The recent earthquakes in Canterbury have left thousands of Christchurch residents’ homeless or facing the possibility of homelessness. The New Zealand Government, so far, have announced that 5,100 homes in Christchurch will have to be abandoned as a result of earthquake damaged land (Christchurch City Council, 2011). They have been zoned red on the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) map and there are another 10,000 that have been zoned orange, awaiting a decision (Christchurch City Council, 2011). This situation has placed pressures on land developers and local authorities to speed up the process associated with the development of proposed subdivisions in Christchurch to accommodate residents in this situation (Tarrant, 2011).
High rise developments dominate skylines and are contentious in many low rise urban environments. Christchurch is no exception and its residents have historically been vocal in articulating their opinions on matters they care about, especially in regard to projects they perceive will ruin their ‘garden city’. At the turn of the millennium, developers were preparing yet another proposal which would get the tongues wagging in Christchurch with the development of the former Ferrymead Tavern site on Ferry Road. The planning process was a long and antagonistic one with many individuals viewing the built towers with a look of ‘disgust’ and discontent. In an ironic twist, the seismic activity in Christchurch over the last few years which has had major implications for a range of planning issues, incrementally led to the death of highly controversial Ferrymead ‘Water’s Edge’ Apartments.
The major earthquakes of 2010 and 2011 brought to an abrupt end a process of adaptive reuse, revitalisation and gentrification that was underway in the early 20th century laneways and buildings located in the south eastern corner of the Christchurch Central Business District. Up until then, this location was seen as an exemplar of how mixed use could contribute to making the central city an attractive and viable alternative to the suburban living experience predominant in New Zealand.
This thesis is the result of a comprehensive case study of this “Lichfield Lanes” area, which involved in depth interviews with business owners, observation of public meetings and examination of documents and the revitalisation research literature. Findings were that many of the factors seen to make this location successful pre-earthquakes mirror the results of similar research in other cities. These factors include: the importance of building upon historic architecture and the eclectic spaces this creates; a wide variety of uses generating street life; affordable rental levels; plus the dangers of uniformity of use brought about by focussing on business types that pay the most rent. Also critical is co-operation between businesses to create and effectively market and manage an identifiable precinct that has a coherent style and ambience that differentiates the location from competing suburban malls. In relation to the latter, a significant finding of this project was that the hospitality and retail businesses key to the success of Lichfield Lanes were not typical and could be described as quirky, bohemian, chaotic, relatively low rent, owner operated and appealing to the economically important “Creative Class” identified by Richard Florida (2002) and others. In turn, success for many of these businesses can be characterised as including psychological and social returns rather than simply conventional economic benefits. This has important implications for inner city revitalisation, as it contrasts with the traditional focus of local authorities and property developers on physical aspects and tenant profitability as measures of success. This leads on to an important conclusion from this research, which is that an almost completely inverted strategy from that applied to suburban mall development, may be most appropriate for successful inner city revitalisation. It also highlights a disconnection between the focus and processes of regulatory authorities and the outcomes and processes most acceptable to the people likely to frequent the central city. Developers are often caught in the middle of this conflicted situation. Another finding was early commitment by businesses to rebuild the case study area in the same style, but over time this waned as delay, demolition, insurance problems, political and planning uncertainty plus other issues made participation by the original owners and tenants impossible or uneconomic. In conclusion, the focus of inner city revitalisation is too often on buildings rather than the people that use them and what they now desire from the central city.
Successful urban regeneration projects generate benefits that are realised over a much longer timeframe than normal market developments and benefits well beyond those that can be uplifted by a market developer. Consequently there is substantial evidence in the literature that successful place-making and urban regeneration projects are usually public-private partnerships and involve a funder, usually local or central government, willing to contribute ‘patient’ capital. Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes that devastated the centre of Christchurch, there was an urgent need to rebuild and revitalise the heart of the city, and increasing the number of people living in or near the city centre was seen as a key ingredient of that. In October 2010, an international competition was launched to design and build an Urban Village, a project intended to stimulate renewed residential development in the city. The competition attracted 58 entrants from around world, and in October 2013 the winning team was chosen from four finalists. However the team failed to secure sufficient finance, and in November 2015 the Government announced that the development would not proceed. The Government was unwilling or unable to recognise that an insistence on a pure market approach would not deliver the innovative sustainable village asked for in the competition brief, and failed to factor in the opportunity cost to government, local government, local businesses and the wider Christchurch community of delaying by many years the residential development of the eastern side of the city. As a result, the early vision of the vitality that a thriving residential neighbourhood would bring to the city has not yet been realised.
Prior to the devastating 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, parts of the CBD of Christchurch, New Zealand were undergoing revitalisation incorporating aspects of adaptive reuse and gentrification. Such areas were often characterised by a variety of bars, restaurants, and retail outlets of an “alternative” or “bohemian” style. These early 20th century buildings also exhibited relatively low rents and a somewhat chaotic and loosely planned property development approach by small scale developers. Almost all of these buildings were demolished following the earthquakes and a cordon placed around the CBD for several years. A paper presented at the ERES conference in 2013 presented preliminary results, from observation of post-earthquake public meetings and interviews with displaced CBD retailers. This paper highlighted a strongly held fear that the rebuild of the central city, then about to begin, would result in a very different style and cost structure from that which previously existed. As a result, permanent exclusion from the CBD of the types of businesses that previously characterised the successfully revitalised areas would occur. Five years further on, new CBD retail and office buildings have been constructed, but large areas of land between them remain vacant and the new buildings completed are often having difficulty attracting tenants. This paper reports on the further development of this long-term Christchurch case study and examines if the earlier predictions of the displaced retailers are coming true, in that a new CBD that largely mimics a suburban mall in style and tenancy mix, inherently loses some of its competitive advantage?
Following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes Christchurch is undergoing extensive development on the periphery of the city. This has been driven in part by the large numbers of people who have lost their homes. Prior to the earthquakes, Christchurch was already experiencing placeless subdivisions and now these are being rolled out rapidly thanks to the efficiency of a formula that has been embraced by the Council, developers and the public alike. However, sprawling subdivisions have a number of issues including inefficient land use, limited housing types, high dependence on motor vehicles and low levels of resilience and no sense of place. Sense of place is of particular interest due to its glaring absence from new subdivisions and its growing importance in the literature.
Research shows that sense of place has benefits to our feeling of belonging, well-being, and self-identity, particularly following a disaster. It improves the resilience and sustainability of our living environment and fosters a connection to the landscape thereby making us better placed to respond to future changes. Despite these benefits, current planning models such as new urbanism and transit-oriented design tend to give sense of place a low priority and as a result it can get lost. Given these issues, the focus of this research is “can landscape driven sense of place drive subdivision design without compromising on other urban planning criteria to produce subdivisions that address the issues of sprawl, as well as achieving the benefits associated with a strong sense of place that can improve our overall quality of life?”
Answering this question required a thorough review of current urban planning and sense of place literature. This was used to critique existing subdivisions to gain a thorough understanding of the issues. The outcomes of this led to extensive design exploration which showed that, not only is it possible to design a subdivision with sense of place as the key driver but by doing this, the other urban planning criteria become easier to achieve.
During the 21st century, New Zealand has experienced increasing public concern over the quality of the design and appearance of new developments, and their effects on the urban environment. In response to this, a number of local authorities developed a range of tools to address this issue, including urban design panels to review proposals and provide independent advice. Following the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquake sequence, the commitment to achieve high quality urban design within Christchurch was given further importance, with the city facing the unprecedented challenge of rebuilding a ‘vibrant and successful city’.
The rebuild and regeneration reinforced the need for independent design review, putting more focus and emphasis on the role and use of the urban design panel; first through collaboratively assisting applicants in achieving a better design outcome for their development by providing an independent set of eyes on their design; and secondly in assisting Council officers in forming their recommendations on resource consent decisions. However, there is a perception that urban design and the role of the urban design panel is not fully understood, with some stakeholders arguing that Council’s urban design requirements are adding cost and complexity to their developments.
The purpose of this research was to develop a better understanding on the role of the Christchurch urban design panel post-earthquake in the central city; its direct and indirect influence on the built environment; and the deficiencies in the broader planning framework and institutional settings that it might be addressing. Ultimately, the perceived role of the Panel is understood, and there is agreement that urban design is having a positive influence on the built environment, albeit viewed differently amongst the varying groups involved. What has become clear throughout this research is that the perceived tension between the development community and urban design well and truly exists, with the urban design panel contributing towards this. This tension is exacerbated further through the cost of urban design to developers, and the drive for financial return from their investments.
The panel, albeit promoting a positive experience, is simply a ‘tick box’ exercise for some, and as the research suggests, groups or professional are determining themselves what constitutes good urban design, based on their attitude, the context in which they sit and the financial constraints to incorporate good design elements. It is perhaps a bleak time for urban design, and more about building homes.
