, Owen Fiss, David Luban, Carrie Menkel-Meadow and Judith Resnik, it will explore the tension between the need to develop the law through the doctrine of precedent and the need to resolve civil disputes fairly, affordably and expeditiously. It will also be informed by the presenter’s personal experience of the interplay between reported decisions and private settlement in post-earthquake Christchurch through her work mediating insurance disputes. From a methodological perspective, this research project itself gives rise to issues suitable for discussion at the Law and Society Annual Meeting. These include the challenges in empirical study of judges, working with data collected by the courts and statistical analysis of the legal process in reference to settlement. September 2015 marked the five-year anniversary of the first Christchurch earthquake. There remains widespread dissatisfaction amongst Christchurch residents with the ongoing delays in resolving claims, particularly insurers, and the rebuild process. There will continue to be challenges in Christchurch for years to come, both from as-yet unresolved claims but also because of the possibility of a new wave of claims arising from poor quality repairs. Thus, a final purpose of presenting this paper at the 2016 Meeting is to gain the benefit of other scholarly perspectives and experiences of innovative judging best practice, with a view to strengthening and improving the judicial processes in Christchurch. This Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in New Orleans is a particularly appropriate forum for this paper, given the recent ten year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and the plenary session theme of “Natural and Unnatural Disasters – human crises and law’s response.” The presenter has a personal connection with this theme, as she was a Fulbright scholar from New Zealand at New York University in 2005/2006 and participated in the student volunteer cleanup effort in New Orleans following Katrina. http://www.lawandsociety.org/NewOrleans2016/docs/2016_Program.pdf
This report provides an initial overview and gap analysis of the multi-hazards interactions that might affect fluvial and pluvial flooding (FPF) hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. As per the terms of reference, this report focuses on a one-way analysis of the potential effects of multi-hazards on FPF hazard, as opposed to a more complex multi-way analysis of interactions between all hazards. We examined the relationship between FPF hazard and hazards associated with the phenomena of tsunamis; coastal erosion; coastal inundation; groundwater; earthquakes; and mass movements. Tsunamis: Modelling research indicates the worst-case tsunami scenarios potentially affecting the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment are far field. Under low probability, high impact tsunami scenarios waves could travel into Pegasus Bay and the Avon-Heathcote Estuary Ihutai, reaching the mouth and lower reaches of the Heathcote catchment and river, potentially inundating and eroding shorelines in sub-catchments 1 to 5, and temporarily blocking fluvial drainage more extensively. Any flooding infrastructure or management actions implemented in the area of tsunami inundation would ideally be resilient to tsunami-induced inundation and erosion. Model results currently available are a first estimate of potential tsunami inundation under contemporary sea and land level conditions. In terms of future large tsunami events, these models likely underestimate effects in riverside sub-catchments, as well as effects under future sea level, shoreline and other conditions. Also of significance when considering different FPF management structures, it is important to be mindful that certain types of flood structures can ‘trap’ inundating water coming from ocean directions, leading to longer flood durations and salinization issues. Coastal erosion: Model predictions indicate that sub-catchments 1 to 3 could potentially be affected by coastal erosion by the timescale of 2065, with sub-catchments 1-6 predicted to be potentially affected by coastal erosion by the time scale of 2115. In addition, the predicted open coast effects of this hazard should not be ignored since any significant changes in the New Brighton Spit open coast would affect erosion rates and exposure of the landward estuary margins, including the shorelines of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Any FPF flooding infrastructure or management activities planned for the potentially affected sub-catchments needs to recognise the possibility of coastal erosion, and to have a planned response to the predicted potential shoreline translation. Coastal inundation: Model predictions indicate coastal inundation hazards could potentially affect sub-catchments 1 to 8 by 2065, with a greater area and depth of inundation possible for these same sub-catchments by 2115. Low-lying areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment and river channel that discharge into the estuary are highly vulnerable to coastal inundation since elevated ocean and estuary water levels can block the drainage of inland systems, compounding FPF hazards. Coastal inundation can overwhelm stormwater and other drainage network components, and render river dredging options ineffective at best, flood enhancing at worst. A distinction can be made between coastal inundation and coastal erosion in terms of the potential impacts on affected land and assets, including flood infrastructure, and the implications for acceptance, adaptation, mitigation, and/or modification options. That is, responding to inundation could include structural and/or building elevation solutions, since unlike erosion, inundation does not necessarily mean the loss of land. Groundwater: Groundwater levels are of significant but variable concern when examining flooding hazards and management options in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment due to variability in soils, topographies, elevations and proximities to riverine and estuarine surface waterbodies. Much of the Canterbury Plains part of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment has a water table that is at a median depth of <1m from the surface (with actual depth below surface varying seasonally, inter-annually and during extreme meteorological events), though the water table depth rapidly shifts to >6m below the surface in the upper Plains part of the catchment (sub-catchments 13 to 15). Parts of Waltham/Linwood (sub-catchments 5 & 6) and Spreydon (sub-catchment 10) have extensive areas with a particularly high water table, as do sub-catchments 18, 19 and 20 south of the river. In all of the sub-catchments where groundwater depth below surface is shallow, it is necessary to be mindful of cascading effects on liquefaction hazard during earthquake events, including earthquake-induced drainage network and stormwater infrastructure damage. In turn, subsidence induced by liquefaction and other earthquake processes during the CES directly affected groundwater depth below surface across large parts of the central Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. The estuary margin of the catchment also faces increasing future challenges with sea level rise, which has the potential to elevate groundwater levels in these areas, compounding existing liquefaction and other earthquake associated multi-hazards. Any increases in subsurface runoff due to drainage system, development or climate changes are also of concern for the loess covered hill slopes due to the potential to enhance mass movement hazards. Earthquakes: Earthquake associated vertical ground displacement and liquefaction have historically affected, or are in future predicted to affect, all Ōpāwaho Heathcote sub-catchments. During the CES, these phenomena induced a significant cascades of changes in the city’s drainage systems, including: extensive vertical displacement and liquefaction induced damage to stormwater ‘greyware’, reducing functionality of the stormwater system; damage to the wastewater system which temporarily lowered groundwater levels and increased stormwater drainage via the wastewater network on the one hand, creating a pollution multi-hazard for FPF on the other hand; liquefaction and vertical displacement induced river channel changes affected drainage capacities; subsidence induced losses in soakage and infiltration capacities; changes occurred in topographic drainage conductivity; estuary subsidence (mainly around the Ōtākaro Avon rivermouth) increased both FPF and coastal inundation hazards; estuary bed uplift (severe around the Ōpāwaho Heathcote margins), reduced tidal prisms and increased bed friction, producing an overall reduction the waterbody’s capacity to efficiently flush catchment floodwaters to sea; and changes in estuarine and riverine ecosystems. All such possible effects need to be considered when evaluating present and future capacities of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment FPF management systems. These phenomena are particularly of concern in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment since stormwater networks must deal with constraints imposed by stream and river channels (past and present), estuarine shorelines and complex hill topography. Mass movements: Mass movements are primarily a risk in the Port Hills areas of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment (sub-catchments 1, 2, 7, 9, 11, 16, 21), though there are one or two small but susceptible areas on the banks of the Ōpāwaho Heathcote River. Mass movements in the form of rockfalls and debris flows occurred on the Port Hills during the CES, resulting in building damage, fatalities and evacuations. Evidence has also been found of earthquake-triggered tunnel gully collapsesin all Port Hill Valleys. Follow-on effects of these mass movements are likely to occur in major future FPF and other hazard events. Of note, elevated groundwater levels, coastal inundation, earthquakes (including liquefaction and other effects), and mass movement exhibit the most extensive levels of multi-hazard interaction with FPF hazard. Further, all of the analysed multi-hazard interactions except earthquakes were found to consistently produce increases in the FPF hazard. The implications of these analyses are that multihazard interactions generally enhance the FPF hazard in the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment. Hence, management plans which exclude adjustments for multi-hazard interactions are likely to underestimate the FPF hazard in numerous different ways. In conclusion, although only a one-way analysis of the potential effects of selected multi-hazards on FPF hazard, this review highlights that the Ōpāwaho Heathcote catchment is an inherently multi- hazard prone environment. The implications of the interactions and process linkages revealed in this report are that several significant multi-hazard influences and process interactions must be taken into account in order to design a resilient FPF hazard management strategy.