Group case study report prepared for lecturers Ton Buhrs and Roy Montgomery by students of ERST 635 at Lincoln University, 2013.The New Zealand Government’s decision to establish a unitary authority in the Auckland Region has provided much of the context and impetus for this review of current governance arrangements in the Canterbury region, to determine whether or not they are optimal for taking the communities of greater Christchurch into the future. A number of local governance academics, as well as several respected political pundits, have prophesised that the Auckland ‘Super City’ reforms of 2009 will have serious implications and ramifications for local governance arrangements in other major cities, particularly Wellington and Christchurch. Wellington councils have already responded to the possibility of change by undertaking a series of reports on local governance arrangements, as well as a major review led by Sir Geoffrey Palmer, to investigate options for governance reform. Alongside these developments, the Christchurch earthquakes beginning in September 2010 have raised a myriad of new and complex governance issues, which may or may not be able to be addressed under the status quo, while the replacement of Regional Councillors’ with centrally-appointed Commissioners is suggestive of government dissatisfaction with current arrangements. With these things in mind, the research group has considered local government in Canterbury and the greater Christchurch area in the wider governance context. It does not limit discussion to only the structure of local government in Canterbury but rather, as the brief (Appendix 1) indicates, considers more broadly the relationship between central, regional, and local tiers of government, as well as the relationship between local government and local communities.
The focus of this paper is to identify potential benefits of community involvement in master planning in the post-earthquake recovery context in Christchurch; and to identify considerations for planners involved in the design of master planning processes that involve the community. Findings are based on the results of an information sharing event on these topics convened by The Habitat Project in December 2011, and a review of the relevant literature.
The recent earthquakes in Canterbury have left thousands of Christchurch residents’ homeless or facing the possibility of homelessness. The New Zealand Government, so far, have announced that 5,100 homes in Christchurch will have to be abandoned as a result of earthquake damaged land (Christchurch City Council, 2011). They have been zoned red on the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) map and there are another 10,000 that have been zoned orange, awaiting a decision (Christchurch City Council, 2011). This situation has placed pressures on land developers and local authorities to speed up the process associated with the development of proposed subdivisions in Christchurch to accommodate residents in this situation (Tarrant, 2011).
The National Science Challenge ‘Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities’ is currently undertaking work that, in part, identifies and analyses the Waimakariri District Council’s (WMK/Council) organisational practices and process tools. The focus is on determining the processes that made the Residential Red Zone Recovery Plan, 2016 (RRZRP) collaboration process so effective and compares it to the processes used to inform the current Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan - 2028 and Beyond (KTC Plan). This research aims to explore ‘what travelled’ in terms of values, principles, methods, processes and personnel from the RRZRP to the KTC planning process. My research will add depth to this research by examining more closely the KTC Plan’s hearings process, reviewing submissions made, analysing background documents and by conducting five semi-structured interviews with a selection of people who made submissions on the KTC Plan.
The link between community involvement and best recovery outcomes has been acknowledged in literature as well as by humanitarian agencies (Lawther, 2009; Sullivan, 2003). My research has documented WMK’s post-quake community engagement strategy by focusing on their initial response to the earthquake of 2010 and the two-formal plan (RRZRP and KTC Plan) making procedures that succeeded this response.
My research has led me to conclude that WMK was committed to collaborating with their constituents right through the extended post-quake sequence. Iterative face to face or ‘think communications’ combined with the accessibility of all levels of Council staff – including senior management and elected members - gave interested community members the opportunity to discuss and deliberate the proposed plans with the people tasked with preparing them. WMK’s commitment to collaborate is illustrated by the methods they employed to inform their post-quake efforts and plans and by the logic behind the selected methods. Combined the Council’s logic and methods best describe the ‘Waimakariri Way’.
My research suggests that collaborative planning is iterative in nature. It is therefore difficult to establish a specific starting point where collaboration begins as the relationships needed for the collaborative process constantly (re)emerge out of pre-existing relationships. Collaboration seems to be based on an attitude, which means there is no starting ‘point’ as such, rather an amplification for a time of a basic attitude towards the public.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the
Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately
35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0
respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some
commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global
insurance event of all time.
These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant
physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and
emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond.
Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses
requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and
significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was
predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki
Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely
physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the
district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of
smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local
government landscape.
This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the
Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed
examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study
looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand
Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected
representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental
agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how
central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them
to their own planning.
It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to
evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the
lessons from WDC.
Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes Christchurch is undergoing extensive development on the periphery of the city. This has been driven in part by the large numbers of people who have lost their homes. Prior to the earthquakes, Christchurch was already experiencing placeless subdivisions and now these are being rolled out rapidly thanks to the efficiency of a formula that has been embraced by the Council, developers and the public alike. However, sprawling subdivisions have a number of issues including inefficient land use, limited housing types, high dependence on motor vehicles and low levels of resilience and no sense of place. Sense of place is of particular interest due to its glaring absence from new subdivisions and its growing importance in the literature.
Research shows that sense of place has benefits to our feeling of belonging, well-being, and self-identity, particularly following a disaster. It improves the resilience and sustainability of our living environment and fosters a connection to the landscape thereby making us better placed to respond to future changes. Despite these benefits, current planning models such as new urbanism and transit-oriented design tend to give sense of place a low priority and as a result it can get lost. Given these issues, the focus of this research is “can landscape driven sense of place drive subdivision design without compromising on other urban planning criteria to produce subdivisions that address the issues of sprawl, as well as achieving the benefits associated with a strong sense of place that can improve our overall quality of life?”
Answering this question required a thorough review of current urban planning and sense of place literature. This was used to critique existing subdivisions to gain a thorough understanding of the issues. The outcomes of this led to extensive design exploration which showed that, not only is it possible to design a subdivision with sense of place as the key driver but by doing this, the other urban planning criteria become easier to achieve.
The city of Ōtautahi/Christchurch experienced a series of earthquakes that began on September 4th, 2010. The most damaging event occurred on February 22nd, 2011 but significant earthquakes also occurred on June 13th and December 23rd with aftershocks still occurring well into 2012. The resulting disaster is the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history with 185 deaths. During 2011 the Canterbury earthquakes were one of the costliest disasters worldwide with an expected cost of up to $NZ30 billion.
Hundreds of commercial buildings and thousands of houses have been destroyed or are to be demolished and extensive repairs are needed for infrastructure to over 100,000 homes. As many as 8,900 people simply abandoned their homes and left the city in the first few months after the February event (Newell, 2012), and as many as 50,000 may leave during 2012. In particular, young whānau and single young women comprised a disproportionate number of these migrants, with evidence of a general movement to the North Island.
Te Puni Kōkiri sought a mix of quantitative and qualitative research to examine the social and economic impacts of the Christchurch earthquakes on Māori and their whānau. The result of this work will be a collection of evidence to inform policy to support and assist Māori and their whānau during the recovery/rebuild phases. To that end, this report triangulates available statistical and geographical information with qualitative data gathered over 2010 and 2011 by a series of interviews conducted with Māori who experienced the dramatic events associated with the earthquakes.
A Māori research team at Lincoln University was commissioned to undertake the research as they were already engaged in transdisciplinary research (began in the May 2010), that focused on quickly gathering data from a range of Māori who experienced the disaster, including relevant economic, environmental, social and cultural factors in the response and recovery of Māori to these events.
Participants for the qualitative research were drawn from Māori whānau who both stayed and left the city. Further data was available from ongoing projects and networks that the Lincoln research team was already involved in, including interviews with Māori first responders and managers operating in the CBD on the day of the February event. Some limited data is also available from younger members of affected whānau.
Māori in Ōtautahi/Christchurch City have exhibited their own culturally-attuned collective responses to the disaster. However, it is difficult to ascertain Māori demographic changes due to a lack of robust statistical frameworks but Māori outward migration from the city is estimated to range between 560 and 1,100 people.
The mobility displayed by Māori demonstrates an important but unquantified response by whānau to this disaster, with emigration to Australia presenting an attractive option for young Māori, an entrenched phenomenon that correlates to cyclical downturns and the long-term decline of the New Zealand economy. It is estimated that at least 315 Māori have emigrated from the Canterbury region to Australia post-quake, although the disaster itself may be only one of a series of events that has prompted such a decision.
Māori children made up more than one in four of the net loss of children aged 6 to 15 years enrolled in schools in Greater Christchurch over the year to June 2011. Research literature identifies depression affecting a small but significant number of children one to two years post-disaster and points to increasing clinical and organisational demands for Māori and other residents of the city.
For those residents in the eastern or coastal suburbs – home to many of the city’s Māori population - severe damage to housing, schools, shops, infrastructure, and streets has meant disruption to their lives, children’s schooling, employment, and community functioning. Ongoing abandonment of homes by many has meant a growing sense of unease and loss of security, exacerbated by arson, burglaries, increased drinking, a stalled local and national economy, and general confusion about the city’s future.
Māori cultural resilience has enabled a considerable network of people, institutions, and resources being available to Māori , most noticeably through marae and their integral roles of housing, as a coordinating hub, and their arguing for the wider affected communities of Christchurch.
Relevant disaster responses need to be discussed within whānau, kōhanga, kura, businesses, communities, and wider neighbourhoods. Comprehensive disaster management plans need to be drafted for all iwi in collaboration with central government, regional, and city or town councils.
Overall, Māori are remarkably philosophical about the effects of the disaster, with many proudly relishing their roles in what is clearly a historic event of great significance to the city and country. Most believe that ‘being Māori’ has helped cope with the disaster, although for some this draws on a collective history of poverty and marginalisation, features that contribute to the vulnerability of Māori to such events.
While the recovery and rebuild phases offer considerable options for Māori and iwi, with Ngāi Tahu set to play an important stakeholder in infrastructural, residential, and commercial developments, some risk and considerable unknowns are evident. Considerable numbers of Māori may migrate into the Canterbury region for employment in the rebuild, and trades training strategies have already been established.
With many iwi now increasingly investing in property, the risks from significant earthquakes are now more transparent, not least to insurers and the reinsurance sector. Iwi authorities need to be appraised of insurance issues and ensure sufficient coverage exists and investments and developments are undertaken with a clear understanding of the risks from natural hazards and exposure to future disasters.
The quality of public space is vital to livable cities. Yet livable cities also require empowered communities. This thesis asks: how is the landscape architect’s design expertise expressed as part of the public participation process, what are the key features of design expertise that lead to an effective design-based participation process and how does quality in the participation process relate to the quality of design outcomes? A theoretical framework is developed from which to clarify the relationship between decision-making processes in design and public participation. Insights from design theory are combined with the findings of key informant interviews with New Zealand and Northern Europe design experts, and with landscape architects, community and Council staff working in post-earthquake Ōtautahi/Christchurch, Aotearoa/New Zealand. Results of a case study of Albion Square in Ōhinehou/Lyttelton reveal that the designer’s interactions with the public play a critical role in shaping elegant design outcomes in public space design. Four key insights reveal that participatory design processes in New Zealand need to be reconsidered in order to enable landscape architects to work more closely with communities in mutual learning, rather than the currently limiting technical problem solving process. Institutional, professional and theoretical implications are drawn from the findings.
Brooklands Lagoon / Te Riu o Te Aika Kawa (‘Brooklands’) is an important wetland and estuarine ecosystem in Canterbury. It is a site of cultural significance to Ngāi Tūāhuriri, and is also valued by the wider community. Home to an array of life, it is connected to the Pūharakekenui/Styx and Waimakariri rivers, and is part of a wetland landscape complex that includes the Avon-Heathcote / Ihutai estuary to the south and the Ashley / Rakahuri estuary to the north. Notionally situated within the territorial boundary of Christchurch City Council and jurisdictionally encompassed by the regional council Environment Canterbury, it has been legally determined to be part of the coastal marine area. The complicated administrative arrangements for the lagoon mirror the biophysical and human challenges to this surprisingly young ecosystem since its formation in 1940.
Here we present a synthesis of the historical events and environmental influences that have shaped Brooklands Lagoon. Before existing as an intertidal ecosystem, the Waimakariri river mouth was situated in what is now the southern end of the lagoon. A summary timeline of key events is set out in the table below. These included the diversion of the Waimakariri River mouth via the construction of Wrights Cut in the 1930s, which influenced the way that the lower reaches of the river interacted with the land and sea. A large flood in 1940 shifted the river mouth ~2 to 3 kilometres north, that created the landscape that we see today. However, this has not remained stable, as the earthquake sequence in 2010 and 2011 subsided the bed of the estuary.
The changes are ongoing, as sea level rise and coastal inundation will place ongoing pressure on the aquatic ecosystem and surrounding land. How to provide accommodation space for Brooklands as an estuary will be a key planning and community challenge, as Environment Canterbury begins the engagement for the review of its Regional Coastal Plan. There is also a requirement to safeguard its ecological health under the 2020 National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management. This will necessitate an integrated mountains to sea (ki uta ki tai) management approach as the lagoon is affected by wider catchment activities. We hope that this report will contribute to, and inform these processes by providing a comprehensive historical synthesis, and by identifying considerations for the future collaborative management of Brooklands Lagoon, and protection of its values. In essence, we suggest that Te Riu o Te Aika Kawa deserves some sustained aroha.
Environmental assessment in New Zealand is governed by the provisions of the Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991. The Act requires persons wishing to undertake certain activities to apply for resource consent from their local or regional council - a procedure termed the Resource Consent Process. The key component of a resource consent application is an Assessment of Environmental Effects (AEE) report; a statement of the environmental effects of a proposed activity.
Problems arise when environmental assessments are complicated by uncertain and abnormal circumstances such as natural hazards. Natural hazards (including earthquakes, floods, tsunami, and coastal erosion) can be catastrophic to an environment. If hazards are not avoided or successfully mitigated, they can result in serious consequences to proposed development and to the environment which the proposal relates. The aim of this study is to assess the adequacy of the resource consent process (as outlined in the Resource Management Act 1991) for dealing with proposed development affected by natural hazards.
This study reviews the context of the resource consent process for dealing with natural hazards to identify potential issues in the assessment process. Guidance criteria for assessing natural hazards (termed Natural Hazard Assessment) are developed to evaluate against two resource consent applications affected by natural hazards. The findings of the consent process review and case study evaluation are discussed to determine the adequacy of the consent process for dealing with natural hazards.
From the review of the consent process it was evident that the process has a number of problems for accommodating natural hazards into the assessment. Although many important traits are provided for in the process, such traits are not always reflected in environmental assessments.
Evaluation of two resource consent applications against the process of Natural Hazard Assessment (NHA) showed that these consent applications did not adequately detail key information relating to natural hazards. Many problems evident in these applications were not amended by the Consent Authorities in the review process and subsequently consent was granted to information-deficient applications. Problematic issues identified in this study include:
• A distinct lack of guidance (legal or otherwise) for the applicant and Consent Authority regarding the boundaries of inclusion of an effect;
• Deficiencies in planning documents are reflected in AEE reports, the review of the consent application and in the end-decision;
• Under-utilisation of "experts" throughout the consent process;
• Minimal identification and account for the degree of uncertainty throughout the consent process;
• Resource consents are being granted even though information in consent applications, and the means for assessing the information is deficient.
These issues reflect that decisions are not being made based on all elements involved in a potential hazard. Subsequently, the resource consent process is not adequate for dealing with all aspects of natural hazards.
The Natural Hazard Assessment process provides educated assessment criteria to assess development affected by natural hazards. By accounting for the problems evident in the consent process, the introduction of a three-tier identification, risk and vulnerability assessment, and evaluation process to account for uncertainties, Natural Hazard Assessment provides a platform for a thorough assessment of natural hazards. The application of the principles of Natural Hazard Assessment to the consent applications affected by natural hazards showed that many key issues were not covered in the assessment under the consent process.
The nature of a natural event is that one may not occur in a given region over many lifetimes, however they will occur at some stage and planning and environmental assessment needs to provide for the associated hazards. Implementation of Natural Hazard Assessment is needed to help provide answers for the problems experienced in the resource consent process. Natural Hazard Assessment would allow decision-makers to make informed judgements on the situation at hand, leading to better planning and land-use options.
Change to current practice is needed, as following the current path of environmental assessment will be the hazard in the end.
