For 150,000 Christchurch school students, the 12.51 pm earthquake of 22 February 2011 shattered their normal lunch time activities and thrust their teachers into the role of emergency first responders. Whether helping students (children) escape immediate danger, or identifying and managing the best strategies for keeping children safe, including provision of extended caregiving when parents were unable to return to school to retrieve their children, teachers had to manage their own fears and trauma reactions in order to appear calm and prevent further distress for the children in their care. Only then did teachers return to their families. Eighteen months later, twenty teachers from across Christchurch, were interviewed. At 12.51pm, the teachers were essentially first responders. Using their usual methods for presenting a calm and professional image, the teachers’ emotion regulation (ER) strategies for managing their immediate fears were similar to those of professional first responders, with similar potential for subsequent burnout and negative emotional effects. Teachers’ higher emotional exhaustion and burnout 18 months later, were associated with school relocation. Lower burnout was associated with more emotional awareness, ER and perceived support. Consistent with international research, teachers’ use of cognitive reappraisal (re-thinking a situation) was an effective ER strategy, but this may not prevent teachers’ emotional resources from eventually becoming depleted. Teachers fulfill an important role in supporting children’s psychosocial adjustment following a natural disaster. However, as also acknowledged in international research, we need to also focus on supporting the teachers themselves.
The devastating magnitude M6.3 earthquake, that struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011, caused widespread damage to the lifeline systems. Following the event, the Natural Hazard Research Platform (NHRP) of New Zealand funded a short-term project “Recovery of Lifelines” aiming to: 1) coordinate the provision of information to meet lifeline short-term needs; and to 2) facilitate the accessibility to lifelines of best practice engineering details, along with hazards and vulnerability information already available from the local and international scientific community. This paper aims to briefly summarise the management of the recovery process for the most affected lifelines systems, including the electric system, the road, gas, and the water and wastewater networks. Further than this, the paper intends to discuss successes and issues encountered by the “Recovery of Lifelines” NHRP project in supporting lifelines utilities.
A magnitude 6.3 earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on Tuesday 22 February 2011. The earthquake caused 182 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to the lifelines. The event created the largest lifeline disruption in a New Zealand city in 80 years, with much of the damage resulting from extensive and severe liquefaction in the Christchurch urban area. The Christchurch earthquake occurred when the Canterbury region and its lifelines systems were at the early stage of recovering from the 4 September 2010 Darfield (Canterbury) magnitude 7.1 earthquake. This paper describes the impact of the Christchurch earthquake on lifelines by briefly summarising the physical damage to the networks, the system performance and the operational response during the emergency management and the recovery phase. Special focus is given to the performance and management of the gas, electric and road networks and to the liquefaction ejecta clean-up operations that contributed to the rapid reinstatement of the functionality of many of the lifelines. The water and wastewater system performances are also summarized. Elements of resilience that contributed to good network performance or to efficient emergency and recovery management are highlighted in the paper.
On the second day of teaching for 2011, the University of Canterbury (UC) faced the most significant crisis of its 138-year history. After being shaken severely by a magnitude 7.1 earthquake on 4 September 2010, UC felt it was well along the pathway to getting back to ‘normal’. That all changed at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011, when Christchurch city was hit by an even more devastating event. A magnitude 6.3 (Modified Mercalli intensity ten – MM X) earthquake, just 13km south-east of the Christchurch city centre, caused vertical peak ground accelerations amongst the highest ever recorded in an urban environment, in some places more than twice the acceleration due to gravity. The earthquake caused immediate evacuation of the UC campus and resulted in significant damage to many buildings. Thankfully there were no serious injuries or fatalities on campus, but 185 people died in the city and many more suffered serious injuries. At the time of writing, eighteen months after the first earthquake in September, Christchurch is still experiencing regular earthquakes. Seismologists warn that the region may experience heightened seismicity for a decade or more. While writing this report we have talked with many different people from across the University. People’s experiences are different and we have not managed to talk with everyone, but we hope that by drawing together many different perspectives from across the campus that this report will serve two purposes; to retain our institutional memory of what we have learnt over the past eighteen months, and also to share our learnings with other organisations in New Zealand and around the world who, we hope, will benefit from learning about our experience.
When the devastating 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit Christchurch, Aotearoa New Zealand, at 12.51pm on 22nd February 2011, the psychological and physical landscape was irrevocably changed. In the days and weeks following the disaster communities were isolated due to failed infrastructure, continuing aftershocks and the extensive search and rescue effort which focussed resources on the central business district. In such moments the resilience of a community is truly tested. This research discusses the role of grassroots community groups in facilitating community resilience during the Christchurch 2010/11 earthquakes and the role of place in doing so. I argue that place specific strategies for urban resilience need to be enacted from a grassroots level while being supported by broader policies and agencies. Using a case study of Project Lyttelton – a group aspiring towards a resilient sustainable future who were caught at the epicentre of the February earthquake – I demonstrate the role of a community group in creating resilience through self-organised place specific action during a disaster. The group provided emotional care, basic facilities and rebuilding assistance to the residents of Lyttelton, proving to be an invaluable asset. These actions are closely linked to the characteristics of social support and social learning that have been identified as important to socio-ecological resilience. In addition this research will seek to understand and explore the nuances of place and identity and its role in shaping resilience to such dis-placing events. Drawing on community narratives of the displacement of place identity, the potential for a progressive sense of place as instigated by local groups will be investigated as an avenue for adaptation by communities at risk of disaster and place destabilisation.
The magnitude 6.2 Christchurch earthquake struck the city of Christchurch at 12:51pm on February 22, 2011. The earthquake caused 186 fatalities, a large number of injuries, and resulted in widespread damage to the built environment, including significant disruption to lifeline networks and health care facilities. Critical facilities, such as public and private hospitals, government, non-government and private emergency services, physicians’ offices, clinics and others were severely impacted by this seismic event. Despite these challenges many systems were able to adapt and cope. This thesis presents the physical and functional impact of the Christchurch earthquake on the regional public healthcare system by analysing how it adapted to respond to the emergency and continued to provide health services. Firstly, it assesses the seismic performance of the facilities, mechanical and medical equipment, building contents, internal services and back-up resources. Secondly, it investigates the reduction of functionality for clinical and non-clinical services, induced by the structural and non-structural damage. Thirdly it assesses the impact on single facilities and the redundancy of the health system as a whole following damage to the road, power, water, and wastewater networks. Finally, it assesses the healthcare network's ability to operate under reduced and surged conditions. The effectiveness of a variety of seismic vulnerability preparedness and reduction methods are critically reviewed by comparing the observed performances with the predicted outcomes of the seismic vulnerability and disaster preparedness models. Original methodology is proposed in the thesis which was generated by adapting and building on existing methods. The methodology can be used to predict the geographical distribution of functional loss, the residual capacity and the patient transfer travel time for hospital networks following earthquakes. The methodology is used to define the factors which contributed to the overall resilence of the Canterbury hospital network and the areas which decreased the resilence. The results show that the factors which contributed to the resilence, as well as the factors which caused damage and functionality loss were difficult to foresee and plan for. The non-structural damage to utilities and suspended ceilings was far more disruptive to the provision of healthcare than the minor structural damage to buildings. The physical damage to the healthcare network reduced the capacity, which has further strained a health care system already under pressure. Providing the already high rate of occupancy prior to the Christchurch earthquake the Canterbury healthcare network has still provided adequate healthcare to the community.
The Lake Coleridge Rock Avalanche Deposits (LCRADs) are located on Ryton Station in the middle Rakaia Valley, approximately 80 km west of Christchurch. Torlesse Supergroup greywacke is the basement material and has been significantly influenced by both active tectonics and glaciation. Both glacial and post-glacial processes have produced large volumes of material which blanket the bedrock on slopes and in the valley floors. The LCRADs were part of a regional study of rock avalanches by WHITEHOUSE (1981, 1983) and WHITEHOUSE and GRIFFITHS (1983), and a single rock avalanche event was recognised with a weathering rind age of 120 years B.P. that was later modified to 150 ± 40 years B.P. The present study has refined details of both the age and the sequence of events at the site, by identifying three separate rock avalanche deposits (termed the LCRA1, LCRA2 and LCRA3 deposits), which are all sourced from near the summit of Carriage Drive. The LCRA1 deposit is lobate in shape and had an estimated original deposit volume of 12.5 x 10⁶ m³, although erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the present day debris volume to 5.1 x 10⁶ m³. An optically stimulated luminescence date taken from sandy loess immediately beneath the LCRA1 deposit provided a maximum age for the rock avalanche event of 9,720 ± 750 years B.P., which is believed to be realistic given that this is shortly after the retreat of Acheron 3 ice from this part of the valley. Emplacement of rock avalanche material into an ancestral Ryton riverbed created a natural dam with a ~17 M m³ lake upstream. The river is thought to have created a natural spillway over the dam structure at ~557 m (a.s.l), and to have existed for a number of years before any significant downcutting occurred. Although a triggering mechanism for the LCRA1 deposit was poorly constrained, it is thought that stress rebound after glacial ice removal may have initiated failure. Due to the event occurring c.10,000 years ago, there was a lack of definition for a possible earthquake trigger, though the possibility is obvious. The LCRA₂ event had an original deposit volume of 0.66 x 10⁶ m³, and was constrained to the low-lying area adjacent to the Ryton River that had been created by river erosion of the LCRA1 deposit. Further erosion by the Ryton River has reduced the deposit volume to 0.4 x 10⁶ m³. A radiocarbon date from a piece of mānuka found within the LCRA2 deposit provided an age of 668 ± 36 years B.P., and this is thought to reliably date the event. The LCRA2 event also dammed the Ryton River, and the preservation of dam-break outwash terraces downstream from the deposit provides clear evidence of rapid dam erosion and flooding after overtopping, and breaching by the Ryton River. Based on the mean annual flow of the Ryton River, the LCRA2 lake would have taken approximately two weeks to fill assuming that there were no preferred breach paths and the material was relatively impermeable. The LCRA2 event is thought to have been coseismic with a fault rupture along the western segment of the PPAFZ, which has been dated at 600 ± 100 years B.P. by SMITH (2003). The small LCRA3 event was not able to be dated, but it is believed to have failed shortly after the LCRA2 event and it may in fact be a lag deposit of the second rock avalanche event possibly triggered by an aftershock. The deposit is only visible at one locality within the cliffs that line the Ryton River, and its lack of geomorphic expression is attributed to it occurring closely after the LCRA2 event, while the Ryton River was still dammed from the second rock avalanche event. A wedge-block of some 35,000 m³ of source material for a future rock avalanche was identified at the summit of Carriage Drive. The dilation of the rock mass, combined with unfavourably oriented sub-vertical bedding in the Torlesse Supergroup bedrock, has allowed toppling-style failure on both of the main ridge lines around the source area for the LCRADs. In the event of a future rock avalanche occurring within the Ryton riverbed an emergency response plan has been developed to provide a staged response, especially in relation to the camping ground located at the mouth of the Ryton River. A long-term management plan has also been developed for mitigation measures for the Ryton riverbed and adjacent floodplain areas downstream of a future rock avalanche at the LCRAD site.
