The M7.8 Kaikoura Earthquake in 2016 presented a number of challenges to science agencies and institutions throughout New Zealand. The earthquake was complex, with 21 faults rupturing throughout the North Canterbury and Marlborough landscape, generating a localised seven metre tsunami and triggering thousands of landslides. With many areas isolated as a result, it presented science teams with logistical challenges as well as the need to coordinate efforts across institutional and disciplinary boundaries. Many research disciplines, from engineering and geophysics to social science, were heavily involved in the response. Coordinating these disciplines and institutions required significant effort to assist New Zealand during its most complex earthquake yet recorded. This paper explores that effort and acknowledges the successes and lessons learned by the teams involved.
We present preliminary observations on three waters impacts from the Mw7.8 14th November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake on wider metropolitan Wellington, urban and rural Marlborough, and in Kaikōura township. Three waters systems in these areas experienced widespread and significant transient ground deformation in response to seismic shaking, with localised permanent ground deformation via liquefaction and lateral spreading. In Wellington, potable water quality was impacted temporarily by increased turbidity, and significant water losses occurred due to damaged pipes at the port. The Seaview and Porirua wastewater treatment plants sustained damage to clarifier tanks from water seiching, and increased water infiltration to the wastewater system occurred. Most failure modes in urban Marlborough were similar to the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence; however some rural water tanks experienced rotational and translational movements, highlighting importance of flexible pipe connections. In Kaikōura, damage to reservoirs and pipes led to loss of water supply and compromised firefighting capability. Wastewater damage led to environmental contamination, and necessitated restrictions on greywater entry into the system to minimise flows. Damage to these systems necessitated the importation of tankered and bottled water, boil water notices and chlorination of the system, and importation of portaloos and chemical toilets. Stormwater infrastructure such as road drainage channels was also damaged, which could compromise condition of underlying road materials. Good operational asset management practices (current and accurate information, renewals, appreciation of criticality, good system knowledge and practical contingency plans) helped improve system resilience, and having robust emergency management centres and accurate Geographic Information System data allowed effective response coordination. Minimal damage to the wider built environment facilitated system inspections. Note Future research will include detailed geospatial assessments of seismic demand on these systems and attendant modes of failure, levels of service restoration, and collaborative development of resilience measures.
Surface rupture and slip from the Mw 7.8 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake have been mapped in the region between the Leader and Charwell rivers using field mapping and LiDAR data. The eastern Humps, north Leader and Conway-Charwell faults ruptured the ground surface in the study area. The E-NE striking ‘The Humps’ Fault runs along the base of the Mt Stewart range front, appears to dip steeply NW and intersects the NNW-NNE Leader Fault which itself terminates northwards at the NE striking Conway-Charwell Fault. The eastern Humps Fault is up to the NW and accommodates oblique slip with reverse and right lateral displacement. Net slip on ‘The Humps’ Fault is ≤4 m and produced ≤4 m uplift of the Mt Stewart range during the earthquake. The Leader Fault strikes NNW-NNE with dips ranging from ~10° west to 80° east and accommodated ≤4 m net slip comprising left-lateral and up-to-the-west vertical displacement. Like the Humps west of the study area, surface-rupture of the Leader Fault occurred on multiple strands. The complexity of rupture on the Leader Fault is in part due to the occurrence of bedding-parallel slip within the Cretaceous-Cenozoic sequence. Although the Mt Stewart range front is bounded by ‘The Humps’ Fault, in the study area neither this fault nor the Leader Fault were known to have been active before the earthquake. Fieldwork and trenching investigations are ongoing to characterise the geometry, kinematics and paleoseismic history of the mapped active faults.
Geological research in the immediate aftermath of the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, New Zealand, was necessary due to the importance and perishability of field data. It also reflects a real desire on the part of researchers to contribute not only to immediate scientific understanding but also to the societal recovery effort by enhancing knowledge of the event for the benefit of affected communities, civil defence organizations and regional and national decision makers. This commitment to outreach and engagement is consistent with the recent IAPG statement of Geoethics. More immediately, it was informed by experience of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake sequence. After that earlier disaster, intense interactions between researchers and various response agencies as well as local communities informed the development and dissemination of a set of ethical guidelines for researchers immediately following the Mw7.8 14 November 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. In this presentation, I argue that ethical engagement of this kind is the key to gathering high quality research data immediately after the event. Creating trusting and mutually respectful, mutually beneficial relationships is also vital to ongoing engagement to facilitate further “in depth” research in collaboration with communities.
The Mw 7.8 Kaikōura earthquake ruptured ~200 km at the ground surface across the New Zealand plate boundary zone in the northern South Island. This study was conducted in an area of ~600 km2 in the epicentral region where the faults comprise two main non-coplanar sets that strike E-NE and NNE-NW with mainly steep dips (60о-80°). Analysis of the surface rupture using field and LiDAR data provides new information on the dimensions, geometries and kinematics of these faults which was not previously available from pre-earthquake active faults or bedrock structure. The more northerly striking fault set are sub-parallel to basement bedding and accommodated predominantly left-lateral reverse slip with net slips of ~1 and ~5 m for the Stone Jug and Leader faults, respectively. The E-NE striking Conway-Charwell and The Humps faults accrued right-lateral to oblique reverse with net slips of ~2 and ~3 m, respectively. The faults form a hard-linked system dominated by kinematics consistent with the ~260° trend of the relative plate motion vector and the transpressional structures recorded across the plate boundary in the NE South Island. Interaction and intersection of the main fault sets facilitated propagation of the earthquake and transfer of slip northwards across the plate boundary zone.
Earthquakes are insured only with public sector involvement in high-income countries where the risk of earthquakes is perceived to be high. The proto-typical examples of this public sector involvement are the public earthquake insurance schemes in California, Japan, and New Zealand (NZ). Each of these insurance programs is structured differently, and the purpose of this paper is to examine these differences using a concrete case-study, the sequence of earthquakes that occurred in the Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2011. This event turned out to have been the most heavily insured earthquake event in history. We examine what would have been the outcome of the earthquakes had the system of insurance in NZ been different. In particular, we focus on the public earthquake insurance programs in California (the California Earthquake Authority - CEA), and in Japan (Japanese Earthquake Reinsurance - JER). Overall, the aggregate cost to the public insurer in NZ was $NZ 11.1 billion in its response to the earthquakes. If a similar-sized disaster event had occurred in Japan and California, homeowners would have received $NZ 2.5 billion and $NZ 1.4 billion from the JER and CEA, respectively. We further describe the spatial and distributive patterns of these different scenarios.
