There is growing expectation that local volunteers will play a more integrated role in disaster response, yet emergent groups are often ‘outsiders’ to crisis management, prompting questions of the conditions and processes by which these groups can forge relationships with established response agencies, and the tensions which can arise those interactions. This article analyses how student-led volunteers, as an emergent group, nevertheless gained “authority to operate” in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 earthquakes in Canterbury, New Zealand. Our study demonstrates how established response agencies and emergent groups can form hugely impactful and mutually supportive relationships. However, our analysis also points to two interrelated tensions that can arise, regarding the terms by which emergent groups are recognised, and the ‘distance’ considered necessary between emergent groups and established response agencies. The discussion considers implications for inclusiveness, risk and responsibility if emergent volunteers are to be further integrated into disaster response.
The New Zealand Kellogg Rural Leaders Programme develops emerging agribusiness leaders to help shape the future of New Zealand agribusiness and rural affairs. Lincoln University has been involved with this leaders programme since 1979 when it was launched with a grant from the Kellogg Foundation, USA.At 4.35am on 4th September 2010, Canterbury was hit by an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the
Richter scale. On 22nd February 2011 and 13th June 2011 a separate fault line approximately
35km from the first, ruptured to inflict two further earthquakes measuring 6.3 and 6.0
respectively. As a direct result of the February earthquake, 181 people lost their lives. Some
commentators have described this series of earthquakes as the most expensive global
insurance event of all time.
These earthquakes and the more than 7000 associated aftershocks have had a significant
physical impact on parts of Canterbury and virtually none on others. The economic, social and
emotional impacts of these quakes spread across Canterbury and beyond.
Waimakariri district, north of Christchurch, has reflected a similar pattern, with over 1400 houses
requiring rebuild or substantial repair, millions of dollars of damage to infrastructure, and
significant social issues as a result. The physical damage in Waimakiriri District was
predominately in parts of Kaiapoi, and two small beach settlements, The Pines and Kairaki
Beach with pockets elsewhere in the district. While the balance of the district is largely
physically untouched, the economic, social, and emotional shockwaves have spread across the
district. Waimakariri district consists of two main towns, Rangiora and Kaiapoi, a number of
smaller urban areas and a larger rural area. It is considered mid-size in the New Zealand local
government landscape.
This paper will explore the actions and plans of Waimakiriri District Council (WDC) in the
Emergency Management Recovery programme to provide context to allow a more detailed
examination of the planning processes prior to, and subsequent to the earthquakes. This study
looked at documentation produced by WDC, applicable legislation and New Zealand
Emergency Management resources and other sources. Key managers and elected
representatives in the WOC were interviewed, along with a selection of governmental and nongovernmental
agency representatives. The interview responses enable understanding of how
central Government and other local authorities can benefit from these lessons and apply them
to their own planning.
It is intended that this paper will assist local government organisations in New Zealand to
evaluate their planning processes in light of the events of 2010/11 in Canterbury and the
lessons from WDC.
This report focuses on the Waimakariri District Council's approach to earthquake recovery which was developed as an Integrated, Community-based Recovery Framework. This approach has been held up as exemplary in a number of fora and has received a great deal of interest and support both nationally and internationally. It has evolved as a result of the September earthquake and the thousands of aftershocks that have followed, along with the regulatory changes that have impacted on building safety and land availability since, but it builds on a set of pre-existing competencies and a well-established organisational culture that focusses on:
* Working with communities and each other;
* Keeping people informed;
* Doing better everyday;
* Taking responsibility;
* Acting with integrity, honesty and trust.
The report identifies, and speaks to, three themes or tensions drawn from either the disaster/emergency management literature or actual cases of recovery practice observed here in Canterbury over the last 2 years. These themes are the:
1. unique position of local government to undertake integrated or ‘holistic’ recovery work with community at the centre, versus the lack of clarity around both community and local government’s role in disaster recovery; 2. general consensus that good local government-community relationships are crucial to recovery processes, versus the lack of practical advice on how best to engage, and engage with, communities post-disaster; and 3. balancing Business as Usual (BaU) with recovery issues.Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management.
This report presents the experiences of Tangata Whaiora (Mental health clients) through the disastrous earthquakes that struck Otautahi/Christchurch in 2010-11. It further analysis these experience to how show the social networks these individuals, their whānau, supporting staff respond and recover to a significant urban disaster.
The disaster challenged the mental health of those individuals who are impacted and the operations of organisations and networks that support and care for the mentally ill. How individuals and their families navigate a post-disaster landscape provides an unfortunate but unique opportunity to analyse how these support networks respond to severe disruption.
Tangata Whaiora possess experiences of micro-scale personal and family disasters and were not necessarily shocked by the loss of normality in Ōtautahi as a result of the earthquakes. The organic provision of clear leadership, outstanding commitment by staff, and ongoing personal and institutional dedication in the very trying circumstances of working in a post-disaster landscape all contributed to Te Awa o te Ora’s notable response to the disaster.
There is strong consensus in the civil defence and emergency management literature that public participation is essential for a 'good' recovery. However, there is a paucity of research detailing how this community-led planning should be carried out in the real world. There are few processes or timelines for communities to follow when wanting to plan for themselves, nor is there a great deal of advice for communities who want to plan for their own recovery. In short, despite this consensus that community involvement is desireable, there is very little information available as to the nature of this involvement or how communities might facilitate this. It is simply assumed that communities are willing and able to participate in the recovery process and that recovery authorities will welcome, encourage, and enable this participation. This is not always the case, and the result is that community groups can be left feeling lost and ineffective when trying to plan for their own recovery.
In attempting to address this gap, my study contributes to a better understanding of community involvement in recovery planning, based on research with on particular a community group (SPRIG), who has undertaken their own form of community-led planning in a post-disaster environment. Through group observations and in-depth interviews with members of SPRIG, I was able to identify various roles for such groups in the post-disaster recovery process. My research also contributes to an enhanced understanding of the process a community group might follow to implement their own form of post-disaster recovery planning, with the main point being that any planning should be done side by side with local authorities. Finally, I discovered that a community group will face organisational, community and institutional challenges when trying to plan for their area; however, despite these challenges, opportunities exist, such as the chance to build a better future.
The National Science Challenge ‘Building Better Homes, Towns and Cities’ is currently undertaking work that, in part, identifies and analyses the Waimakariri District Council’s (WMK/Council) organisational practices and process tools. The focus is on determining the processes that made the Residential Red Zone Recovery Plan, 2016 (RRZRP) collaboration process so effective and compares it to the processes used to inform the current Kaiapoi Town Centre Plan - 2028 and Beyond (KTC Plan). This research aims to explore ‘what travelled’ in terms of values, principles, methods, processes and personnel from the RRZRP to the KTC planning process. My research will add depth to this research by examining more closely the KTC Plan’s hearings process, reviewing submissions made, analysing background documents and by conducting five semi-structured interviews with a selection of people who made submissions on the KTC Plan.
The link between community involvement and best recovery outcomes has been acknowledged in literature as well as by humanitarian agencies (Lawther, 2009; Sullivan, 2003). My research has documented WMK’s post-quake community engagement strategy by focusing on their initial response to the earthquake of 2010 and the two-formal plan (RRZRP and KTC Plan) making procedures that succeeded this response.
My research has led me to conclude that WMK was committed to collaborating with their constituents right through the extended post-quake sequence. Iterative face to face or ‘think communications’ combined with the accessibility of all levels of Council staff – including senior management and elected members - gave interested community members the opportunity to discuss and deliberate the proposed plans with the people tasked with preparing them. WMK’s commitment to collaborate is illustrated by the methods they employed to inform their post-quake efforts and plans and by the logic behind the selected methods. Combined the Council’s logic and methods best describe the ‘Waimakariri Way’.
My research suggests that collaborative planning is iterative in nature. It is therefore difficult to establish a specific starting point where collaboration begins as the relationships needed for the collaborative process constantly (re)emerge out of pre-existing relationships. Collaboration seems to be based on an attitude, which means there is no starting ‘point’ as such, rather an amplification for a time of a basic attitude towards the public.
The city of Ōtautahi/Christchurch experienced a series of earthquakes that began on September 4th, 2010. The most damaging event occurred on February 22nd, 2011 but significant earthquakes also occurred on June 13th and December 23rd with aftershocks still occurring well into 2012. The resulting disaster is the second deadliest natural disaster in New Zealand’s history with 185 deaths. During 2011 the Canterbury earthquakes were one of the costliest disasters worldwide with an expected cost of up to $NZ30 billion.
Hundreds of commercial buildings and thousands of houses have been destroyed or are to be demolished and extensive repairs are needed for infrastructure to over 100,000 homes. As many as 8,900 people simply abandoned their homes and left the city in the first few months after the February event (Newell, 2012), and as many as 50,000 may leave during 2012. In particular, young whānau and single young women comprised a disproportionate number of these migrants, with evidence of a general movement to the North Island.
Te Puni Kōkiri sought a mix of quantitative and qualitative research to examine the social and economic impacts of the Christchurch earthquakes on Māori and their whānau. The result of this work will be a collection of evidence to inform policy to support and assist Māori and their whānau during the recovery/rebuild phases. To that end, this report triangulates available statistical and geographical information with qualitative data gathered over 2010 and 2011 by a series of interviews conducted with Māori who experienced the dramatic events associated with the earthquakes.
A Māori research team at Lincoln University was commissioned to undertake the research as they were already engaged in transdisciplinary research (began in the May 2010), that focused on quickly gathering data from a range of Māori who experienced the disaster, including relevant economic, environmental, social and cultural factors in the response and recovery of Māori to these events.
Participants for the qualitative research were drawn from Māori whānau who both stayed and left the city. Further data was available from ongoing projects and networks that the Lincoln research team was already involved in, including interviews with Māori first responders and managers operating in the CBD on the day of the February event. Some limited data is also available from younger members of affected whānau.
Māori in Ōtautahi/Christchurch City have exhibited their own culturally-attuned collective responses to the disaster. However, it is difficult to ascertain Māori demographic changes due to a lack of robust statistical frameworks but Māori outward migration from the city is estimated to range between 560 and 1,100 people.
The mobility displayed by Māori demonstrates an important but unquantified response by whānau to this disaster, with emigration to Australia presenting an attractive option for young Māori, an entrenched phenomenon that correlates to cyclical downturns and the long-term decline of the New Zealand economy. It is estimated that at least 315 Māori have emigrated from the Canterbury region to Australia post-quake, although the disaster itself may be only one of a series of events that has prompted such a decision.
Māori children made up more than one in four of the net loss of children aged 6 to 15 years enrolled in schools in Greater Christchurch over the year to June 2011. Research literature identifies depression affecting a small but significant number of children one to two years post-disaster and points to increasing clinical and organisational demands for Māori and other residents of the city.
For those residents in the eastern or coastal suburbs – home to many of the city’s Māori population - severe damage to housing, schools, shops, infrastructure, and streets has meant disruption to their lives, children’s schooling, employment, and community functioning. Ongoing abandonment of homes by many has meant a growing sense of unease and loss of security, exacerbated by arson, burglaries, increased drinking, a stalled local and national economy, and general confusion about the city’s future.
Māori cultural resilience has enabled a considerable network of people, institutions, and resources being available to Māori , most noticeably through marae and their integral roles of housing, as a coordinating hub, and their arguing for the wider affected communities of Christchurch.
Relevant disaster responses need to be discussed within whānau, kōhanga, kura, businesses, communities, and wider neighbourhoods. Comprehensive disaster management plans need to be drafted for all iwi in collaboration with central government, regional, and city or town councils.
Overall, Māori are remarkably philosophical about the effects of the disaster, with many proudly relishing their roles in what is clearly a historic event of great significance to the city and country. Most believe that ‘being Māori’ has helped cope with the disaster, although for some this draws on a collective history of poverty and marginalisation, features that contribute to the vulnerability of Māori to such events.
While the recovery and rebuild phases offer considerable options for Māori and iwi, with Ngāi Tahu set to play an important stakeholder in infrastructural, residential, and commercial developments, some risk and considerable unknowns are evident. Considerable numbers of Māori may migrate into the Canterbury region for employment in the rebuild, and trades training strategies have already been established.
With many iwi now increasingly investing in property, the risks from significant earthquakes are now more transparent, not least to insurers and the reinsurance sector. Iwi authorities need to be appraised of insurance issues and ensure sufficient coverage exists and investments and developments are undertaken with a clear understanding of the risks from natural hazards and exposure to future disasters.
