This research provides an investigation into the impact on the North Island freight infrastructure, in the event of a disruption of the Ports of Auckland (POAL).
This research is important to New Zealand, especially having experienced the Canterbury earthquake disaster in 2010/2011 and the current 2012 industrial action plaguing the POAL. New Zealand is a net exporter of a combination of manufactured high value goods, commodity products and raw materials. New Zealand’s main challenge lies in the fact of its geographical distances to major markets. Currently New Zealand handles approximately 2 million containers per annum, with a minimum of ~40% of those containers being shipped through POAL.
It needs to be highlighted that POAL is classified as an import port in comparison to Port of Tauranga (POT) that has traditionally had an export focus. This last fact is of great importance, as in a case of a disruption of the POAL, any import consigned to the Auckland and northern region will need to be redirected through POT in a quick and efficient way to reach Auckland and the northern regions. This may mean a major impact on existing infrastructure and supply chain systems that are currently in place.
This study is critical as an element of risk management, looking at how to mitigate the risk to the greater Auckland region. With the new Super City taking hold, the POAL is a fundamental link in the supply chain to the largest metropolitan area within New Zealand.
At 00:02 on 14 November, 2016 a destructive 7.8 Mw earthquake struck the North Canterbury region of New Zealand’s South Island. Prior to and following the earthquake, natural and social scientists conducted a significant amount of research on the resilience processes and recovery efforts in North Canterbury. This thesis examines community resilience in Kaikōura, a small town and district greatly impacted by the earthquake. Community resilience has been widely used in disaster risk reduction research, policy, and practice to describe how a group of individuals within a boundary respond to events, hazards, and shifts in their everyday life. Using exploratory inquiry, this thesis adopts qualitative research methods including document analysis, 24 semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to explore the idea that the recent scholarly emphasis on resilience has come at the expense of critical engagement with the complexities of communities. I draw on the idea of ‘collectives’ (comprising community-based organisations or less formal social networks with a shared purpose) as a lens to consider how, when unexpected life events happen, collectives can be regarded as a resource for change or constancy. The examination of collectives following a disaster can lend insight into the many elements of community as they bring people together in collaboration or drive them apart in conflict. This thesis therefore contributes to an enhanced practical and theoretical understanding of both community and resilience.
This report focuses on the Waimakariri District Council's approach to earthquake recovery which was developed as an Integrated, Community-based Recovery Framework. This approach has been held up as exemplary in a number of fora and has received a great deal of interest and support both nationally and internationally. It has evolved as a result of the September earthquake and the thousands of aftershocks that have followed, along with the regulatory changes that have impacted on building safety and land availability since, but it builds on a set of pre-existing competencies and a well-established organisational culture that focusses on:
* Working with communities and each other;
* Keeping people informed;
* Doing better everyday;
* Taking responsibility;
* Acting with integrity, honesty and trust.
The report identifies, and speaks to, three themes or tensions drawn from either the disaster/emergency management literature or actual cases of recovery practice observed here in Canterbury over the last 2 years. These themes are the:
1. unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity around both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 2. general consensus that good local government-community relationships are crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 3. balancing Business as Usual (BaU) with recovery issues.Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
The scale of damage from a series of earthquakes across Christchurch Otautahi in 2010 and 2011 challenged all networks in the city at a time when many individuals and communities were under severe economic pressure. Historically, Maori have drawn on traditional institutions such as whanau, marae, hapu and iwi in their endurance of past crises. This paper presents research in progress to describe how these Maori-centric networks supported both Maori and non-Maori through massive urban dislocation. Resilience to any disaster can be explained by configurations of economic, social and cultural factors. Knowing what has contributed to Maori resilience is fundamental to the strategic enhancement of future urban communities - Maori and non-Maori.
This thesis focuses on the role of legal preparedness for managing large-scale urban disasters in Aotearoa New Zealand. It uses the Auckland Volcanic Field as a case study to answer the question: ‘is New Zealand’s current legal framework prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster?’. The Auckland Volcanic Field was chosen as the main case study because a future eruption is a low likelihood, high-impact event that New Zealand is going to have to manage in the future. Case studies are a key feature of this thesis as both New Zealand based and overseas examples are used to explore the role of legal preparedness by identifying and investigating a range of legal issues that need to be addressed in advance of a future Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Of particular interest is the impact of legal preparedness for the recovery phase. The New Zealand case studies include; Canterbury earthquake sequence 2010-2011, the Kaikōura earthquake 2016, the Auckland flooding 2018, and the North Island Severe Weather event 2023, which encompasses both the Auckland Anniversary weekend flooding and Cyclone Gabrielle. As New Zealand has not experienced a large-scale urban volcanic eruption, overseas examples are explored to provide insights into the legal issues that are volcano specific. The overseas volcanic case studies cover eruptions in Heimaey (Iceland), the Soufrière Hills (Montserrat and the Grenadines), La Soufrière (St Vincent) and Tungurahua (Ecuador). New Zealand’s past experiences highlight a trend for introducing post-event legal frameworks to manage recovery. Consequently, the current disaster management system is not prioritising legal preparedness and instead is choosing to rely on exceptional powers. Unsurprisingly, the introduction of new post-event recovery frameworks has repercussions. In New Zealand, new post-event legal frameworks are introduced swiftly under urgency, they contain broad unstructured decision-making powers, and are often flawed. As these exceptional new frameworks sit outside the ‘normal’ legal frameworks, they in effect create a parallel “shadow system”. Based on the evidence explored in this thesis it does not appear that Auckland’s current disaster management framework is prepared to deal with a large-scale urban event caused by an Auckland Volcanic Field eruption. Following this conclusion, it is the submission of this thesis that New Zealand’s current legal framework is not prepared to respond to and recover from a large-scale urban disaster. To become legally prepared, New Zealand needs to consider the legal tools required to manage large-scale urban disasters in advance. This will prevent the creation of a legal vacuum in the aftermath of disasters and the need for new recovery frameworks. Adopting a new attitude will require a change in approach towards legal preparedness which prioritises it, rather than sidelining it. This may also require changes within New Zealand’s disaster management system including the introduction of a formal monitoring mechanism, which will support and prioritise legal preparedness. This thesis has shown that not legally preparing for future disasters is a choice which carries significant consequences. None of these consequences are inevitable when managing large-scale disasters, however they are inevitable when frameworks are not legally prepared in advance. To not legally prepare, is to prepare to fail and thus create a disaster by choice.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the effects of a major disaster on the management of human resources in the construction sector. It sets out to identify the construction skills challenges and the factors that affected skills availability following the 2010/2011 earthquakes in Christchurch. It is hoped that this study will provide insights for on-going reconstruction and future disaster response with respect to the problem of skills shortages. Design/methodology/approach A triangulation method was adopted. The quantitative method, namely, a questionnaire survey, was employed to provide a baseline description. Field observations and interviews were used as a follow-up to ascertain issues and potential shortages over time. Three focus groups in the form of research workshops were convened to gain further insight into the feedback and to investigate the validity and applicability of the research findings. Findings The earthquakes in Christchurch had compounded the pre-existing skills shortages in the country due to heightened demand from reconstruction. Skills shortages primarily existed in seismic assessment and design for land and structures, certain trades, project management and site supervision. The limited technical capability available nationally, shortage of temporary accommodation to house additional workers, time needed for trainees to become skilled workers, lack of information about reconstruction workloads and lack of operational capacity within construction organisations, were critical constraints to the resourcing of disaster recovery projects. Research limitations/implications The research findings contribute to the debate on skills issues in construction. The study provides evidence that contributes to an improved understanding of the industry’s skills vulnerability and emerging issues that would likely exist after a major disaster in a resource-limited country such as New Zealand. Practical implications From this research, decision makers and construction organisations can gain a clear direction for improving the construction capacity and capability for on-going reconstruction. Factors that affected the post-earthquake skills availability can be considered by decision makers and construction organisations in their workforce planning for future disaster events. The recommendations will assist them in addressing skills shortages for on-going reconstruction. Originality/value Although the study is country-specific, the findings show the nature and scale of skills challenges the construction industry is likely to face following a major disaster, and the potential issues that may compound skills shortages. It provides lessons for other disaster-prone countries where the resource pool is small and a large number of additional workers are needed to undertake reconstruction.
In this dissertation it is argued that the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority were both necessary and inevitable given the trends and traditions of civil defence emergency management (CDEM) in New Zealand. The trends and traditions of civil defence are such that principles come before practice, form before function, and change is primarily brought about through crisis and criticism. The guiding question of the research was why were a new governance system and law made after the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010 and 2011? Why did this outcome occur despite the establishment of a modern emergency management system in 2002 which included a recovery framework that had been praised by international scholars as leading edge and a model for other countries? The official reason was the unprecedented scale and demands of the recovery – but a disaster of such scale is the principle reason for having a national emergency management system. Another explanation is the lack of cooperation among local authorities – but that raises the question of whether the CDEM recovery framework would have been successful in another locality. Consequentially, the focus of this dissertation is on the CDEM recovery framework and how New Zealand came to find itself making disaster law during a disaster. Recommendations include a review of emergency powers for recovery, a review of the capabilities needed to fulfil the mandate of Recovery Managers, and the establishment of a National Recovery Office with a cadre of Recovery Managers that attend every recovery to observe, advise, or assume control as needed. CDEM Group Recovery Managers would be seconded to the National Recovery Office which would allow for experience in recovery management to be developed and institutionalised through regular practice.
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the second largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. The extensive slope failure induced by the 22nd February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard model for Canterbury. Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22nd February 2011 earthquake posed risk to life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the immediate aftermath of the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the earthquake. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future response to coseismic slope failure. Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.
Fine grained sediment deposition in urban environments during natural hazard events can impact critical infrastructure and properties (urban terrain) leading to reduced social and economic function and potentially adverse public health effects. Therefore, clean-up of the sediments is required to minimise impacts and restore social and economic functionality as soon as possible. The strategies employed to manage and coordinate the clean-up significantly influence the speed, cost and quality of the clean-up operation. Additionally, the physical properties of the fine grained sediment affects the clean-up, transport, storage and future usage of the sediment. The goals of the research are to assess the resources, time and cost required for fine grained sediment clean-up in an urban environment following a disaster and to determine how the geotechnical properties of sediment will affect urban clean-up strategies. The thesis focuses on the impact of fine grained sediment (<1 mm) deposition from three liquefaction events during the Canterbury earthquake sequence (2010-2011) on residential suburbs and transport networks in Christchurch. It also presents how geotechnical properties of the material may affect clean-up strategies and methods by presenting geotechnical analysis of tephra material from the North Island of New Zealand. Finally, lessons for disaster response planning and decision making for clean-up of sediment in urban environments are presented. A series of semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders supported by relevant academic literature and media reports were used to record the clean-up operation coordination and management and to make a preliminary qualification of the Christchurch liquefaction ejecta clean-up (costs breakdown, time, volume, resources, coordination, planning and priorities). Further analysis of the costs and resources involved for better accuracy was required and so the analysis of Christchurch City Council road management database (RAMM) was done. In order to make a transition from general fine sediment clean-up to specific types of fine disaster sediment clean-up, adequate information about the material properties is required as they will define how the material will be handled, transported and stored. Laboratory analysis of young volcanic tephra from the New Zealand’s North Island was performed to identify their geotechnical properties (density, granulometry, plasticity, composition and angle of repose). The major findings of this research were that emergency planning and the use of the coordinated incident management system (CIMS) system during the emergency were important to facilitate rapid clean-up tasking, management of resources and ultimately recovery from widespread and voluminous liquefaction ejecta deposition in eastern Christchurch. A total estimated cost of approximately $NZ 40 million was calculated for the Christchurch City clean-up following the 2010-2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence with a partial cost of $NZ 12 million for the Southern part of the city, where up to 33% (418 km) of the road network was impacted by liquefaction ejecta and required clearing of the material following the 22 February 2011 earthquake. Over 500,000 tonnes of ejecta has been stockpiled at Burwood landfill for all three liquefaction inducing earthquake events. The average cost per kilometre for the event clean-up was $NZ 5,500/km (4 September 2010), $NZ 11,650/km (22 February 2011) and $NZ 11,185/km (13 June 2011). The duration of clean-up time of residential properties and the road network was approximately two to three months for each of the three liquefaction ejecta events; despite events volumes and spatial distribution of ejecta. Interviews and quantitative analysis of RAMM data revealed that the experience and knowledge gained from the Darfield earthquake (4 September 2010) clean-up increased the efficiency of the following Christchurch earthquake induced liquefaction ejecta clean-up events. Density, particle size, particle shape, clay content and moisture content, are the important geotechnical properties that need to be considered when planning for a clean-up method that incorporates collection, transport and disposal or storage. The geotechnical properties for the tephra samples were analysed to increase preparedness and reaction response of potentially affected North Island cities from possible product from the active volcanoes in their region. The geotechnical results from this study show that volcanic tephra could be used in road or construction material but the properties would have to be further investigated for a New Zealand context. Using fresh volcanic material in road, building or flood control construction requires good understanding of the material properties and precaution during design and construction to extra care, but if well planned, it can be economically beneficial.
The Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 have shone the spotlight on a number of tax issues. These issues, and in particular lessons learned from them, will be relevant for revenue authorities, policymakers and taxpayers alike in the broader context of natural disasters. Issues considered by this paper include the tax treatment of insurance monies. For example, building owners will receive pay-outs for destroyed assets and buildings which have been depreciated. Where the insurance payment is more than the adjusted tax value, there will be a taxable "gain on sale" (or depreciation recovery income). If the building owner uses those insurance proceeds to purchase a replacement asset, legislative amendments specifically enacted following the earthquakes provide that rollover relief of the depreciation recovery income is available. The tax treatment of expenditure to seismically strengthen a building is another significant issue faced by building owners. Case law has determined that this expenditure will usually be capital expenditure. In the past such costs could be capitalised to the building and depreciated accordingly. However, since the 2011-2012 income year owners have been prohibited from claiming depreciation on buildings and therefore currently no deduction is available for such strengthening expenditure (whether immediate or deferred). This has significant potential implications for landlords throughout New Zealand facing significant seismic retrofit costs. Incentives, or some form of financial support, whether delivered through the tax system or some other mechanism may be required. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require insurance proceeds, including reimbursement for expenditure of a capital nature, be reported as income while expenditure itself is not recorded as a current period expense. This has the effect of overstating current income and creating a larger variation between reported income for accounting and taxation purposes. Businesses have obligations to maintain certain business records for tax purposes. Reconstructing records destroyed by a natural disaster depends on how the information was originally stored. The earthquakes have demonstrated the benefits of ‘off-site’ (outside Canterbury) storage, in particular electronic storage. This paper considers these issues and the Inland Revenue Department (Inland Revenue) Standard Practice Statement which deals with inter alia retention of business records in electronic format and offshore record storage. Employer provided accommodation is treated as income to the benefitting employee. A recent amendment to the Income Tax Act 2007 retrospectively provides that certain employer provided accommodation is exempt from tax. The time aspect of these rules is extended where the employee is involved in the Canterbury rebuild and comes from outside the region.
This article argues that active coordination of research engagement after disasters has the potential to maximize research opportunities, improve research quality, increase end-user engagement, and manage escalating research activity to mitigate ethical risks posed to impacted populations. The focus is on the coordination of research activity after the 22nd February 2011 Mw6.2 Christchurch earthquake by the then newly-formed national research consortium, the Natural Hazards Research Platform, which included a social science research moratorium during the declared state of national emergency. Decisions defining this organisation’s functional and structural parameters are analyzed to identify lessons concerning the need for systematic approaches to the management of post disaster research, in collaboration with the response effort. Other lessons include the importance of involving an existing, broadly-based research consortium, ensuring that this consortium's coordination role is fully integrated into emergency management structures, and ensuring that all aspects of decision-making processes are transparent and easily accessed.
The standard way in which disaster damages are measured involves examining separately the number of fatalities, of injuries, of people otherwise affected, and the financial damage that natural disasters cause. Here, we implement a novel way to aggregate these separate measures of disaster impact and apply it to two catastrophic events from 2011: the Christchurch (New Zealand) earthquakes and the Greater Bangkok (Thailand) flood. This new measure, which is similar to the World Health Organization's calculation of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost due to the burden of diseases and injuries, is described in detail in Noy [7]. It allows us to conclude that New Zealand lost 180 thousand lifeyears as a result of the 2011 events, and Thailand lost 2644 thousand lifeyears. In per capita terms, the loss is similar, with both countries losing about 15 days per person due to the 2011 catastrophic events in these two countries.
© This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
The UC CEISMIC Canterbury Earthquakes Digital Archive contains tens of thousands of high value cultural heritage items related to a long series of earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, from 2010 - 2012. The archive was built by a Digital Humanities team located at the center of the disaster in New Zealand's second largest city, Christchurch. The project quickly became complex, not only in its technical aspects but in its governance and general management. This talk will provide insight into the national and international management and governance frameworks used to successfully build and deliver the archive into operation. Issues that needed to be managed included human ethics, research ethics, stakeholder management, communications, risk management, curation and ingestion policy, copyright and content licensing, and project governance. The team drew heavily on industry-standard project management methods for the basic approach, but built their ecosystem and stakeholder trust on principles derived directly form the global digital humanities community.
In response to the February 2011 earthquake, Parliament enacted the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act. This emergency legislation provided the executive with extreme powers that extended well beyond the initial emergency response and into the recovery phase. Although New Zealand has the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, it was unable to cope with the scale and intensity of the Canterbury earthquake sequence. Considering the well-known geological risk facing the Wellington region, this paper will consider whether a standalone “Disaster Recovery Act” should be established to separate an emergency and its response from the recovery phase. Currently, Government policy is to respond reactively to a disaster rather than proactively. In a major event, this typically involves the executive being given the ability to make rules, regulations and policy without the delay or oversight of normal legislative process. In the first part of this paper, I will canvas what a “Disaster Recovery Act” could prescribe and why there is a need to separate recovery from emergency. Secondly, I will consider the shortfalls in the current civil defence recovery framework which necessitates this kind of heavy governmental response after a disaster. In the final section, I will examine how
The world experiences a number of disasters each year. Following a disaster, the affected area moves to a phase of recovery which involves multiple stakeholders. An important element of recovery is planning the rebuild of the affected environment guided by the legislative framework to which planning is bound to (March & Kornakova, 2017). Yet, there appears to be little research that has investigated the role of planners in a recovery setting and the implications of recovery legislative planning frameworks. This study was conducted to explore the role of the planner in the Canterbury earthquake recovery process in New Zealand and the impact of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 (CER Act) on planners’ roles and how they operated.
The methodology comprised a combination of document analysis of legislation and related recovery material and 21 semi-structured interviews with key planners, politicians and professionals involved in the recovery. The results suggest that the majority of planners interviewed were affected by the CER Act in their role and how they operated, although institutional context, especially political constraints, was a key factor in determining the degree of impact. It is argued that planners played a key role in recovery and were generally equipped in terms of skills needed in a recovery setting. In order to better utilise planners in post-disaster recovery or disaster risk management, two suggestions are proposed. Firstly, better promote planners and their capabilities to improve awareness of what planners can do. Secondly, educate and build an understanding between central government politicians and planners over each others role to produce better planning outcomes.
Disasters are often followed by a large-scale stimulus supporting the economy through the built environment, which can last years. During this time, official economic indicators tend to suggest the economy is doing well, but as activity winds down, the sentiment can quickly change. In response to the damaging 2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand, the regional economy outpaced national economic growth rates for several years during the rebuild. The repair work on the built environment created years of elevated building activity. However, after the peak of the rebuilding activity, as economic and employment growth retracts below national growth, we are left with the question of how the underlying economy performs during large scale stimulus activity in the built environment. This paper assesses the performance of the underlying economy by quantifying the usual, demand-driven level of building activity at this time. Applying an Input–Output approach and excluding the economic benefit gained from the investment stimulus reveals the performance of the underlying economy. The results reveal a strong growing underlying economy, and while convergence was expected as the stimulus slowed down, the results found that growth had already crossed over for some time. The results reveal that the investment stimulus provides an initial 1.5% to 2% growth buffer from the underlying economy before the growth rates cross over. This supports short-term economic recovery and enables the underlying economy to transition away from a significant rebuild stimulus. Once the growth crosses over, five years after the disaster, economic growth in the underlying economy remains buoyant even if official regional economic data suggest otherwise.
On September the 4th 2010 and February 22nd 2011
the Canterbury region of New Zealand was shaken by
two massive earthquakes. This paper is set broadly
within the civil defence and emergency management
literature and informed by recent work on community
participation and social capital in the building of resilient
cities. Work in this area indicates a need to recognise
both the formal institutional response to the earthquakes
as well as the substantive role communities play in their
own recovery. The range of factors that facilitate or
hinder community involvement also needs to be better
understood. This paper interrogates the assumption
that recovery agencies and officials are both willing
and able to engage communities who are themselves
willing and able to be engaged in accordance with
recovery best practice. Case studies of three community
groups – CanCERN, Greening the Rubble and Gap
Filler – illustrate some of the difficulties associated
with becoming a community during the disaster
recovery phase. Based on my own observations and
experiences, combined with data from approximately
50 in-depth interviews with Christchurch residents
and representatives from community groups, the
Christchurch City Council, the Earthquake Commission
and so on, this paper outlines some practical strategies
emerging communities may use in the early disaster
recovery phase that then strengthens their ability to
‘participate’ in the recovery process.
Following the September 2010 earthquake and the closure of a number of campus libraries, library staff at the University of Canterbury was forced to rethink how they connected with their users. The established virtual reference service now meant library staff could be contacted regardless of their physical location. After the February earthquake, with University library closures ranging from 3 weeks to indefinite, this service came into its own as a vital communication tool. It facilitated contact between the library and both students and academics, as well as proving invaluable as a means for library staff to locate and communicate with each other. Transcripts from our post-earthquake interactions with users were analyzed using NVivo and will be presented in poster format showing the increase in usage of the service following the earthquakes, who used the service most, and the numbers and types of questions received. Our virtual reference tool was well used in the difficult post-earthquake periods and we can see this usage continuing as university life returns to normal.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.On 2 March 1987 the Bay of Plenty region suffered an earthquake
of magnitude 6.3 on the Richter scale, centred at Edgecumbe.
Severe damage to personal and industrial property and
drainage systems occurred.
In hindsight, although much of the damage was covered by insurance,
loans, public and government contributions, the continuing
reconstruction costs have had a tremendous impact financially
on individuals and the District as a whole.
By highlighting some of these ongoing costs and suggestions of
alternatives other Rural communities may be better prepared to
lessen the effect of a natural disaster such as the Edgecumbe
Earthquake of 1987.
The Canterbury earthquakes, which involved widespread damage in the February 2011 event and ongoing aftershocks near the Christchurch central business district (CBD), presented decision-makers with many recovery challenges. This paper identifies major government decisions, challenges, and lessons in the early recovery of Christchurch based on 23 key-informant interviews conducted 15 months after the February 2011 earthquake. It then focuses on one of the most important decisions – maintaining the cordon around the heavily damaged CBD – and investigates its impacts. The cordon displaced 50,000 central city jobs, raised questions about (and provided new opportunities for) the long-term viability of downtown, influenced the number and practice of building demolitions, and affected debris management; despite being associated with substantial losses, the cordon was commonly viewed as necessary, and provided some benefits in facilitating recovery. Management of the cordon poses important lessons for planning for catastrophic urban earthquakes around the world.
Earthquakes and other major disasters present communities and their authorities with an extraordinary challenge. While a lot can be done to prepare a city’s response in the event of a disaster, few cities are truly prepared for the initial impact, devastation, grief, and the seemingly formidable challenge of recovery. Many people find themselves overwhelmed with facing critical problems; ones which they have often never had experience with before. While the simple part is agreeing on a desired outcome for recovery, it appears the argument that exists between stakeholders is the conflicting ideas of How To effectively achieve the main objective. What I have identified as an important step toward collaborating on the How To of recovery is to identify the ways in which each discipline can most effectively contribute to the recovery. Landscape architecture is just one of the many disciplines (that should be) invovled in the How To of earthquake recovery.
Canterbury has an incredible opportunity to set the benchmark for good practice in earthquake recovery. To make the most of this opportuntiy, it is critical that landscape architects are more effectively engaged in roles of recovery across a much broader spectrum of recovery activities. The overarching purpose of this research is to explore and provide insight to the current and potential of landscape architects in the earthquake recovery period in Canterbury, using international good practice as a benchmark. The research is aimed at stimulating and guiding landscape architects dealing with the earthquake recovery in Canterbury, while informing stakeholders: emergency managers, authorities, other disciplines and the wider community of themost effective role(s) for landscape architects in the recovery period.
The magnitude 7.8 earthquake that struck North Canterbury, on the east coast of New Zealand’s South Island on 14 November 2016 had significant impacts and implications for the community of Kaikōura and surrounding settlements. The magnitude and scope of this event has resulted in extensive and ongoing geological and geophysical research into the event. The current paper complements this research by providing a review of existing social science research and offering new analysis of the impact of the earthquake and its aftermath on community resilience in Kaikōura over the past five years. Results demonstrate the significant economic implications for tourism, and primary industries. Recovery has been slow, and largely dependent on restoring transportation networks, which helped catalyse cooperation among local hospitality providers. Challenges remain, however, and not all sectors or households have benefited equally from post-quake opportunities, and long-term recovery trajectories continue to be hampered by COVID-19 pandemic. The multiple ongoing and future stressors faced by Kaikōura require integrated and equitable approaches in order to build capability and capacity for locally based development pathways to ensure long-term community resilience.
At 4.35am on Saturday 4 September 2010, a magnitude 7.1 earthquake struck near the township of Darfield in Canterbury leading to widespread damage in Christchurch and the wider central Canterbury region. Though it was reported no lives were lost, that was not entirely correct. Over 3,000 animals perished as a result of the earthquake and 99% of these deaths would have been avoidable if appropriate mitigation measures had been in place. Deaths were predominantly due to zoological vulnerability of birds in captive production farms. Other problems included lack of provision of animal welfare at evacuation centres, issues associated with multiple lost and found pet services, evacuation failure due to pet separation and stress impact on dairy herds and associated milk production. The Canterbury Earthquake has highlighted concerns over a lack of animal emergency welfare planning and capacity in New Zealand, an issue that is being progressed by the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Group. As animal emergency management becomes better understood by emergency management and veterinary professionals, it is more likely that both sectors will have greater demands placed upon them by national guidelines and community expectations to ensure provisions are made to afford protection of animals in times of disaster. A subsequent and more devastating earthquake struck the region on Monday 22 February 2011; this article however is primarily focused on the events pertaining to the September 4 event.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event.
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
© 2017 The Royal Society of New Zealand. This paper discusses simulated ground motion intensity, and its underlying modelling assumptions, for great earthquakes on the Alpine Fault. The simulations utilise the latest understanding of wave propagation physics, kinematic earthquake rupture descriptions and the three-dimensional nature of the Earth's crust in the South Island of New Zealand. The effect of hypocentre location is explicitly examined, which is found to lead to significant differences in ground motion intensities (quantified in the form of peak ground velocity, PGV) over the northern half and southwest of the South Island. Comparison with previously adopted empirical ground motion models also illustrates that the simulations, which explicitly model rupture directivity and basin-generated surface waves, lead to notably larger PGV amplitudes than the empirical predictions in the northern half of the South Island and Canterbury. The simulations performed in this paper have been adopted, as one possible ground motion prediction, in the ‘Project AF8’ Civil Defence Emergency Management exercise scenario. The similarity of the modelled ground motion features with those observed in recent worldwide earthquakes as well as similar simulations in other regions, and the notably higher simulated amplitudes than those from empirical predictions, may warrant a re-examination of regional impact assessments for major Alpine Fault earthquakes.
Background: We are in a period of history where natural disasters are increasing in both frequency and severity. They are having widespread impacts on communities, especially on vulnerable communities, those most affected who have the least ability to prepare or respond to a disaster. The ability to assemble and effectively manage Interagency Emergency Response Teams (IERTs) is critical to navigating the complexity and chaos found immediately following disasters. These teams play a crucial role in the multi-sectoral, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary, and inter-organisational response and are vital to ensuring the safety and well-being of vulnerable populations such as the young, aged, and socially and medically disadvantaged in disasters. Communication is key to the smooth operation of these teams. Most studies of the communication in IERTs during a disaster have been focussed at a macro-level of examining larger scale patterns and trends within organisations. Rarely found are micro-level analyses of interpersonal communication at the critical interfaces between collaborating agencies. This study set out to understand the experiences of those working at the interagency interfaces in an IERT set up by the Canterbury District Health Board to respond to the needs of the vulnerable people in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury, New Zealand, in 2010-11. The aim of the study was to gain insights about the complexities of interpersonal communication (micro-level) involved in interagency response coordination and to generate an improved understanding into what stabilises the interagency communication interfaces between those agencies responding to a major disaster. Methods: A qualitative case study research design was employed to investigate how interagency communication interfaces were stabilised at the micro-level (“the case”) in the aftermath of the destructive earthquakes that hit Canterbury in 2010-11 (“the context”). Participant recruitment was undertaken by mapping which agencies were involved within the IERT and approaching representatives from each of these agencies. Data was collected via individual interviews using a semi-structured interview guide and was based on the “Critical Incident Technique”. Subsequently, data was transcribed verbatim and subjected to inductive analysis. This was underpinned theoretically by Weick’s “Interpretive Approach” and supported by Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Results: 19 participants were interviewed in this study. Out of the inductive analysis emerged two primary themes, each with several sub-factors. The first major theme was destabilising/disruptive factors of interagency communication with five sub-factors, a) conflicting role mandates, b) rigid command structures, c) disruption of established communication structures, d) lack of shared language and understanding, and e) situational awareness disruption. The second major theme stabilising/steadying factors in interagency communication had four sub-factors, a) the establishment of the IERT, b) emergent novel communication strategies, c) establishment of a liaison role and d) pre-existing networks and relationships. Finally, there was a third sub-level identified during inductive analysis, where sub-factors from both primary themes were noted to be uniquely interconnected by emergent “consequences” arising out of the disaster context. Finally, findings were synthesised into a conceptual “Model of Interagency Communication at the Micro-level” based on this case study of the Canterbury earthquake disaster response. Discussion: The three key dimensions of The People, The Connections and The Improvisations served as a framework for the discussion of what stabilises interagency communication interfaces in a major disaster. The People were key to stabilising the interagency interfaces through functioning as a flexible conduit, guiding and navigating communication at the interagency interfaces and improving situational awareness. The Connections provided the collective competence, shared decision-making and prior established relationships that stabilised the micro-level communication at interagency interfaces. And finally, The Improvisations i.e., novel ideas and inventiveness that emerge out of rapidly changing post-disaster environments, also contributed to stabilisation of micro-level communication flows across interagency interfaces in the disaster response. “Command and control” hierarchical structures do provide clear processes and structures for teams working in disasters to follow. However, improvisations and novel solutions are also needed and often emerge from first responders (who are best placed to assess the evolving needs in a disaster where there is a high degree of uncertainty). Conclusion: This study highlights the value of incorporating an interface perspective into any study that seeks to understand the processes of IERTs during disaster responses. It also strengthens the requirement for disaster management frameworks to formally plan for and to allow for the adaptive responsiveness of local teams on the ground, and legitimise and recognise the improvisations of those in the role of emergent boundary spanners in a disaster response. This needs to be in addition to existing formal disaster response mechanisms. This study provides a new conceptual model that can be used to guide future case studies exploring stability at the interfaces of other IERTs and highlights the centrality of communication in the experiences of members of teams in the aftermath of a disaster. Utilising these new perspectives on stabilising communication at the interagency interfaces in disaster responses will have practical implications in the future to better serve the needs of vulnerable people who are at greatest risk of adverse outcomes in a disaster.
Though rare and unpredictable, earthquakes can and do cause catastrophic destruction when they impact unprepared and vulnerable communities. Extensive damage and failure of vulnerable buildings is a key factor which contributes to seismic-related disasters, making the proactive management of these buildings a necessity to reduce the risk of future disasters arising. The devastating Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought the urgency of this issue to national importance in New Zealand. The national earthquake-prone building framework came into effect in 2017, obligating authorities to identify existing buildings with the greatest risk of collapse in strong earthquakes and for building owners to strengthen or demolish these buildings within a designated period of time. Though this framework is unique to New Zealand, the challenge of managing the seismic risk of such buildings is common amongst all seismically-active countries. Therefore, looking outward to examine how other jurisdictions legally manage this challenge is useful for reflecting on the approaches taken in New Zealand and understand potential lessons which could be adopted. This research compares the legal framework used to reduce the seismic risk of existing buildings in New Zealand with that of the similarly earthquake-prone countries of Japan and Italy. These legal frameworks are examined with a particular focus on the proactive goal of reducing risk and improving resilience, as is the goal of the international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030. The Sendai Framework, which each of the case study countries have committed to and thus have obligations under, forms the legal basis of the need for states to reduce disaster risk in their jurisdictions. In particular, the states’ legal frameworks for existing building risk reduction are examined in the context of the Sendai priorities of understanding disaster risk, strengthening disaster risk governance, and investing in resilience. While this research illustrates that the case study countries have each adopted more proactive risk reduction frameworks in recent years in anticipation of future earthquakes, the frameworks currently focus on a very narrow range of existing buildings and thus are not currently sufficient for promoting the long-term resilience of building stocks. In order to improve resilience, it is argued, legal frameworks need to include a broader range of buildings subject to seismic risk reduction obligations and also to broaden the focus on long-term monitoring of potential risk to buildings.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the
Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately
35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0
respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some
commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global
insurance event of all time.
These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant
physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and
emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond.
Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses
requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and
significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was
predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki
Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely
physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the
district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of
smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local
government landscape.
This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the
Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed
examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study
looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand
Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected
representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental
agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how
central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them
to their own planning.
It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to
evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the
lessons from WDC.
In this paper, we consider how religious leaders and Civil Defence authorities might collaborate to establish a two-way information conduit during the aftermath of a disaster. Using surveys and in-person interviews, clergy in different Christian denominations were asked about their roles in the earthquake, the needs of their congregations and the possibilities and obstacles to deeper collaboration with Civil Defence authorities.
There are many things that organisations of any size can do to prepare for a disaster or crisis. Traditionally, the advice given to business has focused on identifying risks, reducing their likely occurrence, and planning in advance how to respond. More recently, there is growing interest in the broader concept of organisational resilience which includes planning for crisis but also considers traits that lead to organisational adaptability and ability to thrive despite adverse circumstances. In this paper we examine the policy frameworks1 within New Zealand that influence the resilience of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs). The first part of the paper focuses on the New Zealand context, including the prevailing political and economic ideologies, the general nature of New Zealand SMEs and the nature of New Zealand’s hazard environment. The paper then goes on to outline the key policy frameworks in place relevant to SMEs and hazards. The final part of the paper examines the way the preexisting policy environment influenced the response of SMEs and Government following the Canterbury earthquakes.
