Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to identify through the application of Actor Network Theory (ANT) the issues and impediments to the implementation of mandatory seismic retrofitting policies proposed by the New Zealand Government. In particular the tension between the heritage protection objectives contained in the Resource Management Act 1991 and the earthquake mitigation measures contained in the Building Act 2004 are examined.
Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses a case study approach based on the Harcourts Building in Wellington New Zealand and the case law relating to attempts to demolish this particular building. Use is made of ANT as a 'lens' to identify and study the controversies around mandatory seismic retrofitting of heritage buildings. The concept of translation is used to draw network diagrams.
As a result of the findings and recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Canterbury Earthquake Swarm of 2010-2011 the New Zealand Government has introduced new legislation that will require the mandatory strengthening of all earthquake-prone buildings in New Zealand. An earthquake prone building is currently defined as a building that is less than one third the seismic strength of a new building. If an owner does not wish to strengthen their buildings then they must demolish them. Seismic retrofitting of buildings is a form of property development and as such, the decision to retrofit or not should be based on a robust and soundly conducted feasibility study. Feasibility studies on seismic retrofitting can be particularly challenging for a number of reasons thus making it difficult for owners to make informed and sound decisions relating to their earthquake prone buildings. This paper considers the concept and process of feasibility analysis as applied to earthquake prone buildings and discusses the current challenges posed by such feasibility studies. A number of recommendations are made in an attempt to help develop a best practice model for decision making relating to earthquake prone buildings."
As a result of the Christchurch Earthquake that occurred on 22nd February 2011 and the resultant loss of life and widespread damage, a Royal Commission of Enquiry was convened in April 2011. The Royal Commission recommended a number of significant changes to the regulation of earthquake prone building in New Zealand. Earthquake prone buildings are buildings that are deemed to be of insufficient strength to perform adequately in a moderate earthquake. In response to the Royal Commission recommendations the New Zealand Government carried out a consultative process before announcing proposed changes to the building regulations in August 2013. One of the most significant changes is the imposition of mandatory strengthening requirements for earthquake prone buildings on a national basis. This will have a significant impact on the urban fabric of most New Zealand towns and cities. The type of traditional cost benefit study carried out to date fails to measure these impacts and this paper proposes an alternative methodology based on the analysis of land use data and rating valuations. This methodology was developed and applied to a small provincial town in the form of a case study. The results of this case study and the methodology used are discussed in this paper.
There is a critical strand of literature suggesting that there are no ‘natural’ disasters (Abramovitz, 2001; Anderson and Woodrow, 1998; Clarke, 2008; Hinchliffe, 2004). There are only those that leave us – the people - more or less shaken and disturbed. There may be some substance to this; for example, how many readers recall the 7.8 magnitude earthquake centred in Fiordland in July 2009? Because it was so far away from a major centre and very few people suffered any consequences, the number is likely to be far fewer than those who remember (all too vividly) the relatively smaller 7.1 magnitude Canterbury quake of September 4th 2010 and the more recent 6.3 magnitude February 22nd 2011 event.
One implication of this construction of disasters is that seismic events, like those in Canterbury, are as much socio-political as they are geological. Yet, as this paper shows, the temptation in recovery is to tick boxes and rebuild rather than recover, and to focus on hard infrastructure rather than civic expertise and community involvement. In this paper I draw upon different models of community engagement and use Putnam’s (1995) notion of ‘social capital’ to frame the argument that ‘building bridges’ after a disaster is a complex blend of engineering, communication and collaboration. I then present the results of a qualitative research project undertaken after the September 4th earthquake. This research helps to illustrate the important connections between technical rebuilding, social capital, recovery processes and overall urban resilience.
The earthquakes that struck Ōtautahi/Christchurch began September 2010 and continued throughout2012 with the worse shock being February 22, 2011. The extended ‘seismic event’ radically altered thegeophysical and socio-cultural environments of the city. This working paper presents a broad array of datadescribing the impacts of the disaster on Māori. These data frame the results of small email surveyconducted 18 months after the most destructive February 22, 2011. This survey followed two projectsinvestigating the resilience of Māori to the disaster (Lambert & Mark-Shadbolt, 2011; Lambert & Mark-Shadbolt, 2012; Lambert, Mark-Shadbolt, Ataria, & Black, 2012). Results show that while the termresilience has become common to the point of cliché, the Māori experience thus far is best described asendurance.
